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SYNOPSIS

SILENCED MANIFESTO: AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHY OF LIVING
WITH SCHIZOAFFECTIVE DISORDER

7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS

I have been living with schizoaffective disorder for over twenty years. In that time, I have had
periods of relative wellness and relative illness. I fight each battle as it comes. I am trying to win
my latest battle through my Doctor of Philosophy studies.

This thesis takes the form of an anthropological study of mental health. Specifically, an
autoethnography of living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled
as a lesser human, and understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it.
While the thesis devolves from my unique viewpoint, the autoethnographic methodology that
underpins its hypothesis, research, analysis and conclusions bear witness to the common
experience of the mental health community.

I have seven lesions in my brain. It is ironic because these lesions have no function or purpose.
This disappoints me to no end. According to my neurologist, they are useless and do not affect
9

or cause the schizoaffective disorder that has plagued me for so long. My neurologist states that
the lesions would not have been discovered if not for a continuing growing medical culture of
measurement, which seems to justify an ethos which disempowers those with a major psychotic
illness.

By coincidence, I hear seven voices; often discordant voices.

As a person living with

schizoaffective disorder, I am aware of at least seven voices in my own head, all which conflict
with the person I am now and the person I want to be. In this thesis, I extend my study of the
poly vocal world of my disorder, to position myself within an extension of the multiple voices of
the health and medical systems that now control my life.

In homage to this accidental theme, other chapters follow the ‘seven’ edicts. I take seven drugs
that deal with the side effects of the other three therapeutic drugs. I have also included a chapter
of seven stories, as artefacts, furthering my autoethnography of what life is like living with
schizoaffective disorder. To finish, the conclusion of the thesis is written in seven subsections,
following on and expanding from statements posed in the thesis introduction.

My autoethnography of living with a major psychotic illness is a journey through diagnosis,
institutionalisation and attempts at reintegration. Ultimately, it is a story of transformation in a
profoundly negative sense of the word; how my life has been stripped bare by my illness and the
institutions which now control it. I explore how the biomedical lens of psychiatry views me and
how it positions what I can and cannot do and be. I explore the experience of being tested and
measured. I explore how biomedicine has the capacity to stigmatise and de-humanise people
10

with mental health conditions, but also how difficult it is to resist the definitions and labels
imposed upon me. In a sense biomedicine tries to measure the unmeasurable, and use crafted
measurements to define and confine subjects, as in the mentally ill, often inappropriately and
over-zealously.

By looking at the ways I have been labelled, and by understanding that labelling as a function of
the scientific culture that crafts it and the social culture that validates it, I examine this hypothesis:
that psychiatric science rests on a self-vindicating ethos of clinical measurement and consequent
labelling which perpetuates mental illness. From this, this thesis sets out to break through the
glass ceiling and straight jacket of the labelling, to enable the silenced to be heard, better
understood and empowered. This is here called the Silenced Manifesto.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THESIS

7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS

“I am now convinced I am disabled. I am coming to believe that I am all the labels people
are bestowing on me. I am lacking. I am stupid. I am powerless. I am silenced.” (Field
notes 24th March 2012)

In this chapter I will be hypothesising my thesis.

I have seven lesions on my brain. Apparently, they are there but they do not do anything, nor
have done anything in the past. The neurologist calls the condition ‘functional neurological
symptoms’. I get spasms, mostly in my arms and legs. I especially have trouble standing up and
getting out of cars. I have a 30% chance of developing multiple sclerosis with my condition.
This upsets me somewhat because I was hoping to have an answer and gain some relief from my
mental health prison.

I hear about seven voices. They are both male and female, all ages, different tones. The voices,
or ‘noises’ as I call them, are quiet when I am well, and not so when I am unwell. When I am
unwell, they shout at me. They say things like, “You are so bloody stupid!”; “You are hopeless
and worthless!”; “No one will ever like you and definitely never love you!”; “I hate you!”; “Die
12

bitch die!”; “You good for nothing sap on society!”; “I will find the slowest way to kill
you…bitch!”; “You mother fucking waste of space!”; “You’re not even worth the energy that I
am spending to talk to you…. Fuck you…!!”

The seven stories, to be detailed at the end of the thesis, describe seven experiences I have had
in recent times. They are all harrowing accounts of my life with schizoaffective disorder. It
seems that the label of schizoaffective disorder, like other mental health conditions, cannot be
shaken. The culture I am embedded in has perpetuated and endorsed my labelling. I find that I
am in fact, lacking.

I have adopted an anthropological study of mental health. Specifically, an autoethnography of
my living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled as a lesser
human, and understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it.

There are five statements underpinning this thesis:
1. I live with schizoaffective disorder. I am labelled as such, as per medical science. I have
been measured to affirm this label.
2. I am defined by Westernised biomedical and psychiatric values, and indeed the values of
the broader community who have faith in science, perpetuating my labelling.
3. This labelling and culture perpetuating defines me as a sub-human, sub-citizen, and/or
social misfit. I am stigmatised.
4. I will always be lacking… in the context of the disempowered and perpetual role of
(post)colonialism.
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5. There is the need to put together a strong theoretical framework to move forward. Critical
theory will be explored, to destabilise the dominant biomedical model.

Schizoaffective disorder is basically having schizophrenia with an additional affective side. That
is, having issues with reality and perceptions of reality, including hearing things such as voices,
with a dash of depression and anxiety.

Being Crazy

Throughout this thesis, I banter with the term ‘crazy’. I also use the terms ‘madness’ and ‘sick’
interchangeably, and in jest. The reason why I rely on terms, particularly ‘craziness’, is to
introduce and provoke and request another level of understanding of what it is like living with a
major psychotic disorder. By encouraging a different and another level of understanding, through
jest and a black sense of humour, I hope to relate to others, both the sane and insane. The liberty
of using poetic licence through humour, as permitted with the methodology of autoethnography,
provides a more complex and multifaceted understanding of the experience of living with
schizoaffective disorder. Indeed, by using the term ‘crazy’, I am also challenging the labelling
of the mentally ill with the terms sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit.

A premise of this autoethnography is that it is a reappropriation. A reappropriation is the cultural
process by which a group reclaims terms or artefacts that were previously used in a way
disparaging of that group. (Reappropriation n.d.) Reappropriation is assumed throughout this
thesis. With a deconstruction of schizoaffective disorder, along my autoethnographic journey, I
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have developed a unique insight and profound understanding into the strange alternate world of
the ‘crazy’, as labelled by me.

I must emphasise the significance of my fragmented writing. It is a style that is a side effect, as
it were, of my chaotic and broken and divided mind. It is difficult enough to describe a reality
coherently in a single language, yet I am translating the realities of seven noises yelling at me.
My fragmented writing reflects my craziness. There is not one filter siphoning my thought
processes. My mind does not operate unilaterally. It operates multilaterally, a multiplicity that
screams at me, assaulting my mind at the same time. And this fragmentation is not always
explained well by me. In order to reduce confusion, both for my readers and for myself, I try
and take small steps in my explanations, trying to unpack as I go, carefully, to try and make my
thought processes clear for everyone. Without these attempts of clarity, this thesis would be an
untranscribable mess. All I can hope for is the readers’ patience with my transcribing. The
existence of fragmentation in this autoethnography is data in itself. It is a method of thinking, an
expression, a logic. Fragmented writing is an expression of a fragmented mind. It is a reflection
of trying to understand a way of thinking that can give a voice to the silenced. Let this be called
a paradigmatic method for which to better understand my crazy head.

Whilst in psychiatric wards, I’ve known a man in his 50s claiming to be seven months pregnant
with Jesus Christ. There was also a senior officer in the armed forces cowering behind a cubby
house he built out of a coffee table, magazines, dolls and teddies, claiming to be a king in the
kingdom he built, and the dolls and teddies were his minions. Though what really broke my
heart was when I was in hospital the first time. My brother and his wife were trying to get me to
hold their new baby. All I could do was hide behind chairs in the corner of the room, sobbing,
15

uncontrollably. I wish I could have held the dear little one and expressed my love. I really regret
that. I was powerless from the psychosis. It is times like this that I hate my illness; times which
starve me of the love I have for my friends and family. The process of reappropriation unpacked
in this autoethnography empowers me to be heard; empowers the birth of the language of the
Silenced Manifesto

I have written an autoethnography

Central and pivotal to this thesis is its methodology. I have written an autoethnography. The
fundamental story and reflection of my lived experience is depicted in the details of what it is
like to see what I see and to hear what I hear. What I must tell is vital in the understanding of
living with a major psychotic illness. Developing an autoethnography brings together the worlds
of science, culture, art and emotion. Not a melting pot, or an act of assimilation, rather an
autoethnography tries to make commensurable what has previously and possibly been
incommensurable. I bring together language and discourse to be transferable and translatable. I
attempt to cut through the powerful colonial hegemony and empower the silenced.

Exploring theoretical underpinnings – critical theory and (post)colonialism

The term (post)colonialism is phrased as such, with parenthesis, because some theorists question
whether there has been an end to colonialism the first time around. Aboriginal activist Bobbi
Sykes asked at an academic conference on (post)colonialism, “What? (Post)colonialism? Have
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they left” (Smith 1999: 25)?

As such, in this thesis, postcolonialism will be termed

(post)colonialism (Smith 1999).

Science may be a tool of colonialism, and the concept of mental illness can be likened to
(post)colonialism. It is directly related to my experience of living with a major psychotic illness.
I am controlled, defined and silenced by the politics of the colonisers, in this case and for example
the realm of biomedical science. Thus, the Silenced Manifesto.

The Silenced Manifesto is a fluid cultural concept. Using the method of autoethnography, culture
is essentially a malleable tool for defining and understanding the self, and the self in comparison
to the Other. The fluidity of culture allows for the production of knowledge in a world where
there is no absolute truth. The fluidity of culture disallows the traditionalist older view of a static
culture which is limited by boundedness, timelessness, and homogeneity – such a static view of
culture is quickly adopted by hegemony, which of course is a tool of colonialism (Abu-Lughod
1991: 143)

Cultural interpretation and understanding are the fundamental purpose of anthropology. Culture
depicts a certain sense of identity construct which is constantly under definitional duress. This
duress becomes the fight of the Silenced Manifesto, where culture and identity are forever
changing; forever negotiating; forever struggling to find a voice, a voice that can be heard.

It is at this early point in my study that I need to identify and position myself definitionally; in
an intellectual position and how this relates to my own socialisation. I need to answer the
17

question, “Who am I?”, especially “Who am I, despite my mental illness?”. I go into detail about
my life history and life before craziness in chapters four and five, but here I can say that, drawing
on feminist theory and queer theory, and the poetic and artistic cues that such critical theory
allows, I can situate myself within an identity and history. I am from English/Irish Catholic
descent – from the third fleet to Australia in 1791. I had a Catholic education, was one of seven
children, from a single income family where my father earnt the family’s wage. I have a
commitment to social justice issues, thus my valuing human rights and the essential importance
of cultural wealth. Although I have a family history of association with Australia’s first
colonisers, I feel as if I have been colonised myself.

I feel like I have been disempowered by the colonising government where my voice is not heard
despite my yelling and screaming. I am silenced. So when I am describing the Silenced
Manifesto throughout this thesis, I am not only influenced by the cultural power play of living
with schizoaffective disorder, I am also situated within the creation and dynamics of other
cultures I am socialised into, for example, from being a cis woman, Caucasian, 46 years of age,
post graduate anthropology student, Catholic, heterosexual, and monolingual. My experience
of living with schizoaffective disorder can be better placed with an understanding of these
sub/cultures I am socialised into.

I am a part of the Silenced Manifesto; defined by and hidden behind a dominant and
discriminating discourse. The discourse is punitive as it does not allow for the language or
expression of those living with a psychotic illness. The discourse disallows and disempowers
agency for the marginalised, supporting a form of punitive discourse that promotes the
subjugation of the sub-humans, sub-citizens and social misfits, and promotes inequality, both
overtly and covertly.
18

The term, ‘subaltern’, considered by Spivak (1988) to be the colonised, can be likened to the
culturally crafted identities of sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit discussed in this thesis.
The subaltern has been colonised and suffocated by the colonisers’ dominant ideologies.
(Post)colonialism is strongly represented in this thesis as a theoretical tool of analysis because,
as part of critical theory, it significantly represents the space of the marginalised group.

Within a space for commensurability comes a message from the marginalised, those living with
mental illness; where there is a site of creativity and power; where the mentally ill recover; where
we meet in solidarity to erase the categories of colonized/colonizer. As hooks (1990: 152) states,
“Marginality is the space [site] of resistance. Enter that space. Let us meet there. Enter that space.
We greet you as liberators”. Forms of possible disempowerment for the colonised subordinated
subject is to give up their knowledge for the use of the Western academic. Forms of possible
empowerment and remittance for the colonised include using the coloniser's tools of language
and discourse (hooks 1984).

Labels perpetuated by culture

I aim in this thesis, firstly, to unpack my experience of living with schizoaffective disorder. I
will pull apart, excruciate, examine, study, analyse, extrapolate and compile my experience of
living with schizoaffective disorder, and how my being labelled within the science of mental
health defines me and confines me.
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When considering the cultural identities of sub-human, sub-citizen and social misfit, I cannot
ignore the importance of labelling theory. Durkheim was the first social theorist to discuss
labelling theory in Suicide (1897). Labelling theory came into its own in the 1960s and 1970s,
around the same time that critical theory (including (post)colonisation) became more significant
in the social science vernacular. Goffman (1963) also contributed to labelling theory in his
discussion of stigma. Scheff introduced labelling theory to the construct of mental illness in
1966. Scheff (1974) also discussed the stigma of the mentally ill and how identifying as mentally
ill is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you are labelled as lacking, you will be treated as lacking, and
identify yourself as lacking, and become lacking.

The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are crafted by society and given identity by
society. This is done via the labels that individuals are given by society. Some labels result in
harmful effects, such as the conformity of deviance and the reappropriation and perpetuation of
stigma. These labels are enabled, empowered and perpetuated by society. The negative effects
of labelling, the naming and assumptions, are internalised by the individual so that they adopt
the negative influence of the labelling. Importantly, in this case, the individuals self-actualise
and learn to accept and identify as a sub-human, sub-citizen, social misfit.

In this autoethnography, I will explore what it is like to be labelled and categorised and
stigmatised as sub-human, sub-citizen and/or a social misfit, culturally crafted identities which
have been applied to the mentally ill. These terms are very close in definition and should be
understood as supporting each other. And they need to be defined first. Sub-humans are defined
as those not granted full human status in society in that they are deemed to lack the capacity to
participate in society. Aristotle claimed that to be human is to be social (Colaner 2012). Indeed,
Scheff (1974) claimed that mental health is a social construct. To be sub-human negates the
20

fundamental social nature of humankind. They display behaviour that is going against what is
the norm of social and cultural behaviour (Scheff 1974).

“Human beings are social creatures. We are social not just in the trivial sense that we like
company, and not just in the obvious sense that we each depend on others. We are social in
a more elemental way: simply to exist as a normal human being requires interaction with
other people”.
Atul Gawande (2014)

Sub-citizens, very similar to subhumans, do not participate fully as citizens of the state, not from
their own choice. For example, sub-citizens do not fully contribute to society, politically or
economically. Sub-citizens do not always vote or play an active role in the governance of society.
Nor does the sub-citizen participate in the economy, by having a job or actively seeking work.
The concept of sub-citizen is in relation to the State or nation (Matute 2018).

A social misfit is a person who does not fit into society. There is no room for them. They do not
adhere to the public values and behaviour of the socially kept and powerful. They are rejected
and not tolerated. Their behaviour is labelled as anti-social. They are outcasts of society (Allman
2013). It is not uncommon that people living with a mental illness with their anti-social behaviour
are homeless – and in being so rather public. Those who do not want to have their space
infiltrated by anti-social behaviour do not want to see the mentally ill homeless person in their
public space. They label such people as social misfits, and commonly the social misfits are
admitted to psychiatric wards. They are silenced and hidden by the mental health system. Where
else are they to go?
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Measurement is a tool that labels. In considering measurement and diagnosis as cultural
phenomena, and considering measurement as a labelling tool, one asks, what do these
measurements represent and how does measurement act to label mental illness? There is a magic
of representation displayed in measurement – and at the same time a violence of writing, and a
violence of measurement (Said 1978; Smith 1999). As such, mental health measurements
perpetuate a culture which ultimately leads to a crisis of representation (Smith 1999).

Measurement can be both liberating and/or disempowering. Measurement, for me, has defined
and confined me, for example, through my diagnosis. What are the tools of diagnosis, the tools
that measure sanity? And what are the broader significance of these measurements? I have found
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myself, through measurement, being associated with a certain type of categorisation. Some
perspectives on these are addressed in my medical notes (see chapters five through nine).

Diagnoses via scientific magical evaluation (Lea 2008) may be defined as and perpetuated by the
culture/s of madness, and/or vice versa. An analysis of diagnosis is somewhat legitimised by
the banter and negotiation between the mentally ill and mental health professionals. Diagnosis
is the ultimate in labelling and categorisation. It is reliant on measurement and categories that
perpetuates culture and stigma.

The psychological measurements in these testings have significance to anthropology. According
to Lea (2008), they come to life as a series of numbers, cultural artefacts and ‘factoids’. Lea
(2008) defines a factoid as a fact negotiated and influenced by the socio-cultural, economic and
political context from which it was derived—definably subjective rather than objective. A
generator of factoids is rather controversial, not least because researchers treat factoids as if they
are objective measures. Some advocates of the psychometric tools explored in this thesis hold
great hope of them being a useful measure for representing the needs and possible treatment of
the mentally ill (Lea 2008). (See chapter ten.)

Measurement is a cultural phenomenon, including the cultural phenomenon of a somewhat
universal application of maths and science, for example, how far one metre is and how many four
is. Socially crafted facts are measurements of culture which are used to validate and demonstrate
the success of measurable activities, such as sporting events or government elections. And
measurements can be essential in evaluating more esoteric phenomena, such as measuring and
assessing abstruse cultural activities, such as labelling and identity formation. Measurements
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come wrapped up in an enchanting and captivating consequence of numbers. The cultural
practice of measurement is quite profound and enticing for those who respect and adhere to an
ultimate scientific, measurement mandate – a mandate entwined in the rational, governing
society, and its culture (Lea 2008). Ultimately, however, despite the persistence of and respect
of science, one is left to ponder, can we really measure the seemingly unmeasurable?

“To some people original thought is a medical condition that leads to migraines”
Rassool Jibraeel Snyman (c. 2017)

Culture perpetuating labels

The second part of the thesis focuses on an analysis of the culture/s which perpetuates these
aforementioned categories and labels. The significance of stigma and all the issues addressed in
this thesis is supported by autoethnographic data. In this way, I will examine the significance of
culture, politics and economics.
psychiatry.

I will investigate cultural analysis and measurement in

I will also theorise how measurement relates to the colonisation (or

(post)colonisation) of the mentally ill, much like colonialism being associated with racism.

Culture may be defined as the dynamics of values, norms, beliefs, boundaries, meanings, and
importantly power negotiations bestowed on a social structure. Within the culture that sets
boundaries of values and norms from which structured society is confined, culture defines those
with a mental health disorder.
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Culture is fundamental to power. In fact, culture is fundamentally about power. Culture tells the
story of the most influential and how they became so formidable. Then how they use their
strength and effectiveness to keep them in significant positions through which they can continue
to dominate others. When the discourses of culture are in the hands of the underdog, the power
distribution shifts, even if only briefly (Richard 2008: 1724). It is because of this relationship
between culture and power that the sub-humans/sub-citizens/social misfits are excluded,
marginalised and rejected because of the part of the robustness of the dominant culture.

Considering the purpose of psychiatry, as a form of medical science, it is to gain a scientific grasp
of mental illness and of healing the mentally ill. Psychiatry also plays a cultural role, defining
those with mental health disorders as a type of social class, a class that is defined as lacking.
Similar treatment was assigned to women, homosexuals and Indigenous peoples, who were
hunted and imprisoned and some were killed like vermin (Smith 1999: 28). The psycho-metric
assessment tools measuring me are socio-political technology fact-creating tools which aid in the
governmentality of the unwell and the social misfits.

Some psycho-metric testing measurements have proven to be highly significant
anthropologically, that is, in the cultural context of (dis)empowerment of the mentally ill.
Today’s mental health institutions and hospitals are all about measuring and judging and
surveillance. The mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural tools of
modern psychiatry, are all about measuring and judging deviance (Foucault 1961).

This

measurement leads me to say that I am in servitude to medical science and will be for as long as
I am crazy, which will most likely be until I die.
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The mentally ill are stigmatised as a form of outcasts. They are not full humans nor full citizens
– they are people who don’t belong and are unwanted. This disdain is precipitated and justified
by various policies of cultural significances and control, in the name of managing ‘anti-social
behaviour’ and with people classed as ‘stigmatised’ (McMahon 2017).

There is an assumed a priori knowledge that psychiatric inpatients and/or community patients
are lacking or in deficit in some way and need intervention and support. There is currently a
political commitment to deal with the ‘mental health issue’ in Australia, more so due to Professor
Patrick McGorry, a mental health advocate, being declared Australian of the Year in 2010.
McGorry campaigned for the government and community to address complex socio-cultural
issues of the mentally ill to lessen the degree of stigma related to this marginalised group. The
political issue of mental health is made more perplexing by considering mental health policy and
government bureaucracy. Mental health political and bureaucratic infrastructure is complex and
bewildering. (ABC News 2010)
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The utilisation of measurement results in knowledge production. Measurement tools, for
example cognitive functioning tests (discussed at length in later chapters), become an objective
instrument of governance, producing practices of knowability and justifying the expenditure for
program continuance and policy valuation and implementation. The assessment process creates
a space for knowledge production, a formation of political technology where the act of
‘measurement’ forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance.
Which brings one to question, who owns the knowledge of the crazy?

These cultural spaces in all their facets have affected me, defined me, and labelled me. In this
culture I don’t seem to have a choice. As a young woman (when I was diagnosed), it was through
the culture of medical science that my identity was set. This identity construct, being defined for
me, has disempowered me and brought me great shame as a sub-human.

A cultural space of the State is exemplified by my dependence on the State for the supply of a
drug called Clozapine. Clozapine is an anti-psychotic drug that treats to some degree those who
have been non-responsive to treatment with other anti-psychotic drugs. To be eligible for
Clozapine, I needed to have a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder or schizophrenia. As part of
taking Clozapine, I must consent to being measured and ‘poked and prodded’ monthly. Also, at
least every two months, I must see a psychiatrist. Seeing a psychiatrist so often, and more if
needed, is free of charge. This is an absolute luxury. Clozapine is very expensive, but the public
system covers the cost, for now. The cost of taking Clozapine in addition to all the other
medications I must take comes to approximately 12% of my total wages. This is medication
alone, not including important services such as primary health care and allied health
professionals. If the government decides to stop subsidising Clozapine, I simply could not afford
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the treatment. So, ultimately, at the whim of government policy, my health can be taken away
at any minute. And it will, so the gossip at the Clozapine clinic tells me.

The alternate to taking Clozapine is frightful. I may still be in the throes of psychosis. I am
highly dependent on the drug. I don’t know what I would do without it. The possibility of not
taking it due to cost is appalling. There are undercurrents of fear and terribleness in a highly
dependent community. Despite the horrific side effects, I am tied, glued, attached and entwined
to biomedicine.

How is my thesis different?

Mental illness is a highly stigmatised phenomenon. In Australia, as with many developed
countries, people may be sectioned, or civilly committed, against their will because an
appropriate public servant, medical officer, such as a General Practitioner GP) or senior mental
health professional, judges and perceives an individual to be a danger to themselves and/or to
others (Testa & West 2010). Although many authors have attempted to explore the world of the
mentally ill, their ‘voices’ are external, and in many cases (see Biehl 2005) they struggle to enter
the worlds of the people they are working with. In this thesis I am attempting something different.
I am presenting an autoethnography of my own mental health experience. This is my own
account of the struggles that I have trying to make sense of my world. The experiences of my
day-to-day life living with schizoaffective order include negotiating with multiple and conflicting
noises, heightened paranoia, disassociation and negotiating with the here and now, extreme
anxiety and often a depressed mood.
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This thesis explores areas of mental health in a way that no one else has done. Others have
authored autoethnographies on aspects of health (Ellis 2004; DiaGiacomo 1999), yet, no one has
written an autoethnography before with such insight into the depths as experienced by the person
living with schizoaffective disorder. This thesis is unique in that it illustrates life through the
eyes of someone with insight. With the gift of insight - that is the ability to be significantly selfreflective - I can give a rare and raw perspective of what it is like to live with a major psychotic
illness and be suffocated with the disability it bestows upon me. Perhaps others can relate.
Perhaps others can learn and benefit from my study and sharing of this.

My autoethnography is important as it gives a voice to those living with schizoaffective disorder,
through the lens of one. Previously, such an insight into the patients’ experience and perspective
did not exist. Previously, the only voices being heard in the culture concerning mental health
were those employed and engaged with the bio-medical model.

The mental health

participants/participants are those who are silenced and disempowered. This thesis gives a voice
to the silenced, through me. With due diligence, through my inception of the conception of the
Silenced Manifesto, I have aided the silenced to now be heard, better understood and empowered.

Filling in the gaps

The phenomena of mental illness are categorised. How am I, living with schizoaffective disorder,
understood and defined and labelled, by the broader cultural space? How is this explored through
the lens of an autoethnographer?

This thesis explores the phenomena of living with
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schizoaffective disorder and the labels that are bestowed upon me. These are the labels of subhuman, sub-citizen, and social misfit. Labelling theory allows for a greater understanding of how
labels are perpetuated by culture.

Other people living with a major psychotic illness could share my experience. As this study is
an autoethnography, the sample size is one, me. Through my experiences, I can provide a lens
through which to examine and realise the culture that enculturates me.

As this is an

anthropological study, I will focus on the analysis of the culture/s which perpetuates how it is to
live with a major psychotic disorder.

What are the culture/s that perpetuate this labelling? How is the experience of culture negotiated?
What are my experiences of the culture/s being perpetuated and negotiated? I have been stuck
and oppressed within my diagnosis and the perceived appropriate treatment I need to have, as
per mental health professionals’ decree.

The suffocation of my expression, my thoughts, my essence is perhaps the most disabling
experience of my life. And I wish I could say that it happened only once. Rather, such stifling
and suppression is embedded in psychiatry, for everyone. Further, and a highly significant issue,
is the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health participants receive when they
are an already marginalised and subjugated group. To extrapolate, mental ill health is overrepresented in the homeless, the social misfits (Sullivan et al 2000).
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I delineate the cultural as defining the importance of what is social, and at the same time I would
delineate the social as structuring what is cultural. Only a systemic analysis can come to terms
with this quality of culture that escapes the individual’s control (Hacking 1999: 15). I am
interested in the exercise of power within culture and the social body (Foucault 1982; Kleinman
1988: 25)

Outline of thesis

This thesis begins with a synopsis. Then this introduction, chapter one. Here I begin by depicting
a hypothesis and address for the thesis in the form of five statements. Chapter two sets the
approach of the thesis which aligns the methodological and theoretical scene. I also explain why
I chose the methodological tool of autoethnography, and how this tool best fits a study that places
the researcher in the middle of the query.

As this thesis relies considerably on Foucauldian

concepts, a historical discussion is essential. There are two chapters based on history. Chapter
three situates the discussion as part of a history of madness. The fourth chapter concentrates and
situates the historical discussion from an individual perspective, my perspective. This chapter,
more specifically, displays my own history of madness and my own experience of living with
schizoaffective disorder.

Chapters five through nine are five specific autoethnographic chapters. Chapter five focuses on
my life up until the first of the three psychiatric ward admissions – ‘Life before’. The three
admissions focussed on here are dated from 2012 to 2014. Chapter six gives an autoethnographic
account of when I became acutely unwell and was admitted into the first ward out of three, Ward
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A (public)– in 2012. Chapter seven gives an autoethnographic account of my admission and stay
in Ward B (public)– in 2013. Chapter eight gives an autoethnographic account of my admission
and stay in Ward C (private)– in 2014. Chapter nine, ‘Life after’, unpacks how I now manage
my mental health, utilising skills and techniques I have picked up over the twenty plus years of
living with a major psychotic illness.

The analysis chapters are in three parts. The first, chapter ten, concentrates on measurement. It
describes how psychiatry, and consequent psychiatric diagnoses can be legitimised through the
art of measurement. Chapter eleven describes and emphasises the stigmatised position that I
continue to face; the irony and injustice of trying to live a normal life in a culture that labels me
as sub-human and a sub-citizen, as seemingly incompetent and not fitting in the hegemonic ‘sane’
world. Chapter twelve follows on with an analysis of labelling and the culture that perpetuates
it. This involves a study of stigma, history, governmentality and theory. Here the concept of the
Silenced Manifesto, a concept I discovered, continues to be discussed and examined.

The conclusion, chapter thirteen, summarises and reviews the findings of my autoethnography,
as completely as such a thing can be done.

The glossary, chapter fourteen, concludes the autoethnography.

These fourteen chapters (plus the synopsis) represent for me both an intellectual searching and
a critical time of personal exploration. There are illustrations throughout developed by Bridget
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Rauch. The use of Rauch’s drawings represents my intention here is to change society not just
interpret or write about it. Only an autoethnographic methodology can assist me with this.

Yet always, why is there monitoring, measuring and medicating? Always. (Biel 2005)
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CHAPTER TWO

SETTING THE SCENE – METHODOLOGY AND THEORY

“Honest autoethnographic exploration generates a lot of fears and self-doubt and
emotional pain. Just when you think you can't stand the pain anymore that's when the
real work begins. Then there is the vulnerability of revealing yourself, not being able to
take back what you 've written or having any control over how readers interpret your
story.”
Carolyn Ellis (2004)

When considering autoethnography, there is a sample size of one. One subject to explore,
explain, extrapolate, and to exhaust. One subject to unpack and repack, deconstruct and
reconstruct, and to understand and be confused by. Through the one the many are understood; as
through an autoethnography a culture is enlightened.

Neither a simple narrative nor an

autobiography, the one ethnographer, who has been immersed in a culture, illuminates the sociocultural phenomena in all its complicated complexities and seemly simplicities (Ellis 2004).

I am sitting in my room, freezing, even though it is summer in my hometown, staring at my
surrounds, begging for inspiration. I have arranged over sixty books and countless articles in
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piles on my floor, trying to devise some sense of intellectual order, so I at least have some hope
of ordering the chaos that is inside my head. It took me days to arrange the piles, first in
chronological order, then order by methodologies, and finally in order of topic: a process that
was complicated by my persistent psychotic madness and the shifting multiple realities that
plague me. My favourite books include Tess Lea’s Bureaucracies and Bleeding Hearts (2008),
because I think it is a shrewd account of how public health policy, as an entity, empowers itself
by developing and utilising tools. These tools are called cultural artefacts, and they measure and
then validate the policy makers and service provider’s existence, as well as their inherent power.
Other books range from Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks (1952) to a couple of astute books from
LaTour, one of which is We Have Never Been Modern. I also have the obligatory texts for
anthropology students such as Geertz (1973) and Said (1978). Then there are the texts which are
deemed necessary and very topical reading in critical theory, such as Smith’s Decolonising
Methodologies (1999). Some topics have larger piles on the floor than their neighbours. For
instance, various social theorists make up four large piles, anthropology of emotion has a
substantial pile, whilst specific studies and analyses of the anthropology of madness have a lowly
twelve books in their pile. (Moyer & Nguyen: 2014) This represents not a lack of desire to
engage with such material, but a substantial gap in the anthropological lexicon (Hale 1975).

Well-known Australian based academics who have experience in mental health research include
Foster, who has worked in and has experience from being a child of a parent with mental illness
(2012; 2016). Another academic, Broadbent completed an ethnography about triaging people
with a mental illness in the emergency department (Marynowski-Traczyk, & Broadbent 2011).
Then there is Muir-Cochrane, who is a consumer advocate and qualitative researcher. SalvadorCarulla, from the Centre for Mental Health Research at the Australian National University has
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also been involved in much research in mental health in Australia including the topics of lived
experience and mental health policy. Senior (2006; 2009) has also influenced this body of
research with her support of the autoethnography method used in this thesis.

In addition to the lack of studies on madness, there is a poverty of anthropological studies on
self-experience, or autoethnographic analysis, of madness. I have read autobiographic works
such as Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963) and Janet Frame’s An Angel at My Table (1984).
Although amazing pieces of writing, with excruciating and discomforting detail, they still left
some questions unanswered for me. Firstly, these narratives do not show how the individual
experiences their illness within the context of their public historic-socio-cultural order, that has
structured, engulfed and created the definition of the phenomena of what is today called ‘mental
illness’. The public historic-socio-cultural order which bounds ‘mental illness’ in this thesis is
today’s modern Australian culture. (As per the development and formation of autoethnography,
modern Australian culture ranges from the 1960s till the present.) Secondly, these narratives
lack a comprehensive description and analysis of the individual’s experience of having a mental
illness, more specifically, that of having a major psychotic illness. Thirdly, how does the
psychotic individual experience the phenomena of hospitalisation, both voluntary and
involuntary, and what does this means for both the individual and the social context from which
it was developed.

Following on from Plath and Frame, and according to Neumann (1996) an autoethnography is
“text [that] democratises the representational sphere of culture by locating the particular
experiences of individuals in a tension with dominant expressions of discursive power.” The
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description and analysis of the lived experience of the mentally ill individual seen as within the
structure of the mental health system in this instance, contributes to an alternate view, perhaps
postmodernist or poststructuralist in form, which unpacks and reveals the multiplicity and
kaleidoscopic phenomena which is mental health. To expand, poststructuralism, closely aligned
to postmodernism, but perhaps also reactive to it by negating the importance of all social
theorising, not limiting social analysis just to multiple truths. In reaction to exploring and
negating, the nature of structuralism is known by deconstructing it. There are no macro-universal
truths, nor micro nor nano truths. Social power play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of
the social in practice and the social in theory, if there is an actual difference between the two.
For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a poststructuralist (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007) (Note:
to some theorists, postmodernism is much of a muchness with poststructuralism. See glossary
chapter for definitions of postmodernism and poststructuralism).

I intend to use this dialogue – to explore and analyse through the lens of my mental health
experience, that which includes an analysis of the biomedical labelling of schizoaffective
disorder. It is of interest to note that the social labelling of schizoaffective disorder is not
necessarily at odds with the biomedical labelling of such. From this focus flows my personal
story and an exploration of the societal issues of mental health labelling. This autoethnography
is about understanding the mental health culture that I belong to, seen through my lens, telling
my enculturated stories.

The reason why I focus on a Euro-Western-centric account is because it is the culture which
situates my autoethnographic perspective. This includes the colonisational account that is the
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foundation of my understanding of Australian social science, Australian psychiatry, and the
histories of such. I am also able to situate my personal enculturation into the mental health
system, namely an understanding of the empowerment and disempowerment what it is like to
live with schizoaffective disorder.

A significant theme evidenced in this analysis is measurement. How am I measured? What tools
are used? What artefacts are employed, that is which measurement tools used have cultural
meaning (Lea 2008)? The different types of measurement may turn out to (mis)represent the
subject being measured, thus measuring the unmeasurable, or perhaps measuring nothing in fact.
Of significance to measurement is the realm of diagnosis – measurement is often seen as an end,
serving only to legitimise the diagnosis process, and the role of the mental health professionals
involved. As well, legitimising diagnostic power can be seen through the art of measurement.
The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound (Lea
2008). The purpose of this chapter is to define and build upon the knowledge produced by the
chosen methodology of this thesis, that is autoethnography.

I hope this dialogue scrutinises an account of how evidence is manufactured and negotiated, by
the policies perpetuated by public health and bureaucracy. There is a visible gap in the literature,
thus the need to add this thesis to the scholarship of medical anthropology and/or socialised
medicine (Moyer & Nguyen: 2014). Tess Lea’s Bureaucracies and Bleeding Hearts (2008) asks
the pertinent questions: what are the power dynamics involved in evaluation, measurement and
accountability? What are the social constructions of facts – ’factoids’, and the cultural/statistical
artefacts geared to justify reproduction of cultural institutions/phenomena, such as
bureaucracies? Then there are the phenomena of silenced reports on shelves. where the (political)
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voices and discourse of the marginalised are suffocated and muffled by those in power, the
‘colonisers’ as such of knowledge.

“Where there is power, there is resistance.”
Michel Foucault (1976)

Diagnosis and prognosis

I was 23 when I was first hospitalised into a psychiatric unit. I was there for 39 days inclusive,
from April until May 1997, as per my medical notes. It wasn’t until the end of my stay that I
received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder – which type I do not know. Seeing as diagnoses are
complex and multifaceted, it is not surprising that my actual diagnosis wasn’t discovered for
many years after that first hospital visit. I don’t know whether this absence of a full diagnosis is
because the medical professionals involved didn’t know, didn’t think it is important or that they
wanted to protect me - all reasons I declare to be unsatisfactory. This shows that psychiatry is
an inexact science, much is unknown, and how medical professionals try to paternalistically
protect me and others.

Protection, an inappropriate and well-intentioned means to a

misappropriated end. The need to diagnose is interesting: to define and confine, to measure and
to label apparently improves and guides treatment. For those scientists and mental health
professionals for whom it matters, psychiatry is a science where treatment can be calculated,
determined and evaluated. The science behind diagnosis is also important to some people living
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with mental illness. It gives them somewhat of a tangential explanation of their position, no
matter how oblique (Szasz 2008).

So, I am diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Schizoaffective disorder can affect anyone,
but generally more women than men suffer from the disorder. Schizoaffective disorder often
begins in late adolescence or early adulthood, with a typical age of onset of between 16 and 30
years of age (De Hert et al 2011). Schizoaffective disorder is a condition that many people have
never heard of, and yet it affects as many as one in every two hundred people, that's 0.5% of the
population. The mental health experience for those living with schizoaffective disorder is little
known, and this is not surprisingly due to its complex and multifaceted components. (Benabarre
et al 2001)

Let me discuss the currently accepted definition of schizoaffective disorder. "Schizoaffective
disorder can easily be confused with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia because the symptoms
are very similar. Someone living with schizoaffective disorder will generally experience the
hallucinations and delusions that are commonly associated with schizophrenia at the same time
as, or within a few days of, experiencing the mood disturbances of and depression that are usually
associated with bipolar disorder" (Daniel 2011: 19; DSM V 2013). There are a couple of different
types of schizoaffective disorder - bipolar type and depressive type. I do not know which type I
am. Thus, is the chaos of mental health care. This definition is directed by the fifth diagnostic
and statistical manual of mental disorders – DSM V. The DSM V is the bible for psychiatric
diagnosis, mostly used in the colonial West. People diagnosed with bipolar disorder can also
experience psychosis. The main difference between the two, is that people with schizoaffective
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disorder will experience the psychotic symptoms outside of the mood episode as well as during
the mood episode, whereas someone with bipolar disorder will experience hallucinations and
delusions only during a mood episode. Schizoaffective disorder affective/mood symptoms
include hypomania, mania, depression and mixed states. Affective symptoms can simply be
described as symptoms with an emotional component (Daniel 2011: 20). Psychotic symptoms
of schizoaffective disorder include paranoia, hallucinations, delusions, all showing a diminished
capacity to decipher what is real and what is not real. My main psychotic symptoms are caused
by anxiety.

I find anxiety a massive cross to bear. It is always with me in varying degrees. I am disabled by
it. Anxiety limits freedom, agency and autonomy. It suffocates me. Yet, anxiety is a normal
human feeling that is linked to the sensation of fear that people experience when they are faced
with situations that are either threatening or difficult. Anxiety, therefore, can be a positive
experience because it is designed to protect people from danger. Anxiety is connected to the
famous ‘fight or flight’ response (Daniel 2011: 62-3). However, feelings of massive anxiety
have been diagnosed as panic attacks. Some of the symptoms of the attacks as I feel them,
include: a desperate gasping for air, rapid short breaths, fast pulse from my heart crushing the
inside of my chest, numbness and loss of control of my limbs; and being plagued by sweat, terror
and panic. I have panic attacks often. In these days of relative wellness, I have about one panic
attack every second day.

Depression is also part of the experience of people with schizoaffective disorder however, it does
not plague me as much as anxiety. I do experience depression, chronically, but I feel most
affected by the complications of anxiety. After living with schizoaffective disorder for all these
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years, the powerful underlying anxiety has become a major contributor to my major psychotic
disorder. Many mental health professionals have said that my anxiety is a cause of my psychotic
symptoms. That may not have been the case years ago, but it is now (Kaplan 2003: 509). My
disorder needs to be managed well. To emphasise, anxiety causes psychosis and psychosis
causes a loss of cognitive functioning and poor cognitive functioning causes poor quality of life.

There is much emphasis put on the diagnosis of a mental illness. As mentioned before, the
universal and ultimate publication defining mental illnesses is the DSM V. Mental health
professionals depend on this resource to diagnose and prescribe the most appropriate treatment.
It is a cultural artefact in mental health service delivery, attempting to describe and confine the
biomedical phenomena of the elusive obscurity of mental health. Developing an exact diagnosis
is a very subjective and difficult thing to do. Both clinicians and health participants argue for
and against a diagnostic determination. Again, even many mental health professionals believe
that diagnosing someone with a mental illness limits and marginalises them too much. A
diagnosis can be disempowering for the individual as it categorises and assumes an a priori
assumption of identity. Once categorised, many prescribed, expected and somewhat predicative
behaviours are assumed, or can be, regardless of the actuality of the individual and their
experiences. Yet at the same time, some people find that they are empowered by diagnostic
labelling because they can research and come to understand better the nature of their illness
(DiGiacomo in Elliot & Ray 2002).

Despite the plethora of mental health professionals I have dealt with over the last 23 years, not
one has said what the prognosis is for me having schizoaffective disorder. I suppose I have just
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assumed that my life will be shorter than the average healthy person. What with the numerous
co-morbidities that come with mental health disorders, such as alcohol and drug misuse, diabetes
and obesity and thyroid disease (my hypothyroidism was brought on by years of taking
Quilonum. Quilonum is a mood stabiliser commonly called Lithium and is commonly prescribed
for people with bipolar disorder.) I have taken for granted that I will just not live as long as the
‘average Jo’. Between 30% and 40% of people with schizoaffective disorder attempt suicide at
some point during the disorder. Approximately ten percent of this number will succeed in their
attempt (De Hert et al 2011)

Disability and mental illness

Those living with a mental health disability can access a poor wage from the Australian
Government, called the disability support pension (DSP). It is extremely arduous to apply for
the DSP. I remember applying for it and feeling disabled by the process. The bureaucracy had
disabled me and disempowered me. The DSP, however, was my only option to gain monies to
live. I was dependent on the government to live my own life. Although it wasn’t my own life
that I was living. I was tied down, economically too. I was hidden and silenced, having to talk
the talk and walk the walk of the State. I had become part of the Silenced Manifesto.

The type of disability commonly associated with mental illness is called ‘psychosocial disability’.
It is a term used to describe what is often the outcome for a person with a mental health condition
attempting to interact with a social environment that presents barriers to their equality with others
(NDIS 2020a). Psychosocial disability can be understood as a socialised phenomenon, and
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medical science is also branching out within the realms of the social sciences. So, mental health
disability is called a psychosocial disability which fundamentally defines sociality as imperative
to disability (NDIS 2020a). This is my position as an anthropologist.

When comparing mental illness with other forms of disability, a few questions come to light.
Can mental illness be compared equally with physical illnesses? The World Health Organization
(WHO) estimated in 2012 that about a quarter of all time lost to disability was due to mental
illness (WHO & Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation 2014). According to the National Disability
Insurance Scheme (NDIS), we have some idea around racism, there are a lot of surveys looking
at racism and racist attitudes, sexism too. But we don’t really know that about disability. We
must know what we’re actually dealing with. What are the misconceptions? What are the myths
(NDIS 2020a)? Another query, are the mentally ill underestimated? We know, though it would
seem likely that some people living with a mental illness disability do not identify as such,
possible due to stigma.

Furthermore, according to WHO, and speaking from an international perspective, mental health
is primarily focussed on social health. Mental health and many common mental disorders are
shaped to a great extent by the social, economic, and physical environments in which people live,
while social inequalities are associated with increased risk of many common mental disorders.
WHO & Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. (2014).
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Disability and Otherhood

Because of my diagnosis and my resultant labelling and categorisation, I am immediately placed
in the position of sub-citizen, subhuman, and/or social misfit. The function of the mentally ill in
the stratification of society is that of the ’Other’. ‘Otherness’ can also be likened to the status of
Indigenous people, LGBTIQA+, women, the disabled, the colonised, and any other marginalised
group of people who do not fit in with the social norm.

Australian women first won the vote in South Australia in 1895. Australian Indigenous peoples
only won citizenship right across Australia in 1965 (Australian Electoral Commission 2020).
LGBTIQA+ people are still often seen as social misfits, only recently awarded the right to marry
in Australia. The disabled are not classed as being in full control of their capacities, in other
words the disabled are classed as subhuman. People living with a mental illness who are known
to the police during times of being unwell, are commonly referred to as social misfits. It is not
uncommon for Indigenous peoples to be labelled as social misfits, especially if they also have a
mental illness (National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’
Mental Health and Social and Emotional Wellbeing c. 2017: 2017). This social misfit identity of
the mentally ill is significant, on par with criminals, and classed as outsiders and unwanted in
general society; a.k.a. Othered.

The disability movement has been central in reminding us that there is a long history of people
living with illness or disability, who are already Othered by society. As Said (1978) argued,
Othering means turning the person into an object of some sort, such as a stereotype. Those whom
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we study are ‘not us’. The expert on the lived experience of disability or illness is not the
clinician, but the person experiencing disability (Richards 2008: 1717).

I am an Other, a lesser human, a deviant and a misfit. Living with a mental illness I have
discovered that the mental health professionals are the powerful Us and the mentally ill are the
Other. The Other are an identity I belong to and have insight into the ramifications of this
identity, part of a fundamental and phenomenal assumption of lacking. The prevailing Us is
defined in opposition to Other. The two are hierarchised with Us being commanding. This leads
to the need to unpack the politics of the medical realism. Here the relationship between
psychiatry and colonisation is introduced.

The disabled are squashed into a medicalised narrative. People living with disabilities or illnesses
are objects of study and not agents of study.

There seems to be an underlying assumption that

such people need to be talked about but should themselves remain silent as if they do not have
anything useful to contribute. “Even if I cannot speak, it does not mean I have nothing to say”
(Interviewee with an intellectual disability in a “European Union for Fundamental Rights – FRA
study. The WHO (2011) attempts to treat these issues in its Disability Report.

They are also frequently the recipients of other people’s expertise not contributors. Disability
seems, often, to exist beyond the barriers of thinking, leaving disabled people in silence and
obscurity (McDougall, Swartz & Van der Merve 2006: ix). Not all disabilities and illnesses are
apparent to observers and not all perceived disabilities are disabilities to the people experiencing
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them (Richards 2008: 1719). If disabilities are generalised too far, they can dehumanise the
subjects, and then because of being labelled people turn into patients (Richards 2008: 1720).

This is the case historically, however these days the vernacular is spreading to give those living
with a disability a louder voice, or at least some voice. With the NDIS (2016) being implemented
in Australia, the power dynamic is changing, aiming to empower the ‘disabled’ as the main player
in the dialogue. Here is the government’s intent to relocate the focus of care to the grass roots,
and to empower the individual. The NDIS is about empowering the individual living with a
disability, that is, those living with a disability will decide how their care will be delivered. In
Australia, it will take some time for this policy change to settle and for the ramifications to
resolve. There is no doubt that for now, those living with a disability remain social misfit and
deranged, and that a change in mindset could take decades.

Social sciences and health

There is a rift between the social sciences and health, in this case, mental health. Medical
scientists place all their faith in science. Social scientists place all their faith in the social
sciences. The Silenced Manifesto can help to explain the social science/mental health rift. Social
science, in this case through the gaze of critical theory (see chapter one), significantly represents
(or misrepresents) the space of the marginalised group. Here, the marginalised group is the
mentally ill - the sub-citizens, subhumans and social misfits.

There exists the hidden, the

silenced voices of the sub-citizens, subhumans and social misfits. As an anthropologist, abiding
by critical theory, there is no single truth, no knowledge absolute or independent, and all
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knowledge is socially constructed. Herein lies tension. Social scientists’ value most highly
social phenomena, such as power dynamics and culture. In comparison, medical scientists’ value
most highly clinical settings empowered and epitomised by raw natural and biological science.

Stigma

There is always an element of risk in defining something so ambiguous and hazy as a major
psychotic disorder.

As I have found, labelling someone and defining them as having

schizoaffective disorder can pathologise them and limit them to a constrictive medical identity.
It affects what could be a healthy sense of self and contributes with an assumed identity of less
than human, as unable to contribute equally to society, and enforce a belittling construction of
social identity. Defining a major psychotic disorder goes hand in hand with precipitating and
endorsing stigma.

Erving Goffman (1959) suggested there are socially agreed upon behaviours that are appropriate
to certain people as they engage with the context of Otherhood. According to Goffman (1959),
life is scripted; our interactions with others are highly routinised. An individual’s social
performance, then, is judged by others to be either in line or out of line with culturally expected
behaviour (Goffman 1967). Goffman (1959) argues that people behave in ritualised ways in
public contexts. There is scripted behaviour that occurs in social interaction with others because
people who deviate from expected social performance face stigmatisation, or the spoiling of their
identity. Here issues of stigma, identity and power play come into effect. Having a mental
illness, is like living with a socially outed skin colour: you are totally defined by a single
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characteristic, in this case of mental health, a biomedical label (1987: 319). It is a stigma, an
attitude borne from society that reduces the afflicted person “in our minds from a whole and
usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman 1963: 3). Stigma brings in the whole range
of social deviance, social injustice and political corruption.

In this thesis I intend to look at the theories of Goffman in relation to my own experiences by
way of a person living with a disability in my society, an individual that has been biomedically
labelled. I start from the premise that I agree with Goffman. Goffman’s theories go a substantial
way to explain my situation. I would like to explore the relationship between self and society
regarding experiencing a major psychotic illness, and how self relates to society on a micro
versus macro level. I will also explore the interrelationships of power play between self and
society.

There is not a linear relationship between self and society.

As Bourdieu (1991; 1998) and

Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) stated, the self and its relationship to society is fragmented.
Society emerges from and is constituted by the interaction of selves. The self and society are
crafted and defined by social interconnectedness. In a constant state of flux, the self and society
are mutually intertwined to the extent that the boundaries of each are blurred into one.

I hope that my insight into schizoaffective disorder can analyse, assess and appraise the
phenomena of the pathologised psychotic experience. It seems paradoxical to try and describe
the labelling of schizoaffective disorder when I hate to be labelled. I resent how my day-to-day
experiences are scrutinised by the medical profession, trying to understand my experiences of
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the day to day world, so they know what perspectives of mine need to be mediated and medicated;
to define which of my realities are objective realities. I believe that I can add substantial value to
the current body of work around the lived experience having schizoaffective disorder. I hope to
fill the gap with an understanding and insight of what it is like to live on the fringe of medicine
and society. I must state, however, that close medical monitoring over my illness has saved my
sanity many times, in many ways. It’s a double-edged sword. I hate what I need. Ironic.

Traditional ethnography versus autoethnography

Inspired by the postmodern ‘crisis of representation’ in the late 1970s/early 1980s, and the
poststructuralist paradigm from the same time, the term ‘autoethnography’ was first used by
Hayaro in 1979 to describe studies in which the researcher is a member of the group being studied
(Ellis & Bochner 2000). Autoethnography has evolved to have many different names and forms,
but all have in common the overt inclusion of the self in an investigation, of cultural process
albeit with varying emphasis on each component.

Autoethnography overtly breaches the

traditional separation between researched and researcher challenging and effectively dismissing
(along with various other qualitative approaches), the notion of the mutual, objective researcher.

There are many similarities between traditional ethnography and autoethnography. The essential
difference is the autoethnography’s sample size of one. With this the autoethnographer is enabled
and empowered to analyse utilising less traditional means. Like traditional ethnography, an
autoethnography typically depicts a great depth, detail and richness of the subject, as does
traditional ethnography. The description of minutiae used in autoethnography enables a better
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understanding of the social micro-relations, including micro power relations. An essential and
pivotal part of autoethnography (and traditional ethnography) is the analysis of self to the relation
to the Other. By focussing on the self, autoethnography, brings out a depth and intensity of data
that a traditional ethnography does not so well. It is a textual exploration of the raptness and
breadth of individual experience, demonstrating the various facets that make the cultural dynamic
setting what it is. An autoethnography is not a single voice but an advocate, amplification,
interpreter and vehicle for many (Liamputttong & Ezzy 2005: 33). Note that the relationship
between Us and Other is different to the relationship between self and other. In my definition,
Us and Other refers to the relationship between the socialised groups of colonised and coloniser.
Whereas, also in my definition, self and other refers to how the individual entity is defined by
the greater society.

Autoethnography brings in several very sharp foci. It is different from traditional ethnography.
Differences include: an autoethnography gives the perspective of culture based on an analysis of
the minutia and how it is layered within the broader social structure; the dynamics within micro
power relations are studied and their place in macro social power relations; the identity
formations and perceived role of the autoethnographer; the involvement in micro-politics and
personal contexts; and the functions of personal phenomena in the research process, such as
emotions, physical health, and most importantly in this writing, mental health.

Autoethnography
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Mental health services have long been influenced within landscapes of power.
Autoethnographers are also confronting geographies of power within the acute care experience
(Ellis & Bochner 1999).

Autoethnography can allow a deeper human investigation and

potentially a healing place in mental health care. For example, my insight of living with
schizoaffective disorder will address the deep emotional affects that I have carried over the last
twenty-three years of my life. These include a great sense of shame and fear. Up to the time of
writing I have tried and failed to find a place in mental health care that can be wholly therapeutic
for me with no or little luck.

There are many definitions of autoethnography. Autoethnography (auto - told from the first
person, and ethno – focused on culture) is grounded loosely between postmodern,
poststructuralism, and critical approaches to research. Storytelling is used as a method for
obtaining and interpreting emotional and social data and presenting findings to the research
audience that evoke a desire to effect change (Ellis 1997; 2004; Ellis & Bochner 2000; 2006).
The overt inclusion of emotion is a unique feature of this approach, rendering it particularly
relevant for me in the mental health arena (Foster, McAllister & O’Brien 2005; 2006; White
2003). Autoethnography, according to Kidd and Finlayson (2010), focuses primarily on personal
and interpersonal interrelations. While Marks (1999 in Richards 2008: 1724) points out that the
political is embodied in the personal, and vice versa.

Autoethnography has, as a term, been in circulation for about five decades and is defined as “an
autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness,
connecting the personal to the cultural” (Ellis & Bochner 2000: 739). Autoethnography, mostly
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written in the first person, comes in a variety of creative, expressive and analytic forms, from art
to science – ranging from short stories, poetry, fiction, novels, photographic essays, personal
essays, journals, fragmented and layered writing and social science prose.

These

autoethnographic texts delve into concrete action, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality
and self-consciousness so that the function of the autoethnography is to unearth the stories of the
autoethnographer and the stories of science and society as a whole. The stories told in an
autoethnography add to the growing mass of descriptive, destabilising, testimonial and
emancipatory work associated with the culture at hand, and how these stories are dialectically
revealed through actions, feelings, thoughts and language. Here the personal relates to the
cultural which relates to the personal (Ellis 1999: 673; Ellis & Bochner 2000: 201, 739; Richards
2008 ).

According to Richards (2008), there are four types of autoethnography. The first three stemming
from Richards are testimony, emancipatory discourse and destabilised narrative.

This

autoethnography dabbles in all its types. As in a testimony I will explore how my life has been
dismembered and damaged. Through an emancipatory discourse, I will describe a multifaceted
understanding of disability which recognises the importance of examining interrelationships
between embodied subjects, and complex social psychological relationships. Here,
autoethnography is a form of emancipatory discourse because those being emancipated are
representing themselves, instead of being colonised by others, subjected to their agendas or
relegated to the role of second-class citizen. However, there is a continual threat in representing
themselves, those writing about themselves could replicate the very structures they seek to
destroy, reverting to inauthentic identities that others have bequeathed them (Marks 1999 in
Richards 2008: 1724).
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With a destabilised narrative, I will describe how I have been interrupted by illness (Richards
2008: 1722-1723), and how I have been disrupted by the dominant bio-medicine paradigm. In
short, this study is about unloading my experiences to gain a depth of understanding. This will
be done with the help of my insight into my mental health illness and insight into potent
individual interrelations. Also, I will use my skills as an anthropologist to explore knowledge
of the literature and knowledge of the socio-cultural phenomena which embeds mental health
services within it (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 108).

This autoethnography seeks to explore and analyse the lived experience of a mental health service
participant (me). The rich, vigorous and powerful explanation of my experiences will be
explored through the culture, politics, economics, and the environment of mental health service
delivery. An analysis of my medical notes and mental health policy and bureaucracy will be
utilised.

Autoethnography uses all senses of humanity and these are expressed through emotions and
intentions. Social life is messy, uncertain, and emotional. If our desire is to research social life,
then we must embrace a research method that, to the best of its/our ability, acknowledges and
accommodates mess in chaos, uncertainty and emotion (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015).
Autoethnography can be liberating, offering a way to escape the typical form of academic
writing.
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According to Wall (2008: 39), autoethnography offers a way of giving a voice to personal
experience to advance sociological understanding. Brooks (2010: 2) states that autoethnography
is academic and artful storytelling that is at once personal and intellectual. It is both method and
a text (Reed-Danahay 1997), and it is cultural, introspective, and reflective (Ellis & Bochner
2000). The autoethnographic text delves into the experiences and emotions of the researcher,
keeping his or her voice and perspectives on to and through the context of enquiry (de Freitas &
Patos 2009: 983). These texts, therefore, convey the interactional textures occurring between
self, Other and contexts in ethnographic research (Spry 2001: 708). Not only can we write about
ourselves through autoethnography, but we can write about our contextualised interactions with
others, mixing those lived moments with what we find in literature, theory, and analytical
discussion. Autoethnographic text is an important site for both academic understanding and
social connection because we can carve out an intellectual space thick with shared awareness,
one that goes far “beyond the self of the author” (Sparkes 2001: 222).

Here lies a comparison between positivism and relativism: the science of medicine versus the
individual ‘crazy’ perspective. Science aims to contain via measurement and analysis. As
someone living with a major psychotic disorder, I defy the deification of measurement and
analysis. I cannot emphasise this enough - psychiatry is an inexact science. There is not a
generalised blanket definition of schizoaffective disorder. However, it would be remiss of me
not to explore the phenomena of medical science in a description of the disorder.

The autoethnographic way of writing has been critiqued as inappropriately emotional, personal,
or therapeutic, at the expense of being academic (Atkinson 1997 in Richards 2008: 1717). It
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allows researchers to show how they are part of a larger context and to document the details of
the lived experiences of individual people (Ellis & Bochner 2000 in Richards 2008: 1720).
Emotions play a powerful role in the interaction between individuals, often transcending societal
roles and structures. Further, it is essential to recognise that, emotions and emotional well-being
can be and often are attenuated by dominant social role playing and imposed social hierarchies.
Emotions are a social entity, both developed from and maintained by social construction. There
are several universal emotions. For example: happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust, and
anger (Lutz & White 1986; Wierzbicka 1986). I would have thought that more socially
constructed emotions would be included such as shame, guilt, love, jealousy and hate. Emotions
can be used as power play and a communication tool in the negotiation between self and culture
(Kelly & Kaminskiene 2016).

According to Liggins, Kearns & Adams (2013: 106, 108), autoethnography is a methodology
that seeks to connect personal experience to cultural process and understanding. Perhaps, as
Gadamer said, “it is not truth we are seeking, but understanding” (in Liggins, Kearns & Adams
2013: 108). It is important in this process to tease out the many hats we wear, to be overtly and
reflectively aware that this autoethnography is shaped to a greater or lesser extent by the multiple
positions we hold, so we develop over time to have a multilayered perspective (Liggins, Kearns
& Adams 2013: 108).

According to Ellis (1999: 669), the autoethnographic author seeks to develop an ethnography
that includes the researcher’s whole and vulnerable/able self. Stemming from this are evocative
and thickly descriptive stories depicting reality, as they are socialised. Autoethnography looks
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at how human experience features multiple voices. Not unlike my seven voices. As Heron
(2001) says, “You are partially blown by the winds of reality and partly an artist creating a
composite out of the inner and outer events”. The goal is to use your life experiences to
generalise to a larger group or culture; the practices of social science with the living of life (Ellis
1999: 671). Construction and validation of reality involves an analysis of social action, how this
is described in the social text and then how the text is cast. Social action is communicated
through “ordered clusters of significant symbols” that individuals and groups of individuals use
to employ and orient themselves in a world otherwise opaque (Geertz 1973: 363). The cultural
anthropologist reads their structures of meanings out of the social text. Then the text is cast in
terms of the anthropological universe of discourse. For my autoethnographical story, I am
dependent on the communication tools of the anthropological universe of discourse for me to
make sense of my world.

Often the aim of such writing is to win back some power to a certain group of people. Although,
it is distracting attention from the bigger issues, and might result in self-subjection, voyeurism
and pathologism. It might reduce the narrator to a generalisable patient example, instead of
bringing about change. If it is too individualising it might create a dualism of individual/culture.
This could lead to the individual being seen out of context and the dynamic of the individual and
society being overlooked (Marks 1999 in Richards 2008: 1724).

Autoethnography and ethics
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Autoethnography is a relatively new and burgeoning methodology. Of note, regarding ethics, is
that an autoethnographer has ethical precedence over their own work. The autoethnographer
authorises his/her own ethics, through its own authority, clarity and certainty from the voice of
one. The eyes of one provide the insight of the many.

According to Bochner (2000), two of the significant ways of gathering autoethnographic data
include memory work and storytelling. These methods, strengthened and entwined, depict the
marvellousness and rawness of the past, and how that influences the present; displaying the purity
and essentiality of the narrative; in the dynamics and relations between the self, and society and
culture. Memories are personal, political and relational.

Ethical consideration of an autoethnography will always be incomplete. ‘Data’ (for want of a
better term) gathered from retrospection and memory work and storytelling will always be
piecemeal and wanting. It is difficult to show how these methods are ethical, especially when
the foundations are so fragmented. The main ethical issue related to retrospective and memory
data is that the reflective data may display a crisis of representation. There can never be a
uniquely true, correct or completely, faithful autoethnography. According to Hacking (1999),
we are simply stuck with the reality that there is no life apart from the stories told about it, and
there are no stories apart from the ethical realm.

There are many reasons for undertaking an autoethnography. One of these is emancipation. That
is the purpose of this work. An autoethnographer has a moral responsibility to be honest and
transparent in their research, and to be true to themselves and the culture in the story they tell.
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At times it would be unethical not to tell a story. There are consequences of not telling a story,
and to not tell the story truthfully. Essentially, not telling an honest story would be avoiding the
truth and would not be vigorous and reliable. Part of being transparent and honest in an
autoethnography is about being true to your motive for undertaking such a study. This thesis is
a part of an emancipatory practice, reflecting the truth of power dynamics and unpacking the
complexities of power negotiations My emancipation is realised, paving the way for more to be
emancipated. My story illustrates, “I am the voice, the object, the focus” (Field notes December
10th, 2014). Other purposes of autoethnography include being therapeutic and ethical (Ellis
1999). It is about giving a voice to the silenced.

Using personal experience methods, such as autoethnography, there is little guidance in the
literature about how to understand ethics. Autoethnographers justify themselves by observing
that individuals do not exist apart from the social context, and for this reason, personal experience
can be the foundation for further sociological understanding (Wall 2008: 49). Parker-Jenkins
(2018) states that the autoethnographer is the appropriate authority, giving permission by the
academy or otherwise to write their own story. Autoethnography as such is an avenue to explore
self-understanding and social identity.

There are some basic guides/questions for autoethnographical ethical research that help to
deconstruct what it means to experience the rawness of the basic grassroots of a culture, a rawness
seen through autoethnographical consideration.

Namely, the rawness is defined by the

relationships experienced at the grassroots. Relationships are pivotal to all things socio-cultural.
Here I will contemplate a few. Is there anyone who would be offended by my portrayal of them?
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Family, friends, partners, colleagues, medical staff, and of course myself. If they will potentially
be offended, they will be excluded from the research, representation and experience. Regarding
my medical professionals, they are deidentified in every way, given a pseudonym and changed
location and other de-identifiable factors. And me? Am I okay with the portrayal of myself? I
have been so extensively and falsely defined by everyone else that now, here I am, empowered
to define myself. It is ethical for me to finally define myself.

There are ways to demonstrate and determine an ethical autoethnography. For example, the
ownership of the story and the ownership of the knowledge generated from the story, and the
power and empowerment that comes from representing this story. Indeed, representation of
knowledge can be very political. The autoethnographer, that is me, is the authority, giving my
own permission to write my own story. The autoethnographer has an ethical responsibility to
represent their own story in the truest way possible, that is to be as transparent as possible. The
transparency of autoethnography strengthens the rigour, validity and reliability of the study.
Furthermore, Tolich questioned (2010: 1599), “Do I own a story just because I tell it?...Do I have
the right to tell a story that is not mine?”

Autoethnography aims to be transparent and honest, and to unpack the most complicated as well
as the most basic purpose of research. Autoethnography paints the rawest picture of the rawest
subject. The individual: the culture, the politics, the perceived truth, the power displayed, the
purity of autoethnography, in all its honesty, exhibits strong validity and reliability as it
emphasises a method of true representation as seen through the lens of one – thus being
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transparent and honest. In my case, “Telling an autoethnography, my story is my own” (Field
notes February 27th, 2014).

The ethics of writing and representing through an autoethnography, gives me an opportunity to
have a voice and to break through the barriers of research and research outcomes. The aim of an
autoethnography is to critique and criticise the experience of one, and in doing so help to address
issues of the many. As my story illustrates, “I am the voice, the object, the focus” (Field notes
December 10th, 2014). My emancipation is realised, paving the way for more to be emancipated.

The researcher is empowered by an independent individual voice. The responsibilities of the
researcher include avoiding a crisis of representation and a crisis of truth or facts, or socially
determined facts, that are ‘factoids’ (Lea 2008). Essentially, the responsibilities of the researcher
need to consider the utilitarian greater good. This includes being mindful of (post)colonialism
which can completely derail and absolutely remove any autonomy or agency, precipitating
another crisis of representation and precipitation of askew power negotiation. Autoethnography,
a modern methodology of anthropology, aims to represent culture and self in its purest form.

An autoethnography is very sensitive to researching vulnerable people. Such a methodology
benefits the vulnerable in the community. Through being careful of the rights of vulnerable
peoples (Tolich 2010: 1601), an autoethnography underpins what we see, believe and hold
important. I have sound experience in practising research with vulnerable peoples in the
Northern Territory of Australia. The methodology and tools used were approved by the Menzies
School of Health Research Ethics Committee (reference number 09/20).
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The research

participants ranged from youth gang members, to students and to palliative care patients all living
in remote areas in the Northern Territory. As part of having an emancipatory purpose, this
autoethnography exposes the crisis of representation under the realms of (post)colonialism.

There are several further issues relevant to autoethnography and academic ethics. These include
the essential issues of autoethnography’s apparent lesser place in academia. There is also the
issue of autoethnography not having the academic respect that is offered to more traditional
methodologies in the social sciences (Allen-Collinson & Hockey 2008; Wall 2016). Those who
can be called traditional ethnographers, do not believe in the more poststructuralist
autoethnographer’s social creation of reality. Furthermore, there is the issue of autoethnography
being too artistic, emotional, personal and essentially unscientific. These more so non-academic
qualities add to the worth and richness of the study as situated and based in the culture. Some
discord and disparity between autoethnographers and traditional ethnographers is still rife.

And so, my autoethnography, being an intensely personal research piece, and being told solely
through my own eyes and perception, does not require formal ethics approval from my university.
The authority of note for my research is myself. I represent myself. I am my own authority. I
have produced my own knowledge – as much as my socialisation and culturalization will let me.
The most unethical thing I can do in this case is not tell my story; to not be emancipatory for
myself and other peoples living with a major psychotic illness. There is not an institution that
has authority over my autoethnography. I do not seek ethics approval from such an institution.
I am most mindful about the ethical and moral responsibilities that working with vulnerable
peoples entails, of course, because I am one. I also hold a “working with vulnerable peoples’
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card” from my state of residence, in my country of Australia, granting government approval for
me to work with the vulnerable. I am ethically ethical.

Autoethnography methods

Ellis (1999) suggests the following pointers when writing an autoethnography. First, start
structuring your story with chronological events, then fill it out with memories. If memories are
lacking, rely on your feelings.

Use emotional recall.

Emotional recall is embedded in

sociological introspection, a process accomplished in dialogue with the self and represented in
the form of narratives (Ellis 1991). Reflecting between chronology and feelings, the thoughts
will come. You may start the dissertation with a short story and then build to be a large chapter.
An explanation of each step in the flow of the autoethnography must be acknowledged and
structured to eliminate unexplained conceptual leaps in the thesis and to describe the logical,
accountable and sound allegation. The creation of autoethnography become ideas, self-reflective
in nature. This internal reflectivity is essential in any autoethnography.

Another perspective of understanding autoethnography comes from Pinchon (2003), who
outlines an understanding of autoethnographical analysis. First, themes and interpretations in a
text are not interpreted in isolation but with reference to Other in the text. Second, these methods
typically explore themes omitted or repressed and hidden behind other themes. Third, these
methods often analyse the social and political context of text. To deconstruct or decode is to
uncover these hidden messages and themes behind the obvious themes or upfront messages.
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The autoethnographic method, the gaze, is used in medicine. It is important to consider and
define the subject under investigation as thoroughly as possible, to limit the gaze of the researcher
and the gaze of the medical officer (Foucault 1965). Describing the autoethnographic method,
the autoethnographers’ gaze goes back and forth, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens,
focusing outwards on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then, they look
inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and moved through, refracted and somewhat
resistant cultural interpretations. As the autoethnographic gaze zooms backward and forward,
inward and outward, distinctions between the personal and cultural become blurred sometimes,
beyond distinct recognition. “If thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee”
(Nietzsche 1886).

Importantly is the tool of memory recollection, where the autoethnographer is reliant on memory
to add substance and depth and richness to the story telling. Obviously, an autoethnographer
cannot rely solely on memory, but memory cannot be negated. Memory work adds to the
complexity of the autoethnography. It is a part of the intense and dense form of data collection
that is innately mine. As such, memory is an essential tool in an autoethnography. As well as
relying on memory, I am aided by texts such as my medical records. The result is a sound
autoethnography, a textual encounter of the experienced culture, and an analysis of self and other
in text.

Autoethnography and rigour
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There are many ways of ensuring rigour in qualitative research. Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005)
describe a number of these. The first, as mentioned above, is theoretical and conceptual rigour.
A study has theoretical and conceptual rigour if the theory and concepts are appropriately chosen
so that the research strategy is consistent with the research goals. The second is methodological
and/or procedural rigour.

This involves maintaining and reporting an audit trail of

methodological and analytical decisions which have allowed us to assess the significance of the
research. Third is interpretive rigour and interrater reliability where an account accurately
represents the understandings of events and actions within the framework and world view of the
people engaged in them. While postmodernists have argued that there are no final grounds for
accepting interpretations as ‘accurate’, this does not mean that such interpretations are more valid
than others or will equally be acceptable to participants in the study. Fourth, is the method of
triangulation. And fifth and pivotal in regard in autoethnography is reflectivity, as mentioned
previously but worth repeating. Reflectivity is essential as it is the auto ethnographic main gauge
of interpretation. This list is not exhaustive but cements the rigour and is most relevant to this
thesis.

Autoethnography, being such a new methodology at times needs to prove itself as a method. An
autoethnography, done well, is a robust and rigorous qualitative method that uses text as an
avenue of formal expression. The text brings together various data collated in various ways.
These methods, the ones I use include participant observation, unobtrusive methods, case studies,
and narratives. Analytical tools used in autoethnography include memory work, gaze, discourse
analysis, and thematic analysis and content analysis (Grbich 2007: 146).
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This eclectic relationship between a textualized experience of culture and a personified text is
well appreciated through Foucauldian method and analyses. An important methodology for
Foucault is historical analysis and situatedness. No social phenomena can be understood without
an understanding of its philosophical and historical journey. History is used by Foucault as a
conceptual tool which defines the progression of all meaning and representation of knowledge.
History is used as a pivotal tool looking at preconceptions of power as a base for interpretation.
Historical analysis, explores meaning and representation through history, including politics,
economics, environment, culture. One of the main purposes of using history as a methodology
is to concentrate on power dynamics and tracing and mapping ideologies and their development
over time (Grbich 2007: 146).

It is extremely important to note that when undertaking any Foucauldian analysis, the data is
collected, the analysis is undertaken, and the text that is written are not the only truth but a
reflection of the political reality of the social and the self. These have been situated and
developed over time. There is no one narrative truth but a multitude of narratives and a multitude
of institutions which house and nurture these narratives.

Regarding validity, language is not transparent, and there is no single standard truth. Our work
is verisimilitude (Ellis 1999: 674). Regarding reliability - since we always create our personal
narrative and situated location, we try to ascertain our present and imagined future; there’s no
such thing as orthodox reliability in autoethnographic research. (Ellis 1999: 674). Regarding
generalisability - we share culture and institutions (Ellis 1999: 674).
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Part of the validity of an autoethnography is dependent on the researcher’s motivation behind the
research. The researcher needs to be completely honest in their writing and analysis. This is at
the epicentre of the autoethnographic methodology. The connections made within the writing
and within the analysis needs to be transparent so that the reader may clearly see the logical
connections made (Ellis 2004).

Reliability refers to “the consistency or dependability of the instrument or measurement strategy”
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005: 33-34). Regarding autoethnography, reliability is ascertained by
self-reflective practices and data saturation, that is ensuring there are no questions left to be asked
or doubts or gaps in the data collated. Theoretical rigour, as with data saturation, then follows.
The rigorous methodology of this autoethnography aids in the study being more transparent,
honest, accountable, legitimate, and ensuring responsibility and respectful attention to those
being observed (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005: 33-34).

Reality

My goal in life is to prove to myself that I am smart, or at least not stupid. For much of my living
memory I have been mentally ill, and have in turn had competing, confusing, baffling and
bewildering ’voices’ in my head. Again, I prefer to call them ’noises’. I think that this term
takes away the agency and power that the ‘voices’ try to claim. With these noises, I have limited
capacity to decipher rival knowledge. I cannot trust the version of reality my mind gives me.
Yet, I want to trust and feel that my thoughts and perceptions are valid and true. I want to be
able to not always second guess myself. I don’t like feeling that I annoy people by my constant
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need for reassurance and validation. With psychosis, I hear things that (I hope) are not true. I
am constantly in a state of distrust and confusion about the version of truth in my head, my
version of reality.

It seems ironic to try and describe the labelling of schizoaffective disorder when I hate to be
labelled. I hate that my day-to-day experiences are scrutinised enough by the medical profession,
so they know what perspectives of mine need to be mediated and medicated; to define what of
my realities are objective realities.

A good autoethnography unpacks the observable fact and experience of the construction of
reality. When examining questions about reality, I cannot escape nor negate the probability that
I could just be making this argument up. After all, reality is relative (Hacking 1999).

When examining rigour and validity within autoethnography the questions can be asked: Does
the instrument measure what the evaluator purports to measure? or Does the measurement
strategy yield data that accurately represents reality? I have not come across any research which
does not want to define its subject, even if it is to define what it is not. Some sort of comparison,
or could it be called ‘measurement’ is involved, even in the most minute way. Similarly, even
when arguing that one ‘reality’ doesn’t exist, it is still acknowledged as theoretically existing,
even if only in a dichotomous relationship. I would probably add a slight twist to the analysis,
by noting what hermeneutic realists argue, that there is a real world and our experiences of it are
always and already interpreted (Ezzy 1998). An autoethnography fundamentally depicts the
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world as it is experienced and interpreted through the observer’s senses. This is a real world and
our experiences of it are always and already interpreted (Ezzy 1998).

There is no ‘standard’ methodological formula when conducting autoethnographic research
(Moore 2012: 201). Through telling our stories, we make and remake ourselves. We validate our
identities. We give meaning to our suffering. Our stories shape and structure our experience
rather than simply presenting them to a reader. They tell others who we are, but they also tell us
how they can and do make us who we are (Richards 2008: 1722). Sociological introspection
through autoethnography allows me to study my lived experiences not just as an internal state
but also as an affective process which I recognise internally and construct externally (Ellis 1999).
By exploring social theory with the methodology of autoethnography, I will analyse my lived
experience of being labelled as disabled with a major psychotic illness. This work may bring
light to the complexities and dynamics of the lived experience of the sub-human.

According to poststructuralist and postmodernist understandings, one must either reject the idea
of rigour or reconceptualise it involving the demonstration of the absence of a clear relationship
between ‘reality’ and the study’s findings (Lather 1993 in Liamputting & Ezzy 2005: 36). Here
there is the issue of a politically infused nature of all interpretation (Denzin 1997). To expand,
rigour may also be reconceptualised as a moral and ethical task focused on emancipation and
political action, particularly when postmodernism/poststructuralism are combined with critical
theorists (Denzin & Giardina 2007; Le Roux 2017). Poststructuralist authors fundamentally
challenge the epistemology, ontology and methods of traditional research. This is done in part
via analysis of the power dynamics of historical situating (Steinberg 2011; Ellis 2004).
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According to poststructuralist understandings there is no independent knowable phenomenal
reality. All knowledge is based on a priori assumptions and interpretations that do not just
confine what is seen but also define what is seen. Tyler (1986 in Lincoln & Ellis 2011: 36), for
example, argues for an autoethnography to create its own objects in its unfolding, and the reader
supplies the rest. Hammersley (1992 in Lincoln & Ellis 2011: 36) suggests, we form a relativism
where all accounts are equal. Similar from poststructuralism, social power play is rife, which
brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in theory if there is an actual
difference between the two.

Foucault was particularly interested in the socio-cultural dynamics of the underdog. These
subcultures included prisoners, homosexuals and the mentally ill. Foucault was particularly
interested in studying the ways in which power has been developed and exercised through the
control of knowledge. In creating and maintaining discourses powerful interests obscured the
voices, protests or challenges put up by others with an interest in a piece of knowledge. Foucault
exposed the way the State had created the powerful discourses, for example of ‘madness’, and
how through sovereignty and disciplinary power these ideas had filtered down to the (largely
unresisting) population and had become the basis of their understandings and explanations
(Grbich 2007: 147).

Amongst all of Foucault’s research is the common thread of an exploration and analysis of power.
Power is the meaning of what we do, how we keep doing it, and why. In this case can power be
a methodology and/or tool of analysis? And how is power enabled, valued and measured, if that
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is at all possible? Power manifests itself in many and extreme ways in the social worlds.
Foucault not only studied institutions like the prison, factory, hospital and school, but also
strategies of power which embody themselves and adapt in relation to the institutions they are
engulfed and acculturated by. This power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition
on those who ‘do not have it’. It invests in them, is transmitted by them and through them. It
places pressure upon them, and they resist the grip it has on them (Horrocks & Jevtic 2004: 112).
No power is exercised without extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge
(Foucault 1965 in Porter 1990; 1982).

“The genesis of the manufacturing of truth is also the genesis of the knowledge of truth”
Foucault (1973)
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Reality – medical realism

Derrida (2001) argues that we must consider the meta-narrative. The meta-narrative in this case
is medical science with its associated political and cultural foundations. The doctors and other
health professionals are the powerful Us and the mentally ill are the Other. The two are
hierarchised with the medical practitioners having power over the mentally ill deviant.

My own construction of reality, and my experience of it in my own social world, is a constant
source of perplexity for me. How can I trust my senses? How can I trust the workings of my
mind? Do I trust those around me? Can I trust my closest friends and family? Without any trust,
how do I judge what is real and what is not? I do it many times every day. I ask my family and
friends and my partner: Is that real? Did I understand correctly what that person just said to me?
What about the construction of madness? And what about the construction of institutions of
madness, including psychiatric wards?

How does madness function as a socio-cultural

phenomenon? How is madness a construct of reality and social phenomena? (Foucault 1961;
Douglas 1992).

Reality can be defined in many ways. For example, there is reality as defined by our senses, and
reality as defined by our thinking: empiricism versus rationalism (Markie 2017). Then again,
how does a philosophical perception of reality differ from an individual perspective of reality
(Mead 1927; Hurrelmann 1988)? As an anthropologist, I am consumed by the cultural and social
construction of reality. Neither can I separate reality from other cultural/social phenomena like
politics, economics and, spirituality. Then there is my perspective of reality in my crazy head.
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How is reality constructed, albeit socially constructed, by someone with a psychotic illness that
fundamentally skews all perceptions of reality? Is psychosis a social construction or a biological
construction? Or perhaps psychosis is a social and biological construction? Is it a biological
construction in the sense that the hallucinations and delusions experienced as part of psychosis
are somewhat alleviated with medical therapy? Then again psychosis is also a social construction
in the sense that its ramifications and true meaning are very much defined in social phenomena
(Cooke 2017). If psychosis was not the stigma as it is, those suffering from this mental illness
may not be so ostracised, demoralised and stereotyped as subhuman, sub-citizens and social
denigrates.

Social theories

The social theories considered to be most relevant to this discussion are structural-functionalism,
Marxism, postmodernism, poststructuralism and critical theory including feminism, queer theory
and (post)colonialism. The most significant theories discussed here are critical theory and
(post)colonialism. Foucault’s perspective is also very important. (For an expansion of Marxism
and its relevance to this discussion please see glossary.)

These theories best define the role of the mentally ill and deconstruct their role and their position
in the historical and social construction of reality. “Social rituals create a reality which would be
nothing without them. It is not too much to say that ritual is more to society than words are to
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thought” (Douglas 1966). These theories stand out because it has been my experience of having
a mental illness, especially a major psychotic illness without concrete known and measurable
boundaries.

The phenomena of mental illness and mental health service delivery seem to perform a certain
function in the structured Australian society.

Douglas (1966) argued that societal order

encompasses and contains mental health wants to keep a close reign on something that is
potentially harmful to its otherwise clean functioning. By ’clean’ I mean that society generally
wants the mentally ill to be invisible and silenced. I would also argue that the mentally ill and
mental health service delivery play a role in the societal order and are expected to function in
accordance. Parsons, a structural-functionalist, talks about the functional theory of stratification,
and the idea that hierarchical class systems and orders are necessary for society to function.
Inequality is expected to keep society progressing by motivating individuals to live a full life
(Douglas 1992).

The structural-functionalist position argues somewhat that society is an organism where society
is held together by its culture, that is commonly held belief and values (Durkheim in The
Sociology Book 2015 p. 34-7). Culture, as a common group of individuals, maintains and
supports the structure of a society (Culture and Society n.d.). According to Durkheim (in The
Sociology Book 2015 p. 34-7), in simple terms, everyone has a role to play or a function to
perform, and they perform it to support the structure of their society, hence the name 'structuralfunctionalism’ (or perhaps an extrapolation to “structuralism’). Once a society adapts, has goals
and gets its members to act within these, as per Weber’s idea of ‘goals’, (in The Sociology Book
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2015 p. 42-3 ), it must figure out a way to maintain these goals. So, what are the goals of the
sub-citizen, subhuman, and social misfit? What function to they serve in society? Is their
function nothing but to be Othered?

Foucault has given great insight into the concept of stigma and power play (1965). Any
undertaking of Foucauldian analysis, as with most poststructuralist theory, includes data
collection, analysis, and the text that is written. This is not the only truth but a reflection of the
political reality of the social and the self. These have been situated and developed over time.
There is no one narrative truth but a multitude of narratives and a multitude of institutions which
house and nurture these narratives. As Foucault has described, by studying a major psychotic
disorder from an etic and emic perspective, the two views could possibly be incommensurable.
Speaking from my own perspective, someone living with a major psychotic disorder, the realities
between medical science and the person experiencing the disorder are often unmeasurable,
undefinable and incommensurable.

The use of clinical language is one way that medical professionals alienate and ascertain power
over the ill. Other disciplines dominate in their own way with language. Language is an avenue
through which cultural difference and values are perpetuated. Language draws connections
between the powerful and the powerless. Ultimately it is a form of communication, but it is also
a template and mandate of who has power. The powerful, such as medical professionals,
ultimately have control over the symbols of communication in biomedicine and the sense of
power that comes with knowledge. As Foucault (1967) states, knowledge is power. For medical
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professionals, their control of biomedical knowledge makes them supreme in the social hierarchy
(Lindenbaum & Lock 1993).

As per critical theory, I abide by the belief that there is no single truth, no knowledge absolute or
independent, and all knowledge is socially constructed. Everything underlying Foucauldian
understanding and analysis is the subject and object of power: power in beliefs and values, power
and social order, macro and micro social order, power in symbolism and language and power in
economics and politics. How do we gauge this complex phenomenon of power? Foucault argued
that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions that
appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the
political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so
that one can fight against them (Taylor 1984; Foucault 1982).

In Foucault’s book, Madness and Civilisation (1967), he discussed the way that our identities are
historically produced. In the Middles Ages, the mentally ill were part of public life. In the
eighteenth century, the mentally ill were classed as abnormal and removed from society. Then
in the twentieth century, the mentally ill became medicalised, pathologised and subservient to
medical science. The terms of what have defined mental illness and its association with deviancy
could have changed, yet the prejudice and the stigma remain.

In modern times, according to Foucault, the mentally ill are subject to more measuring and
surveillance and judgement as is relative to the recent legacy of medical science. Today’s mental
health institutions and hospitals are all about measuring and judging and surveillance. The
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mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural artefacts of modern psychiatry,
are all about measuring and judging deviance. The mentally ill are not empowered by their
institutionalisation into psychiatric wards, rather their function in society is to provide an Other
to define in opposition to the Us. In the same way, the deviant and subhuman Other has a role
in society as the underling. The Other is defined in opposition of the powerful Us (Said 1978).

Foucault spoke about the ’genealogy of subjectivity’ where we think we are free agents in our
society but are defined by our historical development over time.

This historical definition

process is covert. It has meant that over time power negotiations between the Other and Us on
all levels and facets, have become embedded in the social fabric and cultural values of the
importance of science. Over the last few centuries, the pillar of science has been naturalised
(Foucault 1963), that is science as supreme was considered an assumption before any other
knowledge or perspective. Scientific fact is an a priori assumption. This version of reality is
the version of reality. All analyses come after this fact.

Postmodernism is essentially a movement that is anti-modern. Modernism, born from the
Enlightenment, bequeathed its supremacy to the new deities of science, technology,
measurement, democracy, industrialism and capitalism. Religion and the autocratic State no
longer ruled supreme. Postmodernism began the path of query and questioned the sanctity and
presumptive reign of medical science of years earlier, and then introduced the notion of cultural
relativism and subjectivity to psychiatry (Porter 2002).
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Another analytical tool used in critical theory is the perspective of Marxism. Utilising Marxism,
the role of the mentally ill is defined in the economic order, as one of a non-contributor. Foucault
(1967) used the comparison of a mental health inpatient and a prisoner. The prisoner spends
his/her days making number plates, whereas the mentally ill inpatient does not participate in any
modes of production. If anything, the sick sapped resources from the economy.

Conclusion

In the last 50 years or so, there has been a paradoxical shift – a decentring involving the authority,
autonomy, stability of institutions, subjectivities and texts. Out of this shift has emerged an
emphasis on the personal narrative as fluid, emotionally and intellectually charged (Miller 1995:
49 in Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 773). The overarching construct of this shift, giving meaning
and purpose, was the culture of society.

It is vitally important to consider the position of the individual in culture. Power dynamics
function and outline the negotiation and method of interaction between citizens. And the function
of the self is the mobile unit or pawn in the game. The self is a social construct - as are all
phenomena in society.

The autoethnographical singular sample size enriches the study and analysis by depicting a
different and alternative viewpoint – amplifying the whisper of the disabled. The individual
subject is used to illustrate, emancipate and rebuild the broader meta-cultural phenomena.
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In these autoethnographic texts, including discourse, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality
and self-consciousness are all featured, appearing as rational and institutional stories impacted
by science and social structure. Indeed, there is the social construction of phenomena like
emotion. These are dialectically revealed through actions, feelings, thoughts and language (Ellis
1999: 673; Ellis & Bochner 2000; Kirmayer 1989). Jones (2005 in Richards 2008: 1725) notes
the liminal nature of autoethnographic writing, describing it as being “between story and context,
writer and reader, and prices and denouncement”. She also points to “the power of the in
between”, of occupying the space between theory and practice, analysis and action.

The social world is structured, at times covertly, by our means of understanding and
communicating in the world, which is through the prism of language. Narratives and discourses,
directed by language, control us but we are not overtly aware as we are so engulfed in them - we
are blinded by this power play. There exist differences between the Other and the Us, and these
differences are reflected in the roles that the Other and Us have in the social order. The Other,
in this case are the mentally ill, the lesser humans, the deviants, the misfits.

My experience of living with schizoaffective disorder has included repeated negotiating and
struggling with multiple intersubjectivities of power play both within myself and outside in the
broader societal contexts, determining multiple truths and multiple realities. As well, I am
constantly in a state of cultural exasperation and epistemological and existential influx. My
position is grounded in critical theories, specifically (post)colonialism. However, I am also
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influenced by structural-functionalism, Marxism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism – in
order of influence.

There are many blocks of time over the last twenty years that are a loss to me. I have some
periods of my life, years and years, of being unwell where I remember only snippets. I have been
lucky enough to have journals, letters, medical notes, personal accounts from friends and family,
and my own emotions that have helped greatly with my recall. The whole process is rather
humiliating, and damaging.

In this chapter, I have discussed methods and methodologies that I am using as part of writing
this autoethnography. Through writing this autoethnography, I will explore and delve into the
culture of my lived experience of what it is like to survive living with a major psychotic illness,
as well as the experience of hospitalisation in three different psychiatric wards. For me,
autoethnography allows for the most honest way of describing the most complex phenomena.
Autoethnography produces not only academic texts, but in depth, rich and thick accounts (Geertz
1973), depicting many facets of the human experience, including emotional, intellectual,
spiritual, psychological and existential.

The depth of experience, through an absolute

engagement and commitment with the culture of the mentally ill, adds to the unique position of
a ‘real’ knowing of the social phenomena, best deciphered here via the individual perspective.
The individual becomes the social and the social becomes the individual.
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CHAPTER THREE

HISTORY OF MADNESS

“People tend to say, ‘I like independent thinkers, but they must think what I want them to
think independently’”
Rassool Jibraeel Snyman (2017)

“Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.”
(Foucault 1982)

Throughout history, the mentally ill have been deemed as lacking. They are viewed as not fully
human, not full citizens. They are most often deemed as social misfits. They are people who do
not belong and are unwanted. This disdain is precipitated and justified by various policies of
social control, policies developed by governments, in the name of managing ‘anti-social
behaviour and those classed as ’stigmatised’. Throughout history similar treatment has been
assigned to women, homosexuals, indigenous peoples and marginalised historical and falsely
accused groups such as witches. Not seen as fully human or full citizens, some were hunted,
imprisoned and some were killed like annoyances.

Others were rounded up and put in

concentration camps, reserves or institutions like creatures to be broken and branded and put to
work (Smith 1999: 28). The mentally ill are stigmatised as forms of outcasts. As well as the
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goals of scientific measurement and healing, psychiatry plays a social role, again in classification,
of a type of social class, a class that is defined as lacking.

It is imperative that I situate an analysis of subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits, and the
culture/s that perpetuate such labelling through my autoethnographic lens (Ellis 2004: 2014).
The discourse below will explain the history of madness and why ‘social misfits’ are defined as
such. To help in the understanding of madness and its social foundations, Foucault’s focus on
history is paramount.

A critique of Western history argues that history is a modernist project which has developed
alongside imperial beliefs about the Other (Said 1978; Smith 1999). The idea is that history is a
self-actualising human subject. In this view, humans have the potential to reach a stage in their
development where they can be in total control of their faculties. Have the mentally ill the
potential to self-actualise considering their history and socialisation into the modern society,
especially considering the self-actualisation achieved stemming from labelling theory (Smith
1999: 31-32)? How can those living with a major psychotic disorder be empowered when
historically they have been starved of power?

History is fundamental to power. In fact, like culture, history is fundamentally about power. It
is the story of the powerful and how they became powerful. And then, how they use their power
to keep and entrench supremacy and continue to dominate. It is because of this relationship
between history and power that the subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits have been excluded,
marginalised and Othered. In this sense history is not important for the mentally ill because a
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thousand accounts of the truth will not alter the fact that the mentally ill are still marginalised
and do not possess the power to transform history into justice (Smith 1999: 35). Power is not a
thing but a relation. It is something enacted rather than possessed (McHoul, McHoul & Grace
2015).

A history of madness, or more precisely, a history of evidence of treating madness suggests
treatment began around 5000 BC. Archaeologists have unearthed skulls which have been
trephined or trepanned; small round holes have been bored in them with flint tools. The subject
was probably thought to be possessed by devils which the holes would allow to escape (Joseph
2015).

Madness has been used as fate or punishment in early religious myths and heroic fables. There
have also been many references to madness in the Old Testament of the Bible, such as stories of
possession by devils, and how the Lord punished Nebuchadnezzar by reducing him to bestial
madness (Szasz 1970). In Deuteronomy (6:5) it is written, “The Lord will smite thee with
madness.”

Early civilisation, in Ancient Greece, saw madness as supernaturally inflicted. The philosophers
who emerged in the Greek speaking city-states from the sixth century BC onward viewed the
cosmos and the human condition naturalistically. Socrates (470-399 BC) notoriously slighted
the gods and, with his pupil Plato (428-348 BC), analysed the psyche’s constituents: reason,
spirit, the passions, and the soul. In due course Aristotle (384-322 BC), Plato’s pupil, defined
man as a rational animal, within the system of nature (Szasz 1970).
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“From a Christian point of view, human reason is madness compared to the reason of
God, but divine reason appears as madness to human reason”
Foucault (1964)

Before Christ, the concept of madness focused on a back and forth, however bloody, between
faith and religion. Then, after Christ, Christianity gained strength and credence as social currency
and the vernacular when the Emperor Constantine recognised Christianity in the Roman Empire
in 313 AD. Knowledge was decreed acceptable if the governing body declared it as such. Unlike
Greek philosophy, Christianity denied that reason was the essence of man: what counted were
sin, divine will, love and a believer’s faith (Massey & Denton 1985).

The rise of the institutions

By the 11th century, leprosy became epidemic in England. Those suffering from leprosy became
the deviants of magic and witchery. Some people believed it was a punishment for sin, but others
saw the suffering of lepers as like the suffering of Christ. As lepers were enduring purgatory on
earth, they would go directly to heaven when they died, and were therefore closer to God than
other people. Those who cared for them or made charitable donations believed that such good
works would reduce their own time in purgatory and accelerate their journey to heaven (Brown
et al 2008)
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The outbreak of leprosy didn’t develop and heighten until the Middle Ages (500-1500). Yet,
the official disease of leprosy was not scientifically identified until 1874 and the cause for the
disease was not proven until the 1960s. It is difficult to diagnose even today, therefore there
must have been much confusion surrounding the disease during the Middle Ages. Those
diagnosed and labelled with leprosy did not necessarily exhibit any of the common symptoms.
The classification ’leper’ was given to many social deviants (Moore 1994). In the fourteenth
century, after the last of the lepers exited the last of the institutions (Arnold 2008), political
sway stepped in and the institutions became safe places where the mad could be hidden. The
subhumans/sub-citizens/social misfits became an identity to themselves; they were labelled;
this was the new stigma.

In London the religious house of St Mary of Bethlehem (founded in 1247 and lastingly known
as ‘Bedlam’) was catering for lunatics from the late fourteenth century (Arnold 2008). Other
cities in Europe soon followed suit and provided institutions for their mad. These were mostly
charitable and religious based asylums. They were staffed by nuns and brothers. These
institutions lodged the mad right up in to the twentieth century (de Young 2010). Since Bedlam
was open to visitors, the sane and the mad were brought tantalisingly face-to-face: who could tell
the difference? For its many critics, the fact that Bedlam allowed itself to be included among the
‘shows of London’, like the menagerie in the Tower, was central to its scandal. Having the Other
on display in a human zoo or freak show courted shameless voyeurism (Lawrence 2018).
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Foucault famously argued in the 1960s that the rise of Absolutism (1550-1800), typified by Louis
XIV in France, inaugurated a Europe-wide ‘Great Confinement’ of the mad and poor, a
movement of ‘blind repression’. Scandalous by law and order all those ne’er-do-wells tainted
by ‘unreason’ became targets for appropriation in a vast street-sweeping operation. Paupers,
petty criminals, layabouts, streetwalkers, vagabonds and beggars formed the bulk of this
monstrous army of the unreasonable, but symbolically their leads were the insane and the idiotic
(Foucault 1961).

This demonising process may be regarded as psychologically and

anthropologically driven and from the deep-seated and perhaps unconscious need to order the
world. Demarcating the self from the Other (not the Us and the Other), we polarised distinctions.
For example, black and white, sane and insane (Szasz 1970). The culture of madness ‘reality’
and ‘representations’ endlessly played off each other (Porter 2002: 64).

This ‘Great Confinement’, argued Foucault (1961), amounted to more than physical
sequestration. It also represented the debasement of madness itself. Hitherto, the mad had
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exercised a force and fascination, be it as a holy fool, witch, or a man possessed. Half-wits and
zanies had enjoyed the licence of free speech and the privilege of mocking their betters.
Institutionalisation however, maintained Foucault, robbed madness of all such empowering
features and reduced it to mere negation, an absence of humanity. Small wonder, he concluded,
that madhouse inmates were likened to and treated as wild beasts in a cage: denied reason, that
quintessential human attribute. What were they but brutes? (Foucault 1961).

Foucault (1961) claimed that the Great Confinement essentially involved the requisitioning of
the poor. There is little trace of organised labour in early asylums – indeed, critics accused them
of being dens of idleness. Enterprising madhouse proprietors naturally sought rich and genteel
patients, who would not be expected to work.

The time of the persecution of witches is a significant time for the history of madness. Madness
noted within the Catholic Church was treated by institutionalism, spiritual means, or burnings at
the stake for witches.

Spiritual means included the performance of masses, exorcism,

pilgrimages, and/or worshipping to a shrine. From the late 1400s, peaking around 1650, madness
was associated with magic and witchery. The witch craze gathered momentum across Europe.
It was believed that the witches were possessed and had compacted with the Devil. The craze of
hunting for heretics, namely hunting for witches, led to the execution of 40,000 to 60,000 of the
so-called heretics, which were mainly women (Szasz 1970).

The conflagration of heresy-accusations and burnings stoked by the Reformation (beginning with
Luther in 1517) then Counter-Reformation (ending by the Thirty Years War 1618-1648), and the
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Civil Wars in Britain (1642-1651) stirred strong reactions against religico-political extremism,
condemned as ruinous to public order and personal safety alike. After 1650, elites washed their
hands off witchcraft: now it was not a Satanic plot but individual sickness or collective hysteria.
Eighteenth century magistrates similarly deemed converts who shrieked and swooned in a
response to a belief in the supernatural. This was turned into a matter of psychopathology (Szasz
1970).

In due course this Lockean thinking, so highly esteemed in the Enlightenment, formed the basis
of the new secular and psychological approaches to understanding insanity.

Amongst

seventeenth-century philosophers madness was increasingly identified not with demons,
humours, or even passions, but with irrationality. Irrationality is associated with madness,
whereas rationality is associated with sanity (Szasz 1970). Thus, did Rene Descartes’ (15941650) decree, “I think therefore I am”.

Following Locke and Descartes, madness was seen to be not only about irrationality. All
societies judge some of their own as mad (any strict clinical justification aside). This is part of
the business of marking out the different, deviant, and perhaps dangerous. Such ‘stigma’,
according to the American sociologist Erving Goffman (1961), is the situation of the individual
who is disqualified from the full social acceptance. Stigmatising – the creation of spoiled identity
– involves projecting into an individual of group judgements as to what is inferior, repugnant or
disgraceful.
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Medicalisation

The sensibilities of the Enlightenment (1685-1815) brought about the medicalisation of insanity
and the move to lock up mad people (Foucault 1961; Goffman 1961). To support this political
and intellectual movement, John Locke wrote and insisted upon The Reasonableness of
Christianity (1694 in Nuovo 2012). Even religion had to be rational. The new scapegoats
included beggars, criminals and vagrants. This pathologisation of ‘religious madness’ led
Enlightenment free-thinkers to pathologise religiosity at large. As it were, the subject of power
was now in the realms of the universities not the churches. Religion had become rationalised
and made part of medical science – pathologised.

Except in France, the seventeenth century did not bring with it any spectacular surge in
institutionalisation – and it certainly did not become the automatic solution. Different nations
and jurisdictions acted dissimilarly. Indeed, madness engulfed in its stigma had become a sort
of entertainment. Jokes about the mad monarchs came home to roost remarkably rapidly: George
III’s delirious descent in 1788 provided a golden opportunity for satirists and cartoonists. It was
fashionable to be struck with melancholy or hysteria, mostly afflicted to women. (Tasca et al
2012; Malcalpine & Hunter 1968) There was now a glamorisation of the gloomy genius. The
movement for female emancipation was gathering momentum from the mid nineteenth century.
Women were moving against a domination of cultural stereotyping of mental disorder. For
example, hysterics and young working-class women, far from being objective phenomena ripe
for scientific investigation, were instead being viewed as cultural artefacts justifying for female
subjugation (Lawrence 2018).
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Absolutist France indeed centralised its responses to ‘unreason’ (Foucault 1961; Goffman 1961).
In England around 1800, the confined mad were largely housed in private asylums, operating for
profit within the market economy in what was frankly termed the ‘trade in lunacy’ (Szasz 1970).
In England, not until 1808 was an Act of Parliament passed even permitting the use of public
funds for asylums. Not until 1845, and against those who denounced it as a waste of money or
an infringement of freedom, was the provision of such county asylums made mandatory (Porter
2002: 94). In urbanised Europe, and in Northern America, the rise of the asylum is better seen
not as an act of State but as a side effect of commercial and professional society. Growing surplus
wealth encouraged the affluent to buy services – cultural, educational, medical – which once had
been provided at home.

The early history of such private asylums is obscure, for they prized secrecy: families would wish
to avoid publicity, and only from 1774 were they required even to be legally licensed in England.
Such receptacles go back, however, to the seventeenth century (Szasz 1970; Goffman 1961).
Early asylums came in all shapes and sizes, some well run, and others atrociously run. In no
country before 1800 was medical supervision a legal requirement, nor did medical overlordship
automatically ensure good care (Goffman 1961).

The science of asylum management

Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) embraced the progressive thinking of the Enlightenment. He is
credited as being the first in Europe to introduce more humane methods into the treatment of the
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mentally ill. The term used to describe an ethical way to treat patients in mental institutions was
coined ‘moral treatment’ or ‘moral therapy’. Pinel is credited with helping new ways of treatment
including talking with each individual patient. Physical restraints were at best an irrelevance, at
worst a lazy impediment and a lazy expedient and an irritant. For Pinel, treatment must penetrate
to the psyche. Pinel instigated the argument that if insanity was a mental disorder, it had to be
relieved through mental approaches (Bynum 2012).

William Tuke (1732-1822) was born into a leading Quaker family. Like Pinel, with a vision for
the treatment and care of the mentally ill, ahead of his time, he had thoughts of moral treatment.
Tuke established the Retreat in 1796 based on the concept of ‘moral therapy’, like Pinel. Tuke’s
version was modelled on the ideal of the bourgeois family life, and restraint was minimised.
Moral therapy, incorporated by Tuke, was a therapeutic and preventive philosophy for managing
mental disorders. Treatment consisted of removing the afflicted from their homes and placing
them in a surrogate ‘family’ of 250 members or less, often under the guidance of a physician. It
emphasised religious morals, benevolence and clean living, in contrast to the somatic therapies
of the day (such as bloodletting or purging) (Bynum 2012).

William Tuke modelled care with the idea that the mentally ill were equal human beings and they
were to be treated with gentleness, humanity and respect. Physical restraints were removed from
the patients, they were accorded humane and kindly care and were required to perform useful
tasks in the hospital (Bowrey & Smark 2010). Patients and staff lived, worked and dined together
in an environment where recovery was encouraged through praise and blame, rewards and
punishment, the goal being the restoration of self-control (Porter 2002: 104). Ideas such as
Tuke’s and Pinel’s were ground-breaking and the Retreat focused on healing of the mentally ill.
Tuke’s ideas were like those of Pinel’s.
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Everywhere, the care and the cure of the mad became the subjects of the new ‘science’ of asylum
management.

Alexandra Crichton (1798) argued that psychiatry should be based on the

philosophy of the mind. The close of the eighteenth century brought a remarkable marriage
across enlightened Europe between new psychological and reformist practice in what has been
called ‘moral therapy’, as per Pinel and Tuke (Bynum 2012). In all the advanced nations,
psychiatry gained a public face (if with little prestige and much distrust) after 1800 and
psychiatrists found public employment in universities, especially in Germany, and in asylums.
Psychiatry became a profession around the mid-century, when medical superintendents
(‘alienists’) banded together to form specialised organisations (Harper 1997).

As mentioned by Foucault (1961; 1963), State organised receptacles for the insane hardly
appeared at all before 1850, those who were confined were generally kept in monasteries, and
across great swathes of Europe, few were psychologically institutionalised. Two lunatic asylums
still sufficed for the whole of Portugal at the close of the nineteenth century, holding no more
than about 600 inmates (Birmingham 2018).

The asylum solution should be viewed less in terms of central policy than as the site of a myriad
of negotiations of wants, rights, and responsibilities. These considerations should be assessed
between diverse parties in a mixed consumer economy with a burgeoning service sector (Porter
2002: 98). St Luke’s Asylum and owner of a private asylum, Battie, conceded in the 1750s that
a fraction of the insane did indeed suffer from ‘original insanity’, which, like original sin, was
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incurable. Yet far more common was ‘consequential insanity’ – that is insanity resulting from
events – for which the prognosis was favourable (Szasz 1970).

The links between the Industrial Revolution (approximately 1760-1840), the Protestant Ethic
(1905), Imperialism (1870-1914) and the ongoing history of science can be discussed in terms of
time and the organisation of social life. Changes in the mode of production brought about by the
Industrial Revolution meant there was an emerging middle class able to generate wealth and
make distinctions in their lives. However, the subhuman/sub-citizen/social misfit class remained
without a productive and positive role in the economy, that is, they did not own or control any of
the modes of production that affect their lives. They will be forever in servitude to the middle
class (Smith 1999: 56).

Nineteenth century and the rise of the psychiatrist

Throughout Europe, it was the nineteenth century which brought a skyrocketing in the number
and scale of mental hospitals. In England, patient numbers climbed from 10,000 in 1800 to ten
times that number in 1900. The jump in numbers was especially marked in new nation States.
In Italy, no more than 8,000 had been confined as late as 1881; by 1907 that number had soared to 40,000

(Porter 1999).

Such increases are not hard to explain. Positivistic, bureaucratic, utilitarianism and professional
mentalities vested great faith in institutional solutions in general – indeed quite literally in bricks
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and mortar. Schools, workhouses, prisons, hospitals, and asylums – would these not contain and
solve the social problems spawned by demographic change, urbanisation, and industrialisation?
As well, perhaps the increase resulted from more people identifying as mentally ill (SANE
Australia 2013)

In the late nineteenth century, many psychiatrists were now engaged in a career which was
developing as a socially ‘well-to-do’ path, and as well, were now establishing their discipline as
a truly scientific enterprise. Psychiatry could now take its rightful place in the pantheon of the
‘hard’ biomedical sciences, alongside neurology and pathology. As well as being utterly distinct
from such ‘quackish’ and ‘fringy’ embarrassments as mesmerism and spiritualism (Nobel 1992).
Providing psychiatry with a sound scientific basis was particularly important at that time, because
of its strong positivistic and Darwinian leanings (Foucault 1961; 1973). The rigid segregation of
the sane from the mad which the asylum had implemented no longer seemed to make
epidemiological sense.

Following and developing from the nineteenth century, for some, the twentieth century brought
Freud’s (1856-1939) revelation of the true dynamics of the psyche. For others, psychoanalysis
proved a sterile interlude. Still, psychiatry had developed with a neurophysiological and
neurochemical understanding - the brain was finally more understood and advanced and bore
fruit from effective medications (Holt 1989). According to Szasz (1970), psycho-pharmaceutical
developments certainly allowed psychiatry itself to function better, but pacifying patients with
drugs hardly seemed the pinnacle of achievement and any claims as to the maturity of a science
of mental disorders seemed premature and contestable. Meantime, mainstream academic and
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hospital psychiatry remained committed to the program of describing and taxonomizing the
mental health disorders stemming from Kraepelin (who is claimed to be the founder of modern
scientific psychiatry).

“[Yet] the original or primary cause of madness is a mystery”
William Pargeter (1792)

Madness in the twentieth century

Moving to the twentieth century, a politics of psychiatry was emerging in which it could soon
be decided that the very lives of the mentally ill were ‘not worth living’. In the 1930s Nazi led
psychiatry deemed ‘schizophrenics’ as similar in class to Jews, ripe for elimination. Between
January 1940 and September 1942, in what might be a trial run for the ‘final solution’, 70,723
mental patients were gassed (Strous 2007).

Modern psychiatry, from the mid twentieth century, emerged from the conclusion that the
greatest proportion of mental disorders were to be found not in the asylum, but in the community
at large (Goffman 1961). Thomas Szasz (1970) pioneered the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’,
which won high acclaim in the 1960s and 1970s. Mental illness was not an objective, behavioural
or biomedical reality or a negative label of a strategy coping in a mad world. Madness had a
truth of its own. Mental health had a truth of its own. Mental health was now used in law courts.
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In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten was found to be not guilty on the grounds of insanity after murdering
the Prime Minister’s private secretary (Porter 2002: 154-5).

Psychosis could be a healing process and should not be pharmacologically suppressed. Mainly
associated with left-wing politics, anti-psychiatry thus urged de-institutionalisation. At the same
time, and from a wholly different angle, politicians of the radical right, included Ronald Reagan
in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, lent their support to ‘community care’ (Szasz
1970).

Mental health had become labelled and socialised in the community, albeit negatively. It had
become part of the language, the culture. It was more than a biomedical group of facts. The
term ‘mental health’ had become part of the vernacular at about the same time the term
‘schizophrenia’ was introduced by Paul Eugen Bleuler in 1908 (Fusar-Poli & Politi 2008).

To paraphrase Porter (2002: 206), those whose lives were worth living lived long enough to
benefit from the upsurge of new psychoactive drugs. The new drugs enjoyed phenomenal
success. In the 1960s, the tranquiliser Valium (diazepam) became the world’s most widely used
medication. In the 1970s, one American woman in five was using minor tranquilisers. By 1980,
American physicians were writing ten million prescriptions a year for antidepressants alone.
Introduced in 1987, Prozac, which raises serotonin levels and thus enhances a ‘feel good’ sense
of security and assertiveness was being prescribed almost ad lib for depression. Within five
years, eight million had taken this ‘designer’ antidepressant, said to make people feel ‘better than
well’. “With the immense success of the anti-psychotic, anti-manic, and anti-depressant drugs
97

introduced in the last half of the twentieth century, organic psychiatry is arguably in danger of
becoming drug driven. By permitting treatment of the mentally disturbed on an outpatient basis,
psycho-active drugs have substantially reduced the numbers of those institutionalised” (Oxford
University Press 2012).

“Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are.”
(Foucault 1982)

Australian experience of madness

As per The Black Dog Institute (c. 2018), an Australian advocacy organisation supporting
mental health, mental illness is very common in Australia. One in five (20%) Australians aged
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16-85 experience a mental illness in any year. The most common mental illnesses are
depression, anxiety and substance use disorders. Schizoaffective disorder is rarer.

For some statistical background, in this instance, regarding suicide. The Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2016) showed a total of 3,027 deaths by suicide (12.7 per 100,000), equating to an
average of 8.3 deaths by suicide in Australia each day. Of this total, 2,292 were males (19.4
per 100,000) and 735 females (6.2 per 100,000).

Considering young people, all causes of death, suicide accounted for 28.6% of deaths among
15-19-year-old males, and 37.9% of deaths among 20-24-year-old males in 2015. For females,
it was 33.9% and 31.4% for these age groups respectively. (Australian Bureau of Statistics.
2016).

Considering Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples, suicide rates are substantially
higher in Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples, accounting for 5.2% of all
Indigenous deaths, compared with non-Indigenous at 1.8%. The standardised death rate from
suicide for Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islanders was more than double the rate for nonIndigenous people at 25.5 per 100,000 compared with 12.5 per 100,000 (Australian Bureau of
Statistics. 2016). Additionally, reports released by the Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare (AIHW) found that 1 in 3 Indigenous peoples experience high or very high levels of
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psychological distress. It also reported that Indigenous individuals are managed by GPs at a
rate of 1.3 times in comparison with other Australian individuals (AIHW 2019).

Australia is alike other developed countries with its institutionalisation of the mentally ill.
Such institutionalisation has stemmed from the time of colonisation in 1788 (Dax 1989). One
of the key moments in Australia’s history with mental health, was its deinstitutionalisation of
the mentally ill in 1992 (Burdekin & Guilfoyle 1993). And the first mental health care plan, a
primary health care intervention providing psychological treatment among other services, was
also implemented nationwide in 1992. In Australia today, those living with a mental health
disability are managed under the NDIS. It started July 1, 2013 (NDIS 2020a). The scheme
aims to support the mentally ill with an ethos where the individual receiving support has choice
and control over their care (discussed in chapter two).

Australia is ranked highly on the international stage on progressive mental health policy. In fact,
Australia has contributed to and helped to form powerful and negotiative relationships in
collaboration with other progressive and powerful countries to support lesser resourced countries.
This group is called LAMIC and aims at reducing the burden of untreated mental disorders in
low- and middle-income countries (Milton & Lewis 2017). “Of the 800 000 people who commit
suicide each year, 75% are in low-income and middle-income countries” (Leeder 2015).

With other States, specifically powerful developed States that have a history of colonisation, the
mentally ill in Australia have been subjugated as sub-citizens and subhumans and social misfits.
The colonised are subject to a concept which has a history of disempowerment for the under
resourced, that is the Silenced Manifesto. The mentally ill are hidden, their voice is stifled, and
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their future is determined in this case by Australia, the State and culture which controls them.
There are economic dynamics within Australia which can be associated with the more educated
and better positioned class, that is the bourgeois. The bourgeois are better resourced to treat their
mental illnesses. As well, the history of mental health in Australia been closely associated with
psychiatry’s connection with medical science. This connection has disassociated with the
development of the social sciences (Huxley & Evans 2009).

The hidden mentally ill of developing countries

The question remains whether labelling is precipitated by certain cultural dynamics. Nora
Mweemba (in Chambers 2010), who works for the WHO in Zambia, explains that many people
suffering from mental health problems don't come forward for treatment because "communities
still regard mental health as a misfortune in the family or some sort of punishment [from God]".
What treatment is delivered tends to rely on traditional healers who often interpret mental illness
in terms of possession or curse.”

Nowhere is there more widespread a mental health stigma than in developing countries. There
are more layers upon layers of disempowerments and discriminations and human rights
violations than those existent in developed countries. The World Health Organisation states that
we are "facing a global human rights emergency in mental health” Chambers (2010).

People living with mental illness in developing countries are further stigmatised and
disempowered if there is a history of colonisation. Waves and strata and webs and connections
of a history of colonisation/s develop into, again, layers of (post)colonisation, sustaining the
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complexity of power subjugation of the developing country citizens. To emphasise, the mentally
ill are not full citizens or fully human in society, further silencing them in the Silenced Manifesto.

Nowhere is the Silenced Manifesto more prevailing than in developing countries. “With so many
health issues affecting developing countries, tackling mental health tends to be something of a
luxury. Aid spending remains focused on the ‘big three’ communicable diseases of HIV/AIDS,
malaria and tuberculosis, with many other health conditions receiving only a fraction of the
attention and funding” (Chambers 2010). So, the silenced living with mental illness are further
gagged and smothered by disempowerment and a massive lack of resources – “half of all
countries in the world have no more than one psychiatrist per 100,000 people and a third of all
countries have no mental health programmes at all” (Chambers 2010). And the stigmatised are
hidden, hidden behind the more attractive and marketable health issues and illnesses. Nowhere
are mental health issues more perpetuated and disabled and proliferated than by economic
poverty. Further to Chamber’s narrative (2010), “Mental illness adversely affects people’s
ability to work, creates a potential carer burden on their families and generally leads to greater
poverty.”

Wellness

Today, mental health is encapsulated as embracing ‘wellness’. More so, mental health rejects
the pathologisation of the ill, the old production of stigma, the abuse of misrepresentation and
the colonialism of the mind. Wellness is a mix of influences for the human. Including the hard
sciences (biomedicine), the social sciences (society, culture), and the humanities (politics,
economics, religion, and sexuality).
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“In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the
madman: on one hand, the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby
authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, the
man of madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally
abstract reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of
the group, the requirements of conformity”
Foucault (1961)

Definitions of madness over time have been the result of a turbulent relationship between various
views of religion and various views of science. Religion and science and all knowledge thereof
in fact, have oft been at war with each other. The mad have been treated variously over time and
generally have been labelled, never accepted as fully human or a full citizen. A holistic approach
– is being attempted and ‘talked up’ across the present deconstruction of mental illness profession
and sector (Berg & Sarvimäki 2003). However, labelling and categorisation prevails and remains
central within this approach (Scheff 1974).
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CHAPTER FOUR

7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS

7 DRUGS I TAKE BECAUSE OF CLOZAPINE: MY EXPERIENCE
LIVING WITH SCHIZOAFFECTIVE DISORDER

“The expressions of those moving about a picture gallery show ill-concealed
disappointment that they only find pictures there.”
Walter Benjamin (1928)

Living with schizoaffective disorder is inexplicable. It is dangerous and impenetrable and
enigmatic. It’s like negotiating the unfathomable – conversing in absolute incommensurable
languages. You never know what you are going to get.

I should be grateful. This is because I am what they call in mental health service provision
’highly functional’ and ‘insightful’. This is a gift and seemingly not easy to find amongst the
mentally unwell. I am lucky to be equipped with the insight to be discerning, intuitive and
perceptive about my mental health. Being highly functional and insightful equips me for a state
of limbo, straddling across two life experiences - wellness versus ill health. I can almost
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disassociate from being well and unwell through mindfulness. This way of thinking comes
through heightened awareness and sound understanding of my health.

The highly functional are more likely to be able to appreciate, analyse and unload what it really
means to have a health condition, in this case, a mental health condition. I am highly functional,
but sometimes I wish I wasn’t. I consider myself in turmoil. When I am unwell, I hear the seven
noises banging around in my head. They are an accusing, challenging and sometimes impugning
noise.

When I am more well, this space is quieter and the noises fade, but they are always there to some
degree. There is concern when the noises take a reality or personality of their own. I then need
to negotiate between my reality, the reality developed from my psychosis, and medical science.
Managing my mental health involves navigating an incommensurable space between the realities
of myself, my illness, and my treatment.

Speaking from my perspective, that of someone living with psychosis, these various realities are
often incommensurable. The languages spoken in and around this space are not always easily
translatable. Medical science does not necessarily make room for the ontological and surreal
experience of living with a major psychotic disorder. Although medical definitions can be
inadequate, it is still important to consider and define the subject under investigation as
thoroughly as possible, to limit the gaze of the researcher. What does this mean for me? A bunch
of interference with my own thinking and natural sense of self. A bunch of doubt and diagnosis
that are not always consistent or logical.
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Often my appointments with the mental health professionals bring me into a state of anxiety. I
try not to think about the issues that come up in my appointments, for example, ‘Have you had
any thought of psychosis recently?’ What about, ‘Have you felt the need to kill yourself or
others?’ I know these are staple questions that mental health professionals are required to ask,
however, these appointments can be quite difficult to endure, and I often feel dissatisfied
afterwards.

I feel like I should be making the most out of these appointments. It is as if I have

not squeezed the juice out of my psychiatrist for all the knowledge he has. Unless I am unwell,
I won’t see my psychiatrist for two or three months.

I’m sure that my psychiatrist could easily write this thesis in a fraction of the time than it would
take me. The difference would be that my perspective is personal, it is raw. With his biomedical
training, as well as his left-wing bias, my psychiatrist could bring an outstanding insight into
mental health. My version, however, is poignant. It is an insider’s view of a horrific allencompassing experience that is schizoaffective disorder.

There is an autoethnographical gap in the literature about the lived experience of schizoaffective
disorder. My autoethnography is crude, authentic, and intense. The inexact science of mental
health is persistent. Are the viewpoints of mental health science commensurable with my own?
Is there a comparison of the macro powerful history of biomedicine with a micro powerful selfreflection and transparency that can be analysed from a sample of one? (see chapter two).
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Identity constructs

The construction of identity for the marginalised, the Othered, can be dependent and explained
in more ways than just its dependence on government and institutions. The identity construction
of the marginalised can be understood another way via the concept of the Silenced Manifesto.
The agency of the marginalised Other, dependent on the State, and as per the Silenced Manifesto,
is in turn dependent on the space of commensurability where the silenced is given a voice, armed
with the language and discourse of freedom of their own. Freedom from false labelling, for
example the disabling label of disability or difference, untranslatable narrative, discriminatory
stigmatisation, and measurement that measures only that which can used as ammunition to the
colonisers, the creators of difference. The marginalised, the different, the Other, are often
stigmatised.

My own personal agency is again tied to others in governmentality and servitude to those with
ownership of the modes of production, my employers (Marx in Rius 1994). This can be
understood via the perspective of Marxism. Governance, politics and policy control the structure
of identity for the marginalised, which in turn is cemented by the strong hold of bureaucracy and
validated by measurement. The Silenced Manifesto represents a way to cut through the red tape,
to de-colonise the colonised. The utility of identification with the Silenced Manifesto brings with
it a resource that the marginalised can use to empower. The Silenced Manifesto creates a space
where the Othered can be heard, seen and accommodated.

In defining a major psychotic disorder, or the identity of other marginalised groups, there is
always an element of risk in confining something so ambiguous and hazy. Labelling someone
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and defining them as having a disorder or Otherhood can pathologise and/or stigmatise them and
limit them to a constrictive identity, or an identity impinged upon them rather than constructed
themselves. The marginalised person can be defined as having less than human status, as a person
who, according to the coloniser is unable to contribute equally to society and thus a social identity
is constructed and forced upon them. Defining a major psychotic disorder goes hand in hand
with precipitating and endorsing stigma (Goffman 1963).

As eluded to, marginalised groups can experience the same stigma as the mentally ill. They are
suffocated and hidden – silenced - subhumans. The Silenced Manifesto explains how their stories
and experience – their narrative - is shushed and not translatable to the dialect and narrative of
the powerful. The powerful are typically the white, male, middle-class, able-bodied, non
LGBTIQA+ of society who in many ways are the colonisers. The Other, for example women,
non-white, low socio-economic grouping, disabled, and LGBTIQA+, are labelled by the
powerful colonisers, labelled as lesser beings, where they live with a label of stigmatisation.

To try to explain a little how identity is examined, I use two closely related examples,
communication and language.

Communication and negotiation are significant ways that

identities are developed. When I try to communicate, I feel that people look at me coldly and
with judgment, as if I do not make any sense. I am paranoid that people think I am stupid, and I
cannot communicate well. For example, I feel like my colleagues look at me with blank faces,
stupor and annoyance. This could be my paranoia and oversensitivity, or it may be that my sense
of self identity is deeply affected by stigmatisation. I feel disabled, powerless, unable to
communicate. I would suggest that other marginalised groups would feel the same. Their
negotiation of communication and the powerplay that endures leads to miscommunication and
the ramification of discrimination.
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To extrapolate, the uses of clinical language is one way that medical professionals alienate and
ascertain authority over the ill, by precipitating and endorsing stigma. Language is an avenue
through which cultural difference and values are perpetuated. Language draws connections
between the powerful and the powerless. Ultimately it is a form of communication, but it is also
a template and mandate of who has supremacy. Mental health professionals exert their command
over the symbols of communication in medicine and from this they have privilege and influence
that comes with that knowledge. As Foucault argues, knowledge is power. Creating an identity
with schizoaffective disorder disempowers you as the language used between doctor and patient
are governed ultimately by biomedicine. Reflecting on this, perhaps schizoaffective disorder
endures in an incommensurable world where there is little understanding between knowledge
and power. There are many ways that schizoaffective disorder comes to life.

So, a fruitful and empowered identity construction of the Other exists in the commensurable
space between coloniser and colonised, that is the Us and the Other. This space exists despite
governance and politics and policy, and the bureaucracy that holds it together and makes it tick.
Identity construction for marginalised groups, or groups of difference and/or lesser power, relies
on the negotiation and banter, be it possibly aggressive negotiation and banter. This intercession
is transferred via the representation of the marginalised group, for example through
communication and language, with consideration of not misrepresenting the Other and
perpetuating those which are in more of a position of powerlessness.

Another example how the marginalised are identified is through measurement and labelling. The
language, symbols, and knowledge production of the Us is validated by the acts of measurement.
Those who have power over knowledge production through measurements become the monarch
109

of control of that socio-cultural entity. The marginalised measured become identified as cultural
outcasts. The powerful rely on measurements to validate the power of the coloniser, the Us.
Measurements inadvertently create a schism of (dis)empowerment and labelling between those
who use the measurement tool and the Other (McMahon 2013).

The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are crafted by society and given identity by
society. The Other learns to adopt, then actualise and accept, via self-fulfilling prophecy, the
label of difference, disability and i from the participation of knowledge production. The labelled
internalise the identity bestowed upon them, and this could lead to a crisis of representation and
false categorisation. The identity construct that labelling creates is precipitated in the functioning
of culture. How can I break through this divide of cultural misrepresentation? To break the
development of the cultural divide from coming to life?

It should be emphasised that the marginalised do not always identify as marginalised. Some
people who have a mental illness do not necessarily identify themselves as disabled. In fact, by
suggesting that they are disabled or marginalised, I am labelling them. I am disempowering them
by falsely identifying them as subhuman, sub-citizens, social misfits. I have welcomed a false
representation and bought into the crisis of representation that I have fought against. Although
not identifying as marginalised, some have adopted the identity in order to gain some government
benefits. For example, I presented my self as disabled in order to receive the disability support
pension, even though I hate to call myself disabled. In fact, I fought against identifying myself
as such. I use the Silenced Manifesto to demonstrate that I have a voice of my own, despite
government and institutional decree. I would hate to misrepresent those who do not represent
themselves as Other. They will have their own representation and their own voice in the Silenced
Manifesto. Everyone has a voice that isn’t always heard.
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Some statistics about mental health in the Australia context

My life expectancy is less than someone else my age without living with schizoaffective disorder.
Of interest, a study in the United Kingdom showed that life expectancy across all mental illnesses
was well below the United Kingdom average of 77.4 years for men and 81.6 years for women.
Specific to women with schizoaffective disorder, they have an average life expectancy reduced
by 17.5 years, and men with schizophrenia whose lives were shortened by about 14.6 years. Of
those most affected by mental illness were women living with schizoaffective disorder (Hughes
2011).

In Australia, those from a lower socioeconomic background are more likely to live with a mental
illness. Approximately a quarter (26.4% or 2,277,210) of community mental health care contacts
were for people living in areas classified as being in the lowest (most disadvantaged)
socioeconomic status quintile. People living in areas classified as being the highest (least
disadvantaged) socioeconomic quintile had the lowest number of community mental health care
contacts (1,297,305) and rate (273.0 per 1,000 population) (AIHW 2020b). I may mention here
that in Ward C (private), the private and most expensive ward that I have been admitted to, the
severity of mental illness is tempered and minimised. Wealth foreshadows the ugliness of mental
health.

Australia’s health system is complex — and so are its funding arrangements. It is funded by all levels of

government (federal and states and territories); non-government organisations; private health
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insurers; individuals when they pay out-of-pocket costs for products; and services that aren’t
fully subsidised or reimbursed.

In 2016–17, Australia spent nearly $181 billion on health:
•

41% by the Australian Government

•

27% by state and territory governments

•

17% by individuals (for products and services that aren’t fully subsidised or reimbursed)

•

9% by private health insurers

•

6% by non-government organisations

Health spending was about 10% of gross domestic product. This means $1 in every $10 spent
in Australia went to health.
(Department of Health 2019)

The foundation of the Australian health system is Medicare, established in 1984. Its three major
parts are: medical services, public hospitals and medicines (Department of Health 2019). Mental
health services that are subsidised through Medicare include: primary health care for instance
GPs, psychiatrists, psychologists, occupational therapists and social workers (Parliament of Australia
2019). Medicare also supports public hospitals. State, territory and local government are responsible for
managing and administering public hospitals (Department of Health 2019).
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The Federal Government also shares responsibility with the states and territories for other
activities under national agreements, such as the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).
These other activities include funding public hospital services and the national mental health
reform (Parliament of Australia 2019) as well, the NDIS. The NDIS is a ground-breaking,
once-in-a-generation change to the way people with disability are supported in Australia. It is a
social reform on the same scale as the introduction of Medicare or compulsory superannuation
(Every Australian Counts 2018). In March 2013, the NDIS legislation was passed and the
NDIS Act 2013 was created, along with the Scheme was the National Disability Insurance
Agency (NDIA) (NDIS 2019).

According to Knaus (2018), about 81.4% of those who requested NDIS support for
psychosocial disability (a disability particular to those with a mental illness) were accepted,
compared with more than 97% for people with cerebral palsy, autism or intellectual disability.
The scheme, at full rollout, is designed to cover about 64,000 people with psychosocial
disability. That is well below the total number of people who require ongoing support for
severe mental illness in Australia, which the government estimates at 230,000. The report casts
doubt on the government’s figure, saying its basis is unclear, given there are an estimated
690,000 Australians with a severe mental illness (Knaus 2018).

Regarding government mental health expenditure in Australia, the AIHW states:
•

$9.9 billion, or $400 per person, was spent on mental health-related services in
Australia during 2017–18, a real increase from $382 per person in 2013–14.
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•

1.1% annual average increase in the real per capita spending on mental healthrelated services from 2013–14 to 2017–18.

•

7.6% of government health expenditure was spent on mental health-related services
in 2017–18.

•

$6.0 billion was spent on state/territory mental health services in 2017–18; $2.6b on
public hospital services; $2.3b on community services.

•

$1.3 billion, or $51 per person, was spent by the Australian Government on benefits
for Medicare-subsidised mental health-specific services in 2018–19.

•

$541 million, or $21 per person, was spent by the Australian Government on
subsidised mental health-related prescriptions under the Pharmaceutical Benefit
Scheme and Repatriation Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits during 2018–19.
(AIHW 2020a)

And so lies some knowledge of the governmental structural and costings of mental health in
Australia.

Though this presents with little knowledge to causes - the exact causes of

schizoaffective disorder are not known. It is thought that the disorder is produced by a
combination of genetic and environmental factors – nature and nurture. There is some evidence
of a biomedical cause simply because medication can work. As well, the disorder tends to occur
more in families where there is a history of schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder (Kaplan 2003: 509; Daniel 2011: 20-22). Mental health issues run riot in my family.
Most of my siblings are living with mental health issues. I have many cousins, aunts and uncles
who also battle with mental health issues. Sadly, my cousin with schizophrenia committed
suicide.
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Seven drugs I take because: My experience living with schizoaffective disorder

I was diagnosed at first as having bipolar disorder for about four years, although I never fitted
that label very well. I didn't have the definitive highs or lows that come with bipolar. Later, I
was diagnosed as having schizoaffective disorder, after a psychiatrist changed his mind and
disregarded the bipolar diagnosis. I never really agreed with this classification either, although I
never really agree with being pigeonholed in any way. I can relate to some schizophrenia type
symptoms: heightened senses, hearing noises (voices), hallucinations, paranoia, for example
believing that people around me are able to read my soul by looking into my eyes or that I can
sense what people are thinking about, experiencing strange sensations, and erratic thought
patterns (demonstrated by inconsistent, illogical and changeable conversations)

Mental health issues do not discriminate against sex, race, culture and class. Their treatment,
which involves taking medications and various therapies, are more complicated than what they
may seem. For example, mindfulness practices I do include fortnightly counselling, where I talk
my way out of poor health and am given tools to reduce and manage the debilitating effects of
anxiety. I also practice meditation and yoga, eat well and exercise, all in my effort to manage
anxiety. There may indeed be variations to treatment related to social and cultural indicators of
the individual. My non-responsiveness to standard anti-psychotic medications has forced me to
take a powerful anti-psychotic drug called Clozapine.

Taking Clozapine commits me to having a relationship of dependence on the State. It is an
extremely highly regulated drug requiring regular tests: blood tests, blood sugars, blood pressure,
temperature, weight, blood sugars, thyroid functioning, echocardiograms, psychological and
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others, all monitored by a team of mental health professionals. I am constantly measured,
prodded and assessed. Clozapine can potentially be a dangerous drug. It killed people in the
early 1970s from a condition called agranulocytosis, a disorder involving a dangerous decrease
in the number of white blood cells. By the early 1980s, was back on the market and was shown
to be very effective in reducing suicide and reducing instances of psychotic episodes (Sinha
2020).

There is an irony about 7 drugs I take. I take three drugs a day which are not directly related to
taking Clozapine, and seven drugs a day because of Clozapine and its side effects. Below is a list
of my medications:

•

Quilonum (lithium carbonate) – a mood stabiliser

•

Thyroxine – a hormone I must take due to Quilonum affecting my thyroxine levels

•

Lamotrigine – to treat clinical depression

•

Oxybutynin hydrochloride– another anti-depressant that reduces bedwetting caused by
Clozapine

•

Amitriptyline hydrochloride – for bedwetting caused by Clozapine

•

Betmiga – for bedwetting caused by Clozapine

•

Abilify – another anti-psychotic to aid the efficacy of Clozapine

•

Coloxyl with Senna – for constipation caused by Clozapine

•

Atropt drops – to reduce drooling from the Clozapine

•

Clozapine
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A side-effect of Clozapine is that I drool at night. I wake up during the night over heated and
saturated in my own saliva. When the drooling first happened, the Clozapine nurse, who had
become a friend as such, in a dependent sort of way, suggested I use a terry towelling waterproof
pillowcase. I remember feeling shocked at the suggestion of using such an item. It was a
suggestion down the path of humiliation. Drooling – how undignified! I was used to having a
dry mouth for many years, which has brought its own problems such as decayed teeth. Now, I
produce too much saliva. The amount of saliva I drooled at night felt as if I had wet myself.
However, bedwetting is a side-effect of its own.

After about eight months of taking Clozapine, I started wetting the bed at night. At first, it was
only small amounts, of which I tried to ignore. Surely no one will notice, only small patches?
Then it became more – more frequent and more of it. I cannot tell you the great shame I felt
when this started happening to me. My boyfriend at the time didn’t take it very well. Who could
blame him? He would wake up wet as well. The ignominy of it all was astronomical. Sometimes
when my bed was wet and I was too oblivious to change the sheets in the middle of the night
(having a very deep sleep was also a side effect of Clozapine), I would go and sleep on the couch.
This didn’t solve the problem however, because I would wet the couch too. My strategy to my
bedwetting was to avoid the subject. It was too obvious though once I started wetting the couch.
My housemate brought the subject up with me. It could no longer be ignored. I remember
negotiating with my housemate about what I should do. First, I had to book a GP appointment.
Second, I had to scrub clean the couch. Third, I needed to start wearing adult nappies. Fourth, I
needed to purchase a mattress protector. I felt absolutely gutted and mortified, like there was no
way out of this putrid indignation and degradation. I felt so disgraced, so much that I lost all
pride – I felt like I had lost my reputation and now sunk into a pit of sadness and dishonour. I
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am mortified due to Clozapine, despite its success and its efficacy in treating psychosis. Medical
science had ruined my strong sense of identity and self-worth in turn for which I had quieter
noises in my head. Which is better to keep? My sanity or my dignity? It seems that I did not
have the freedom to choose. Both are questionable spaces to be.

I saw two urologists about my bedwetting. The specialists admitted that usually their clientele
is much older than me or had bladder cancer. I had to go through a series of humiliating tests.
Yet again I am embarrassed by medical science. One of the urologists prescribed me some
medication which worked (mostly). My bedwetting had decreased remarkably but I still had the
odd night of shame. When I told the specialist that my bed wetting had reduced to seventy
percent of the time, he was happy, as if it is still acceptable to be mildly incontinent. I don’t
seem to be able to shake my association with bedwetting. I only recently took off my mattress
protector because my boyfriend couldn’t deal with the crunching noise it made when you turn
over in bed. One ironic benefit of bedwetting in the public mental health system is that you have
case managers that can take advantage of the situation. It seems that I get about $500 every year
to pay for the privilege of being incontinent.

There are other shameful side-effects that are absolutely dehumanising in themselves. There is
the obvious side-effect of putting on a lot of weight. I have put on 23 kilos over the period since
my first diagnosis. It is difficult for me to lose weight due to the medications. In addition, I am
at risk of developing Type II Diabetes. I find this shameful. Then there are other physical side
effects from taking so much medication, such as drowsiness, heavy sleeping (probable cause of
bed wetting), slow responsiveness, slow cognitive functioning, poor concentration and memory,
118

increased effects of alcohol, constipation, nausea, dizziness and light-headedness. Other side
effects include having an underactive thyroid, as a result of taking Quilonum for many years. I
am now required to take thyroxine indefinitely. Alternate therapies are often necessary because
medication cannot treat the social problems such as isolation, unemployment, lack of education,
and poverty that accompany schizoaffective disorder. These therapies aim to address the
multifaceted facets of social issues that affect someone with schizoaffective disorder. However,
this is a huge topic warranting another thesis.

The noises (voices) are definitely quieter now I am on Clozapine. However, am I now free? This
is a paradox for me, as a Clozapine patient. The noises are softer, but my identification as a crazy
sub-human, sub-citizen and a social outcast is cemented by association with the treatment. I must
give away my ultimate freedom, put my full trust in biomedicine. It is true that I need monitoring
with the other drugs I am taking, but that is nothing compared to the regime of taking Clozapine.

I am forever labelled a Clozapine patient, not normal, not a fully contributing citizen, disabled
and a cost to the State. I am stuck in a dynamic between health professionals and myself, where
measurement and assessment are tools of engagement and care. I am in a measurement contract
I am constantly being assessed and medicated accordingly. The misuse and exploitation of a
measurement can in some ways be likened to the effects of colonialism, likened to mind abuse
and rationality bombing. (Mistreatment and this association with colonialism is to be discussed
further in chapter twelve.)

119

Clozapine belongs to a group of drugs called antipsychotics. These medicines work on the
balance of chemical substances in the brain. Clozapine is only prescribed for people with
resistance to other antipsychotics available. It is necessary to closely monitor someone taking
Clozapine. The regulation when first given Clozapine involves staying at the mental health clinic
for the first day, undergoing regular blood tests and being closely monitored. Then there are
blood tests, a Clozapine nurse and a psychiatrist visit every week for 18 weeks. Now, the
psychiatrist and Clozapine nurse visits are monthly. The psychiatrist appointments then fall back
to every couple of months, or when needed.

A basket case?

I cringe when I think about creative therapies. All the psychiatric wards that I’ve been to have
strongly advocated creative therapies. Personally, colouring in and threading beads just doesn’t
cut it for me. There is the argument that craft puts you in the company of others, and I can
understand doing craft in therapy is useful. Creativity is also helpful in calming the mind, very
helpful. Creativity is therapeutic, and it should be nurtured.

Another way of understanding

creativity is that in its demonstration it reinforces a child-like relationship with those who care
for me, specifically hospital staff.

Living with schizoaffective disorder requires constant awareness and mindfulness of the smallest
signs and symptoms. I must be vigilant in my treatment and be compliant if I am to have any
quality of life. For my friends and family, living with someone with schizoaffective disorder is
more than challenging. However, I am living proof that you can be highly functioning and have
schizoaffective disorder.
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As far as I know, schizoaffective disorder is mine to keep. Not as a badge of honour, but a
shackle that I constantly struggle with, a marriage made in purgatory - in a constant state of pain
and dismay. I have heard stories about people with hallucinations becoming friends with their
voices. Not me. It just goes to show how potentially powerful psychiatrists can be. People
diagnosed with major psychotic disorders are in the lap of the psychiatry gods - diagnosis and
treatment is predominantly controlled by these gods of (in)sanity. There isn’t a blood test or an
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) or an x-ray which will absolutely diagnose everything.

Assume that the mental health system is a clinical arm of the State. And the State’s bureaucracy
creates cultural artefacts/biofacts from various (culture associated) measurements of the mentally
ill. Bureaucracy has control over the knowledge generated, and the power it develops (Lea 2008).
The mentally ill are dependent on the State and are as much a guinea pig for affordable health
care and medicine. When you’re in the system, getting your medication from the government as
I do because I take Clozapine, you are totally a ward of the State (Kleinman 1980; DiGiacomo
1987, 2013; Biehl 2005). That is, a dependent of the State.

I must admit that I cannot imagine life without schizoaffective disorder. Through schizoaffective
disorder I have experienced the worst times of my life, yet it has also given me the most poignant
insight and understanding to the meaning imaginable in my life.

To conclude, living with schizoaffective disorder, for me, is unreal: in the truest sense of the
word. Basically, it is my experience to constantly be negotiating with myself whether something
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is real or not. I am paranoid about losing my cognitive ability. I am also paranoid that I am
stupid and will be locked in a cage of stupidity for the rest of my life.

I do feel the stigma from living with a major psychotic disorder. Loved ones have questioned
my attention span and memory in simple tasks such as ordering a few drinks at a bar. This all
makes me quite sad. I know all too well that there is an element of truth in the distrust of my
loved ones. I loathe to admit it. I hate to think that I will always be like this.

Being highly functional, I have good insight into the paraphrenia that is schizoaffective disorder.
This disorder, as with all medical conditions, has socio-cultural facets which need to be
understood alongside biomedicine. The socio-cultural perspective of the disorder will always
provide substantial depth and efficacy which needs to be a focus in the analysis of any mental
health research.
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CHAPTER FIVE

LIFE BEFORE INSANITY

“Social life is messy, uncertain, and emotional. If our desire is to research social life, then
we must embrace a research method that, to the best of its/our ability, acknowledges and
accommodates mess in chaos, uncertainty and emotion.”
(Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015)

I often try and remember what life was like before; before noises, paranoia, surrealism, anxiety
and being fat; before being a subhuman, a less productive and valued member of society. Was I
an active, productive member of society before I was diagnosed as crazy? What was I like before
being diagnosed mentally ill? Was there a definitive difference in my life before and after
diagnosis? The truth was that before being diagnosed with a mental illness, I had a full and
wonderful life, heading towards a successful future. After being diagnosed as having a major
psychotic illness, there was a switch that changed my life forever.
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This chapter introduces the start of my mental health journey, in particular, experiences around
early diagnosis and my first admissions into a mental health institution. I begin with some
background to my early life prior to these. It also works as a foundation chapter to the proceeding
three ethnographies of my mental health hospital experiences (chapters six to eight).

My narrative at times uses informal language – I employ the words that best communicate my
feelings and my meaning, best portraying the history of me. Today, my mind and the way it
functions, or dysfunctions, is an enigma to me. There is a weird effect on my line of thought
which can confuse people as I jump back and forth in conversation, seeming like I have a short
attention span. So, I ask you for your patience with my erratics. (See the introduction for an
explanation of my fragmented thought processes and expression.) I find it difficult to remember
linear events leading up to my diagnosis in the preceding years. My memory is sketchy and
vague. It bounces tangentially back and forth, between and around various recollections. The
result is a somewhat surreal, vague and dreamlike experience of what I think happened. I tried
asking my Mum about what I was like when I first became ill. She said, “I can’t do it! I can’t
go back to that time. You’ll have to ask your father about that.” My mother’s reaction really
worried me. Surely those memories couldn’t be that horrible. I certainly have little to no memory
of that time, but I thought that was just from the sedatives and antipsychotic medication they
ploughed me with. The truth be told, I have few memories, even sketches of memories, of the
times when I have been unwell, especially in the early years.

I was one of six kids. Such a large family was expected of devoted Catholics. I spent my primary
school years being a sincere and dedicated Catholic. I was seven when I decided that I wanted
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to try to be the first Saint Rachael. My godmother, Aunty Helen, was a Dominican nun. She
encouraged me in my devotion to the Catholic Church. Aunty Helen supplied me with many
books on saints and prayers. It was through reading these books that I noted that most of the
‘good’ saints started their devotion to the Church during childhood. What I classified as the ‘bad’
saints were mostly saints, canonised hundreds of years ago, with their Christian work centring
on being part of royalty.

I had a little shrine at the head of my bed, decorated with a crucifix and a palm leaf attached to it
out of respect for Palm Sunday (a significant day in the Catholic Church), a picture of the Pope
at the time and the prayers and pictures of my favourite saints. I remember getting in big trouble
from my Mum when I told my younger brother and sister the story of King Herod slaughtering
babies. I went to confession a few times over that one. Mum and Dad encouraged my faith or,
at least, tolerated it.

Years later I wondered if my obsession with the Catholic faith as a child, and my planning on
becoming a nun could have possibly contributed to the development of my schizoaffective
disorder? Was my faith within the realms of normalcy? Did my devotion embody some form of
mania? Did I define myself as whole only though my commitment to Catholicism?

Ireland, a country with strong Catholic heritage, has an unusual and significant history,
relationship and over-representation with mental health illnesses. A small town in the west of
Ireland, on the Dingle Peninsula, has an especially unusual history, one where there are strong
relationships and correlations between mental health, age, gender, and sexual history. The
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recorded history of this small town shows that on a given census day in 1971, two out of every
hundred men were in a mental institution. Nearly all those hospitalised men (89%) are lifelong
celibates, most were between the ages of 35 and 50, and more than half were diagnosed as
suffering from schizophrenia (Scheper-Hughes 2001).

Is there a correlation between schizophrenia, age, celibacy, and gender? Does spiritualty have
anything to do with it? Can I draw any correlation with my experience as a child and those Irish
men living in a small Irish town? Can my history and belief in God, and a faith in the Catholic
Church, be associated with the social and cultural indicators from the small Irish town? Either
way, without my belief as I grew up, I felt incomplete.

This is uncanny, because the discussion in this thesis involves debate over the mentally ill being
‘sub-human’ and incomplete – as being set apart and detached from society. Could my faith as
a child have disconnected me from the normal social experiences of growing up? I don’t know
any other children who have committed themselves to religion in the same way. I hold true to
the faith I developed as a child, to the bible message in Mathew 18:3, “Truly, I can say to you,
unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.”

I remember wanting to belong, to someone or something, to feel loved and included. As a child,
I wanted to belong to the Church. As I grew older, into my teens, I turned away from the Church
and my faith as such. I felt less a need to commit on a personal level to my faith and more a need
to grasp hold of social inclusion. My faith did not satisfy my developing need to be accepted and
wanted socially. What was intimate and personal became a strong sense and desire to have
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cultural connections. As a teenager I wanted to belong to as many groups as possible, to feel
wanted.

My needs had changed. I needed cultural inclusion, a connection with the broader and more
worldly sociocultural experience. Through this connection, I have been able to find meaning
with my community. My social identity wins over my personal faith. My cultural identity wins
over a relationship I have between myself and God. After many years, my relationship with God
was overtaken in importance by my relationships within the society in which I lived.

My secondary schooling showed that I was a joiner, joining any club, charity or society, any
event, happening or occasion. I was one of those annoying students promoting ‘school spirit’,
receiving medals for it too, embarrassingly enough. There were many times in my teens when I
was anxious and depressed, often ending in tears. I remember a strong sense of self-loathing.
Still I was heavily committed to extra-curricular activities, feeling like I needed to belong
somewhere. Through social inclusion, I strived to become human and complete, rather than subhuman and incomplete as I was too soon become. I remember feeling alienated, despite my
heavy commitments to social activities. Similar to what Marx stated, “social potential has
become the private power of the few...The less you are, the more you’ll have. To have more,
you must alienate yourself” (Marx in Rius 2012: 80-01). I was desperate to be wanted by others.
I put this down to teenage angst.

The strong desire I had to belong and feel wanted carried through to the early years of adulthood.
After some travelling, I settled into a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology/Development Studies
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(third world development, as it was called at the time). I became unwell when I was halfway
through my honours year in Development Studies. I was heavily involved with social justice
organisations and other clubs, living with two of my best friends, and going out with a fantastic
guy. I was one of those idealist types who believed one could make a career out of a degree
majoring in Anthropology and Development Studies. I planned to save the world! I had my
heart set on becoming an aid worker overseas, helping people with my (assumed) in depth
knowledge of Foucault and Marx.

I did do some aid work, when I had just turned twenty-one. A friend and I decided we’d go to
Calcutta and work hand in hand with Mother Teresa. This we did. Mother Theresa was to deliver
to us, the group of admiring faithfuls attending early morning mass, a lesson of true charity. She
told all the volunteers that it was wonderful that we could do this valuable work in Calcutta, but
we should be made aware that there are people close to us, in our own communities, that need us
just as much. It was time to wake up and take note. My personal needs were overtaken by the
needs of those in my community. I realised that my cultural connections were the most important
connections I had, and they also resonated with me personally. The personal had become the
political. The personal had become the cultural.

So, I did it. I connected with my society and culture. There were people amongst my family and
friends who needed support, so I set about to support them. However, this was not enough. I
kept working as much as I could with social justice organisations, as well as my part time/full
time job as an aged care worker. I also decided to join a public speaking group. My friends tell
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me that at this time I was swaying towards mania, trying to organise myself and make the most
of every minute, literally.

I remember feeling desperation to fit everything in, along with a great sense of self-loathing, and
confusion. I remember trying to prepare for my honours thesis and panicking about it. I didn’t
feel that I was smart enough to do it. I was left dumbfounded and bewildered. I have never felt
good enough, never smart enough. I have tried over many years to compensate for these
inadequacies. I would try to fit as much in the day as possible. I have never been good enough.

I remember just before I became acutely ill, that I was organising all my time, awake and sleep,
in ten-minute intervals. I even allocated an exact time of just eighteen minutes to cook dinner
for my housemates and allotted boyfriends. I wasn’t really sleeping. I felt desperate to make
every minute of the day and night purposeful and fruitful. I couldn’t miss out on any opportunity
that came to me. It all seemed quite okay and doable at the time. This proved to be one of the
first definable signs of my psychosis.

I have been asked many, many times if I had any signs or symptoms of poor mental health before
‘the diagnosis’. With my shoddy memory, it is hard to say. I remember one time coming home
with my boyfriend I started crying inconsolably and for no apparent reason. My arms also started
to move spasmodically and involuntarily. The tears and the arm movements stopped after a
couple of hours. A couple of months later, for no apparent reason, I started crying again,
inconsolably. I also started cowering and hiding from people, not feeling safe to walk to the
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shops, being afraid to talk to my friends and hiding behind furniture. These symptoms lasted a
few days.

My friends and boyfriend were now very worried about me and my strange behaviours– mania
and psychosis – although these terms were new to them. My boyfriend booked an appointment
for me with a GP who was recommended to be sympathetic to people displaying such symptoms.

My boyfriend and I met the GP. When she saw me cowering behind a chair and showing signs
of hallucinations and delusions, she said we had to go at once to the psychiatric ward.

I don’t know how this all happened. Was my hospitalisation related to my need to belong and
feel wanted as in my younger years? Was I a social misfit, a sub-human, not belonging
anywhere? I really have no idea! I have always claimed that the onset of my illness was out of
the blue. There was no rhyme or reason. My mental health is mandated by my own biomedical
composition. This would make sense looking at the massive over-representation of mental illness
in my family. I cannot negate that the biomedical model is completely obsolete. Despite revision
of psychiatric theory, it remains a strong force even after hundreds of years (Szasz 1970).

While I strongly believe that my schizoaffective disorder is intimately related and dependent on
my biomedical make-up, I cannot negate the myriad of other factors that also take precedence in
relation to my mental health. There is a strong argument that declares that mental illness is a
socio-cultural phenomenon and, as an anthropologist, I feel that I must adhere to such a
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declaration. To paraphrase Kleinman (1980: xiii), the socio-cultural medical phenomenon is
being taught in universities. It is imperative to teach both undergraduate and postgraduate
students in psychiatry social and cross-cultural psychiatrics, and as it is imperative to teach
medical anthropology to anthropology undergraduates and graduate students.

Let us go back to my story. I will try to extrapolate the difference between the biomedical model
and the socio-cultural model, recognising that they at times work together: a relationship that has
been recognised sporadically over the centuries.

So it happened. I broke for the first time.

This was the beginning of my hell on earth. I was just 23 years of age. My sense of self was
fucked permanently. I remember feeling that I had to find myself again, but I was lost as to how.
Sadly, this has proved to be an ongoing and frustrating endeavour. My agency and selfdetermination were not my own. My identity and my future were in the hands of the mental
health professionals, revered ‘demi-gods’ of Western medical science. These are the ones who
utilised the tools of biomedicine to gain control: that is, achieving mental health as defined by
the science of modern psychiatry.

My boyfriend was holding it together well. With instructions from the GP, he took me to the
Emergency Department of the nominated hospital. The GP had already rung ahead to the hospital
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so that they were ready for me. I didn’t have to wait. Thinking about it in retrospect, waiting in
the Emergency Department would have been a new-found hell for me.

I was examined by who I think was a psychiatric registrar in the room allocated for mental health
assessments. I remember the doctor asking me all sorts of probing questions:
‘“Do you know where you are?’ – Yes, I’m at the hospital
“Are you hearing voices?” – There’s a lot of noise in my head
“What are the noises saying?” – Bad stuff. That I’m stupid and hopeless
“Do you see things that aren’t there?” – Not usually, but there are bugs all over the floor
“Have you ever thought of ending your life?” – Sometimes
“Do you want to end your life now?” – No. I couldn’t do that to my family and friends
“Who is the Prime Minister of Australia?” – What the! Really? Funnily enough I couldn’t
answer.

Throughout all these questions, I was cowering behind a chair, tracing with my finger the lines
of the tiles of the walls. I remember the tiles were white, but a bit grey with dirt and age. I think
I was wearing a second hand top and skirt and old shoes - typical student uniform. My clothes
wouldn’t have been black. I always thought that black was a depressing colour and I didn’t want
to be perceived as depressed, ironically. I had lost a bit of weight in the last couple of months,
probably due to my manic activities. My senses were terribly heightened. I remember the smell
in that room. It was that typical disinfectant and bleach smell that one associates with hospitals.
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The smell makes you realise that this is a cold clinical setting – it is the kind of smell that reminds
you of getting vaccinated as a kid, and the related fear. The hospital was not a place of nurturing
or love. It was a place that worshipped the science of medicine, of sterility and hygiene, of dead
germs. Mental health does not fit into such a germ focussed/disease focussed medical science
paradigm. Mental health, in today’s world, requires therapy centred on feelings and perceptions.
Treatment involves talking therapies and medication and various other psychological tools.

In the mental health examination room, I felt overwhelmed and suffocated, frightened. I could
not shut them up: the noises. Terrified, I cowered further behind the standard and ‘safe’ hospital
chair provided in the psychiatric assessment room. By safe, I mean that there were no sharp
corners on the chair that could be used for self-harm. My boyfriend was trying to help me answer
the questions. By doing this I think he was trying to hasten the treatment process, telling the
doctor the answers that he perceived were needed. He wanted me to be well now.

I read in my medical notes that my boyfriend declared that I had a history of nine months of
paranoia. That I was edgy, agitated, unable to focus or concentrate – and not getting any study
done. He stated that I had panicky episodes, poor sleep and poor appetite and that three weeks
prior I had become more edgy, stifling easily, hiding behind lounges and doors and was “afraid
to be here”. The mental state examination on admission recorded that I was an acutely agitated,
disturbed young woman; that I had severe psychomotor agitation; that I was tearful with dramatic
gestures, that I was initially unable to speak much, but later able to give some history. It was
recorded that my mood was depressed, despairing and anxious, that my thoughts were paranoid
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ideas. I had no suicidal plans although I talked about it and thought about it. I thoroughly blamed
myself.

And so, after what felt like a gruelling examination, I was admitted to a psychiatric ward, Ward
A (public), for the first time. I could hardly believe it! This was the beginning of a lifelong
relationship - no, a war - with my insanity. From then on, each day has been a battle. My first
admission was voluntary. There is a thin line between being a voluntary and an involuntary
patient. Basically, if you are at risk to yourself or others, and non-compliant, you will be
sectioned or given an involuntary treatment order under the Mental Health Act (for example, the
Mental Health Act 2015; Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Amendment Act 2014; Mental
Health Act 2015 (ACT); Northern Territory of Australia Mental Health and Related Services Act
(2018). Each Australian state and territory have their own version.) Most of the times that I have
been considered insane, I have been in enough control of my faculties to be admitted as a
voluntary patient. That first admission, despite being psychotic, I was deemed sensible enough
to be a voluntary patient.

I don’t remember how I got from the Emergency Department to the psychiatric ward. I do
remember that when I first arrived in the ward, I was given a dose of Neulactil – an old school
anti-psychotic medicine and my first ever psychometric drug. The first of what seems like
thousands now. After taking the drug, I remember saying, “Okay. That’s all good now. I’ll just
catch a cab home.” I was very serious, but the doctor and my boyfriend thought I was hilarious!
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In my first admission, I remember feeling overwhelmed and inundated. It dawned on me that
life would never be the same for me again. My dreamed of future was ruined. At this stage, I
didn’t have the cognitive capacity to complete my honours thesis.

Of course, mental health professionals are interested in any mental health history in your family.
And, as it would transpire, many of my siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles are afflicted with
mental health disorders. We cannot seem to escape it. Is this a biomedical problem or a cultural
problem? Mental health disorders are still seen as biomedical in the first instance. The doctors
give you a physical examination, mainly so that they can rule out any biological causes. For
instance, my hypothyroidism came about from side-effects from one of my medications.
Hypothyroidism can cause depression. Hyperthyroidism can cause psychosis. Quilonum makes
your hands shaky, it makes your writing difficult to read. So, we have to be mindful of that.

In the early days I hid behind furniture. I was full of self-deprecation and shame. I also kept
saying variations of the following:
“Other people need the bed”
“I’ll make the bed dirty”
“I don’t want anyone to know”
“I’m probably just putting this on to get out of doing my [honours] thesis.”
“I’m not really sick.”
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In the early days in the ward the doctors struggled to find the correct medication. I was very
withdrawn, very suspicious and ultimately paranoid. On the first day I was given the drugs
Largactil and Valium after the Neulactil. According to my medical notes, I settled after taking
medication. There was an incident on the first night of my admission when I fainted. It so
happened that I had not eaten for over 36 hours. The nurses quickly laid me down, took my
blood sugar level and gave me some juice. And then I was able to eat dinner.

I remember, on my first day in hospital, being extremely anxious about receiving a diagnosis. I
was desperate to understand what was happening to me. The health professionals seemed
hesitant to give a certain and confident diagnosis. A fixed diagnosis would pin them down and
commit them to a definition which they were essentially unsure of themselves. As has been
emphasised so far in this thesis – psychiatry is an inexact science.

After five days of being in this initial psychiatric ward I was given a more thorough interview
with the psychiatrist. Reading through the notes of my first hospital admission, the term ’acutely
agitated and disturbed’ was repeated over and over again. I also experienced severe psychomotor
agitation, this involved involuntary arm and leg movements. There was reference to my
behaviour potentially stemming from psychosis or depression, beginning at the age of 15. It was
at this age, on reflection, that I noticed occasional but pronounced emotional lability: I would
withdraw for days at a time, became agitated, and experienced feeling lost, confused and
disorientated. As well, there was the possibility that my symptoms were brought on as part of
post-traumatic stress disorder caused by a rape at the age of 19. I really didn’t want to bring that
up again.
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Some visual hallucinations I had during this time in hospital included hundreds of bugs crawling
all over the floor, as well as animated faces in my blanket. I was also paranoid, endlessly. I felt
that the nurses talked to me (when they didn’t) and that they could read my mind. This is a
common symptom when I am unwell, I am afraid of looking in people’s eyes because they will
be able to read my thoughts and feel what is in my soul.

I experienced pretty much all the time a thing called thought blocking. This is manifested by me
losing comprehension and track of my thoughts midsentence. My memory loss also started. I
was devastated to lose some cognitive functioning. I was mortified to start my life as a subhuman. It seems that the symptoms that I’ve had over the last twenty years will continue. The
major symptom is my mind going blank without warning, me losing track of the conversation I
was just having. My mind is just vacuous, nothing more.

I remember something that was very upsetting to me during that first hospital admission. I was
afraid of quitting my honours year. I felt a great sense of obligation and commitment to finishing
my honours. I felt shattered and broken about failing that year. The fear has carried on until
now, when I am writing a PhD, afraid that I will be a failure again.

It is interesting to note what is considered therapeutic on the ward. Groups and group activities
are a priority (Frame 1984). Group activities consist of several things such as reading the
newspaper, cooking, a great deal of craft, and for those considered more advanced there is the
137

option of group discussions on anxiety and depression. In this first admission, and consequent
admissions over the next couple of years, I was deemed only suitable for doing craft. I remember
thinking it is quite a joke that making beaded necklaces, painting and sticking things together
were considered the most therapeutic actions for me to be involved in. I remember feeling quite
insulted that sticking things together, in no particular way or inclination, was considered the
upper limit of my capabilities. I asked the nurse if I could go to the anxiety and depression
groups, but she thought this was testing my capabilities.

It is interesting to look at structure and compliance on the ward. I was only starting to be labelled
as improving when I started to comply with the ward structure. For instance, my medical notes
were more positive in their description of me and my symptoms after I had participated in some
craft activities. Needless to say, craft did not make me feel better. I was permitted towards the
end of my stay to attend the assertiveness group. The best thing that the nurses could write about
me attending these activities, was that I stayed the duration of the whole group.

Perhaps the visits from my family, my boyfriend and my friends made me feel better because
there is a cultural/relational facet entwined in positive mental health. Nurturing and developing
my relationships made me feel better. The right drugs, at the right dose, at the right time also
made me feel better. A mixed approach between biomedicine and social connectedness is the
most therapeutic treatment for me.

The powerful nexus between social connectedness,

specifically relationships, and power is a strong Foucauldian concept (O’Farrell 2005).
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Another measure of assessing wellness is by examining a balance between feelings and thoughts,
and how these are negotiated and managed off the ward. By feelings and thoughts, I mean nonpsychotic feelings and thoughts - manageable anxiety and manageable paranoia for example. I
was deemed as dischargeable once my mood and my reasoning was considered more real and
rational, as defined by the mental health professionals.

A major factor in being well again is the ability to manage within society off the ward. What
does that mean? To be competent in society? I don’t think even the sane know. We do seem to
know what is not acceptable: a mentally ill social misfit. It wasn’t until I had had a successful
run of outings from the ward, showing that I displayed appropriate behaviour, that I was deemed
well enough to be discharged. In preparing for my discharge I was expected to manage my own
drugs and talking therapies, while managing my socio-cultural needs, for example nurturing and
relying on relationships. (Kleinman 1980)

The medical staff were focused on the way I felt and the way I thought. The notes say things
like “thinking more clearly” and “feels less confused, lost, dislocated”. It seems that throughout
my stay I required constant reassurance from the staff, saying that “I’m not supposed to be here”.
In these early days of my illness I lacked insight. It wasn’t until I had my first hospital admission
that I first started to gain insight. I started saying to the nurses and doctors, “I’ve just realised
something. Maybe I’m sick”. My admission at this time lasted a total of 39 days. I was
discharged May 27, 1997.
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Later, being somewhat of a mystery for my psychiatrist, I was diagnosed as somewhere between
bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia. I am currently thought to have
schizoaffective disorder (for now). I was also thought to have the symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety and depression. Diagnostic labels are very haphazard. There seems to
be a myriad of tests, scientific and not so scientific, that assist in the labelling process. Some
mental health professionals are lost without their tests, while others are comfortable with things
being vaguer. I will discuss later the use of the term ‘scientific’ married with ‘mental health’.
My second admission was 20 days long in 1998. My third admission was 17 days long in 1999.

Below are listed some of the tests that I was subjected to during each admission:
•

Advanced Clinical Solutions

•

Basic 23

•

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 4th edition

•

Mini Mental Examination

•

Wechsler Memory Scale, 4th edition

•

Test of Everyday Attention Version A

•

The Speed and Capacity of Language Processing Test Version A

•

Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System

•

Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale
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•

Numerous blood tests measuring levels of medication, such as Quilonum, must be given
within the therapeutic range so as not show any great effect on the grander biology of the
body. As I have mentioned my long term taking of Quilonum has caused my thyroid to
be under active

•

Brain MRI - testing for physical causes of my mental health disorder

During my third admission (11 May – 28 May 1999) I was given a nursing care plan. The care
plan went into detail about what I was supposed to be achieving by what date. The plan, simply
put, outlined my milestones to get well. The initial plan, day one, was to have all pathology and
planned physical tests. Days one to three required assessing my individual needs. Days three to
seven involved learning to make decisions that increase a sense of control over the situation.
Days seven to fourteen were about nurturing relationships and reconnecting with society. The
nursing care plan was not completed. It missed out the allied health interventions, and feedback
on my progression each week. The nursing care plan was not completed due to lack of staff.
The plan was not high up on the staff’s priorities, although it was valued and considered an
important part of quality assurance and evaluation.

The therapeutic group program involved:
•

0600 - get up and shower and dress

•

0730 - walk

•

0800 - breakfast
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•

0900 - relaxation

•

1000 - group work covering
o self esteem
o managing depression
o anxiety management
o assertion
o quiz groups
o education groups

•

living skills including
o craft
o self-development
o healthy lifestyle
o creative expression
o current events
o options

•

1200 - lunch

•

1330 - more activities as mentioned above

•

1600 - free time - visitors allowed
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•

1800 - dinner

•

2100 - visitors leave

•

2130 - bed

As I have said, I believe that my memory was shaky for those first four to five years or so of my
illness. I think that is my minds way of protecting itself. Psychosis is a terrifying experience.
When I try to think about psychosis and what it felt like, I can only grasp at thin wisps of fleeting
nothingness. The thing that I remember the most clearly is the noises in my head. Mental health
professionals like to label them ‘voices’. To hear ‘voices’ is an extremely tell-tale sign of
schizophrenia and schizo related disorders. I have called my voices ‘noises’ in my effort of depersonalising them; to make them unreal and take some of the power away from them. My
‘noises’, are lessened these days due to Clozapine – a very effective anti-psychotic drug. I do
still, however, get snippets of the noises, just to remind me, it seems, that I am still nuts. The
noises frighten me. They engulf my mind. I cannot keep them away. They entrap me. Their
whispers infiltrate my consciousness, and possess me with their messages:
“You are profanely absolutely bloody stupid...You are completely loathed... unwanted by
everyone and everything.... never to amount to anything... ugly... disgusting...pitiful. No one
cares about you in the slightest, even your family who are supposed to have unconditional love
for you... You are not even deserving of that! Dying would even be above you...you are not even
worthy of the expense of a funeral, though no one would come to the funeral anyway... I hate
you, I utterly hate you, I loathe you!

Just die. Just melt away into nothingness where you

belong…”
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All of these are spoken in different voices. About seven voices. They are shouting and hissing
at me in total disgust.

During a psychotic episode, while the noises are saying such things and they are getting louder
and louder, my senses are extremely heightened. I can feel the world caving in on me, crashing
around me, I am asphyxiated and crippled. I can hear people talking to me, such as doctors,
nurses and loved ones, but what they are saying is muffled into silence so that the noises dominate
my sense of the real. The world has morphed into chaos. All I can do is hide. I hide behind
chairs, tables, behind a cocoon I make with my arms. I try to detach from the world, ironically,
while it crushes me down.

Just to make things perfect, I also live with extreme anxiety and depression. My anxiety is related
to my psychosis. It is a battle to keep calm when your sense of reality threatens and demeans
you.

I had three hospital admissions in the same hospital in the first three years. In those early years,
my boyfriend who originally supported me broke up with me, I moved back home to live with
my parents, I put on 23 kilograms, and I was put on the disability support pension. I was then
labelled by the government as ‘disabled’, a lesser citizen who is dependent on and in servitude
to the State. I tried to fight this derogative and patronising label, although in order to continue
receiving the disability support pension, I had to keep convincing the State that I was sub-human
and in need of their governance. That is, in order to receive the funds, I needed to define and
precipitate myself as ‘lacking’, a sub-citizen and in need of dependence. I always fought the
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category of being an insipid ward of the State (See Smith 1999; Lupton 2013). Fortunately, I
always made sure that I was doing a course or volunteering so that my resume had no gaps in it.
Apparently, employers are suspicious of gaps in resumes.

I spent those early years, those times I remember, in varying states of anxiety, paranoia and
depression. I would try and exercise every day, when I wasn’t too crippled with anxiety or
depression. Frustratingly I was unable to read at times. My cognitive functioning was adversely
affected. I usually had about three mental health professional appointments each week. I have
a healthy mistrust of mental health professionals. I remember one psychiatrist telling me not to
trust any man who had a beard. My Dad has a beard.

I’m now relying on information given to me by loved ones to explain those times to me. The
loved ones then are still my loved ones today, minus the boyfriend, who ultimately couldn’t cope
with my illness anymore.

I learnt quickly that mental health was stigmatised. I decided not to disclose my illness to many,
due to the shame associated with it. I was made to feel incompetent, incapable and unreliable.
It was at the very beginning of my illness that stigma raised its ugly head. My illness was a secret
kept hidden from friends and relatives. It was a private thing and we couldn’t talk about it
publicly. Stigma is so entrenched it was and is hard to dissociate from it.
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In 2000, I had not long before failed at working as a travel agent. That job proved to be far too
stressful. I was in a constant state of panic. I wasn’t coping. I was mortified, humiliated and
defeated again. It was when I started volunteering in aged care that things started to look better.
I was about 26, three years after my first admission. Aged care was familiar to me as I had
worked in the field during my undergraduate degree. I was soon asked to attend an interview for
a paid job as a personal care assistant in the dementia unit. It felt good to be employed at last, in
a job that I could potentially do.

With my new employment things were looking up, although I still suffered extreme anxiety.
Soon after commencing my new employment I suffered another relapse. I was 27 years of age.
I had collapsed several times, semi-conscious, and was taken to hospital via ambulance on each
occasion. Once I was at the GP’s surgery when it happened. She was very concerned about
possible neurological causes. The ambulance came that time too. The collapsing experience was
quite unique. I would lose bodily control and just slouch in a chair, as if I was fainting. I felt
extremely weak and powerless. Conversely, I remember feeling gratified that I didn’t have to
worry about things, and I could just close my eyes and forget about everything. I felt safe. My
anxiety levels decreased. I was going to the hospital. I felt validated; my symptoms must be real
if I went to hospital by ambulance. These were physical symptoms. I was convinced that I was
physically unwell. They would look after me there. By the time I reached the hospital, I was
able to speak. Each time, the Emergency staff couldn’t find anything wrong with me. After my
last collapsing episode, I think at number four, a doctor suggested that my condition seemed to
be psychosomatic. This was the worst news! I was gutted! I felt disempowered because what I
thought was a validated health problem turned out to be fake and made up in my head. I had lost
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yet another battle! I felt like I needed to start all over again. I was absolutely determined to beat
this!

I took some time off work. My medications were adjusted, and I received counselling. After
this relapse (they never diagnosed my collapsing episodes as having a cause other than high
levels of anxiety) and with some adjustments to my medication, I came back to work a new
woman! My anxiety had decreased, and my confidence and cognitive functioning had increased.
I had lost weight. Life was looking great!

I was able to move onwards and upwards, more so than I had in years. I decided to make the
most of my strengths. It was then that I started to study to be an enrolled nurse. It took me two
years to do the nursing course. I studied part time whilst working at the dementia unit. Once
qualified, I began working at a residential mental health rehabilitation centre. I loved working
there and felt empathetic to the clients from my own experiences. I felt comfortable working in
this centre.

By the time was twenty-nine, I was in a relatively good place. I was working in an area I was
good at. I had moved out of home. I started dating again. My friendships were supportive. I
was having fun. I then met George. We fell in love and decided to move interstate. It was a
happy time.
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After moving interstate, I worked in the public hospital. I spent some time working in the Ward
B (public)– the psychiatric ward, mainly caring for one patient at a time when they were a suicide
risk. One patient that I took care of had to have her bra confiscated as she tried to hang herself
with it. I was a newly trained nurse in mental health, yet I could tell the difference between a
well-run ward and one that was not. As a nurse working on Ward B (public) I remembered the
experience as unstructured and disordered. The ward was so hectic that I wasn’t given an
orientation of the emergency procedures. The nurses seemed stressed and frenzied, working
reactively – putting out spot fires as they arose. It was obvious that they were under resourced
to manage the high number of patients with mental health issues. The entire ward was chaotic.

I soon left nursing. I was tired of dealing with the minutia. I felt powerless. What could I do?
I started working in a mental health non-government organisation. I was a support worker in a
program that aimed to prevent hospital admissions to Ward B (public), or to reduce stays at the
Ward B (public). It was surreal being on another side – being the mental health worker.

My own mental health needed maintaining and nurturing, requiring me to have some sick days.
I had to tell my boss about my mental health status. I didn’t want to disclose but was pressured
to do so. I have been pressured to disclose to all my employers over the years. I don’t know
which has the most precedence, the employer’s insistence and supposed ‘right’ to know, or my
right to privacy and self-determination and the right to define my own self-identity. My own
personal agency is again tied to others in governmentality and servitude to those with ownership
of the modes of production, my employers (Marx in Rius 1994).
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I tried to remove myself from anything related to mental health. I was sick of being tied so
thoroughly to the category of disabled. I wanted to be free, in control of my own identity and
governance. I wanted to be a full citizen, in control of my own resources of production and my
own voice. I started to work in project management, then research. My psychiatrist at the time
was not happy with me working full time and studying part time (I had just commenced a Masters
in Public Health). She believed I only had the capacity and the ability to work part time. I felt
disempowered by her views but was determined to move forward!

My relationship with George at this stage had ended, but I took it better than expected. I began
my doctorate. For about eighteen months, I was stable and productive. I was 36 years old and
happy. I was working hard, studying hard and enjoying myself.

The next memory I have after this time of productivity is a vague one of my lying on my couch,
hiding. I had become delusional and paranoid again. I remember my boss at the door, knocking
and calling out to me to see if I was alright. My employer got in touch with my psychiatrist who
stated that I needed to be looked after or I would be admitted to Ward B (public). It seemed that
there were no services to support me in the community.

After talking with my GP, my employer kindly took me in to stay with her and her family. I
remember being embarrassed to learn that I was to stay with my employer, but we had also
become friends by this stage. They had two small children and I was afraid I would scare them
with my strange involuntary arms movements and foot tapping (these symptoms are typical of
me when I am experiencing psychosis). I told the children I was playing the drums. I stayed
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with my boss and her family for about a week. I spent my time scrubbing and cleaning, tidying
and arranging things neatly and obsessively. When I wasn’t obsessively cleaning, I was smoking.
In a period of about three months, I spent close to a thousand dollars on cigarettes. From what I
can gather, I manically spent another few thousand on stuff that took my fancy – art, travel, pretty
dresses, shoes, skin care products and whatever else I was attracted to. I didn’t have this money.
I put everything on credit, maxing out every credit card that I could put my hands on.

I felt terrible that I was encroaching on my boss and possibly affecting her children with my
crazy behaviour, although, my boss and her husband assured me otherwise. I opted to leave their
home and stay with another close friend. I stayed with her for about a week, after which I
stabilised a little. I did a lot of obsessive cleaning and ordering wherever I went. One time when
my boss took me to see my GP, I proceeded to organise all the brochures in the waiting area.
Firstly, in order of topic, then, in alphabetical order. I threw myself into my work, quite
manically. My boss pulled me aside at work to tell me to calm down. I was being manic overwhelming myself by overworking.

I was starting to show signs of psychosis. My employer contacted my father, who then travelled
interstate then came to see me.

I have a memory of my Dad and I seeing my GP. They discussed my needing some time in
hospital. It was agreed that Ward B (public) was the last option. They decided on me going back
home to go the public ward there. I had been to this ward during the first years of my illness.
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My life will never be the same.

I will be forever broken.

And so, I begin the narrative of the three wards.
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CHAPTER SIX

LIFE AFTER...

LIFE SINCE JULY 2015

“Some people never go crazy. What truly boring lives they must lead!”
Bukawki (Australian Broadcasting Commission, Changing Minds 2014)

I often wonder what it would be like to think like a normal person, to feel like a normal person,
to experience life and to love as a normal person. As someone living with schizoaffective
disorder, I wonder if my experience of life is that different from the so-called ‘normal’ people. I
will forever be ‘Othered’, subhuman, dependent on the State, and somewhat a deviant. As Said
argued in ‘Orientalism’ (1978), describing (post)colonialism, there is a divide between ‘West’
and ‘East’. West are the colonisers, having power over the East the colonised. Those with major
psychotic illnesses are the colonised (East) who are controlled by the colonisers (West). People
from the East are here called the Others. The East have been Othered. The West has exiled us
from normalcy.

152

This is my life living with schizoaffective disorder. I will try and describe to you in this chapter
what living with schizoaffective disorder is like. This chapter describes some of the cultural
phenomena I must deal with day in day out.

Every day I have to manage my illness. Some days are harder than others, some minutes are
harder than others. Over the years I have developed exceptional insight, according to many
mental health professionals, a far cry from the confused individual I was when I first became ill.
Even though I have this supposed great insight I still find it difficult to make judgements about
what is real and what is not. The most reliable yardstick for reality that I have is asking people
that I trust around me, “Is that real?”, “Did s/he say that?”. These people include doctors, nurses
and psychologists, and more commonly and importantly my family and my dearest friends.
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This ever-present confusion about reality adds up to me having poor self-esteem. I doubt
everything I hear and see and smell. I constantly hear the cruel noises shouting at me, telling me
how stupid and hopeless and worthless I am. It is tremendously difficult navigating between
these noises and the stimuli I manage externally in the supposed ‘real’ world. What do I believe
to be real? What do I believe? Without knowing what is real, and when I cannot ask another, I
am forced to make leaps of faith in judgement. Negotiating a thought or a sense becomes an
exercise in second guessing what is right and what is wrong. I will always live with this
uncertainty. (I have noted, however, that since commencing Clozapine, the unwelcome noises
are a lot quieter.)

The sense of touch grounds me. When I am unwell, or beginning to get unwell, I am often seen
tapping: tapping the chair I’m sitting in, the table I’m sitting at or tapping my head. The sense
of touch centres me. The surface stays the same. I cannot distort it. The senses of hearing and
sight are subjective for me. Whereas touch is stable. As I go about my everyday routine, I
constantly ground myself through touch. I touch the wall I walk past in the corridor, the floor at
my feet, the computer keyboard I type on, the pages of the book I am reading, the hair on my
head as I brush it for the day. With touch, I don’t need to ask others, “Do you feel that?” I trust
in my own sense of touch.

It is difficult to use my tried and true method of touch whilst navigating my own self-identity.
Without this stabilising method of assessing truth and with all of the second-guessing and
confusion about reality, I am left with having the construction of a negative self-identity. My
identity construction is not my own. It is determined by the values and beliefs purported by
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society and the power influences that sway the culture, politics and economics of society. My
sense of self identity is already consumed by the social forces in the processes and production of
socialisation. My identity is not my own. It is given to me. I do not have the power to say who
I am, where I belong and what I value. I often lack the strength and power to create my own
identity, as I am unable to take control over the resources that affect my life, or the outcomes of
relationships I have formed. That power is taken from me.

For the 20 plus years I have lived with schizoaffective disorder, I have battled with my perception
of reality. It is difficult to decipher what is real when the noises are loud in my head.

Are they real? This is a reoccurring question. How does one assess what is real and what is not?
There is reality judged by the senses. There is also the reality judged by our thinking. Then
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again, how does the philosophical perception of reality differ from an individual perspective of
reality? Can they and should they be separated? In my readings of philosophy, constructions of
what it means to be real are cerebral. As an anthropologist, I am concerned with the social
construction of reality. I cannot separate the cerebral with the social and cultural. Neither can I
separate reality from other social and cultural phenomena like culture, politics, spirituality and
economics.

An important premise of my thesis is my belief that medical science disempowers the mental
health patient. Regardless of how institutionalised – as an inpatient or outpatient – they are
disempowered through misrepresentation and the tunnel-vision of medical science. It is through
this misrepresentation that the mentally ill become sub-citizens and social misfits (Szasz 1970):
they are often perceived as engaging in anti-social behaviour, so they must be removed from
public sight. There are some correlations between public policy dealing with the psychotic and
the Indigenous. My identity as a subhuman is crafted for me by medical science, carefully
measuring me and labelling me. I am misrepresented by the dominant and powerful mental
health professionals as a mental health patient, not a full and equal human being. This part of
identity construction is authorised by the scientific paradigm. I am, in effect, socialised through
modernist medical science and the cultural phenomena and socio-historical context of which
medical science purports to (DiGiacomo 1987). My identity is overwhelmed and overtaken by
just one fraction of who I am - a biomedical facet - which can be treated by medication which,
simply put, balances the biochemical phenomena in my brain. (Goffman 1963; Kleiman 1988)
Can I be wholly identified by brain chemistry?
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The label bestowed upon me has left me powerless (Becker 1963; Scheff 1974). Powerlessness
is demonstrated in many realms. I am powerless to construct my own self-identity, be it an
identity as defined by mental health, or not defined by mental health. I am an object of medical
positivism, to be measured and weighed. I am forever battling the right to identify myself
holistically. I am frustrated because I am so much more than my illness. I am more than a client
with schizoaffective disorder, identified by psycho-metric testing and blood tests - biomedical
indicators. I am Rachael Jane McMahon. Socially, I am a daughter, a wife, a sister, an aunt, a
friend, an employee, a student, and a girlfriend, plus more. Spiritually, I have the heritage of
being Catholic; currently I practice mindfulness. Culturally, I adhere to the values and ethos of
my community. Economically and somewhat politically, I endeavour to have control over the
resources affecting my life. I am all of these things and more.

I can negotiate these facets as best as I can, in the non-medical world, with the limited agency I
have.

However, as someone living with schizoaffective disorder, who is dependent on

medication, medical science and the State to remain as well as can be, I cannot escape being
pathologised and having my identity crafted by medicine. I cannot escape science, as the
treatment for me is mostly and historically pharmaceutical. Psychiatry is now exploring and
learning about its social situatedness in the social sciences. It is hard to describe which treatment
is more effective – medical or social. I’ve come to believe in a combination of both. The
emphasis on either remains the preference of the individual. As an anthropologist, I would love
to argue that society and culture are the main foundations to sound mental health, but I can’t.
Even from my example, I need the support of my family and friends, being grounded in my
values and beliefs, as well as the psycho-metric drugs that have been prescribed for me. Wellness
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is a balance between the healing properties of socialisation and culture and those of
medicalisation.

My identity is also defined by social stigma. There is a public perception of major psychotic
illness which confines its sufferers as deviants. As alluded to earlier, there is a hierarchy of
mental health conditions. Depression and anxiety are the best ones to have. It is not unusual for
famous people to be suffering depression and/or anxiety. Indeed, it is very common to have such
a diagnosis of depression or anxiety. There is merit in that, seemingly a badge of honour,
especially for the creatively minded or those who call themselves ‘artists’. Eating disorders also
seem to be a phenomenon of the modern age where the concept of the self is pivotal.
Schizophrenia and its friend schizoaffective disorder are not esteemed illnesses. There is great
shame in any illness with the prefix ‘schizo’. When one hears on the news about a person who
is wielding a knife down a street, they are often identified with the prefix ‘schizo’. Those of us
living with schizoaffective disorder look to the likes of John Nash to save our reputations.

Public portrayal of madness in contemporary Australia does not empower the mad. The
television series, Changing Minds (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2014) depicts a
psychiatric ward in the present day. Changing Minds gave the viewer some insight of being
mentally ill and being treated in a psychiatric ward. The Liverpool Hospital, where the series
was filmed, houses one of the busiest psychiatric wards in Australia, where 1200 mental health
patients are treated each year. In Australia, for males aged 15 to 24 years, suicide is the major
cause of death. Twenty people attempt suicide each day. For those living with schizophrenia, a
third become well and don’t relapse, a third remain well on medication, and a third worsen. Some
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people living with mental illness will never recover completely, some of their cognitive
functioning will be lost with each episode of being unwell. This is the case with me.

Each time I have a psychotic episode, my cognitive capacity diminishes. I really notice when
this happens. I could read a page of a book, the same page, for two hours and not have a clue
about what is said. My memory is terrible, and retaining knowledge is hard. I must take extra
time, using varied methods, so that I can begin to be in a still place to study. With a calm mind
and repeated ways of reading and processing information, I can just get by. A long-standing and
ongoing effort for me is to control and manage my anxiety levels, to limit further psychotic
episodes. It is a mammoth effort for me to put all my mental resources into controlling my
anxiety levels. Limiting anxiety means limiting psychotic episodes which means maintaining
cognitive functioning.

Changing Minds also illustrated the intense powerlessness and lack of autonomy of the mentally
ill. One patient became aggressive with a nurse when, after waiting for hours to see his assigned
clinician, he was told that the clinician couldn’t meet him yet because the clinician was heading
off for his break. The patient arced up yelling, “I want a break too! Where’s my thirty minutes
off the ward?” The nurse tried to reassure the patient saying that they understood, but the patient
retaliated by yelling, “‘I understand’ doesn’t cut it for me!”

The television series depicted the warped sense of reality displayed by the patients. The job of
the mental health professionals in the hospital was to support the individual patients to get well,
that is to minimise depressive, anxious and psychotic symptoms. The mental health professionals
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take the lead in reducing symptoms so that patients can have clarity about reality. The main tool
employed to assist patients to have a clearer mind are psycho-tropic medications. A structure is
provided by medication in conjunction with cognitive and emotional supports provided by
psychological therapies. Patient and staff can together unpack the psychotic episodes and try to
make sure they never or rarely happen again.

I have adopted an anthropological study of mental health. Specifically, an autoethnography of
schizoaffective disorder, looking at the ways I have been labelled as a lesser human, and
understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses it.

The job of an

autoethnographer, such as me, is to unpack the cultural phenomena of psychosis, to better
understand the values and purpose of living with a major psychotic illness. There is more to
psychiatry than medical science. Cultural analysis commands depth of understanding, bringing
symbols such as medicalised ‘shrouded’ language into clearer meaning. There are limitations to
medical science in its approach to effect recovery. Medicine arrests symptoms but is not a tool
for recovery for the patient as an individual or a social/cultural actor. Treatment of the mad under
psychiatric medicine can be correlated with the treatment of the Indigenous people under
colonial, metanarrative hegemonies, as per Derrida (1978). This in turn supports the grand
narrative of medical science. The mental health professionals are agents of this grand narrative.
Similar plights have been identified by feminists, race theorists and queer theorists (Campbell
2000).

Apparently, the mental health ‘misfits’ of society need parameters, governance, control and
ruling. To live like this, to feel imprisoned by my own mental health, I am left without cause or
attribution. I am judged by my capabilities or assumed lack thereof. I am judged to be lacking
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as subhuman and basically stupid. Yet again, I am not considered to be fully human and lack the
competency to live a full life. I am labelled.

I have not the social strength to resist such labelling. Indeed, according to labelling theory a label
of ‘psychotic’ can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I become what I think and feel, guided and
stemming from the decree of powerful others (Becker 1963). The psychiatric profession labels
me in such a way, and the community follows suit, especially if the subhuman is displaying antisocial behaviour. Such behaviour is undesirable.

A prominent way people with mental illness are dehumanised, by professionals and nonprofessionals alike, is the telling of a narrative in which they are unfit to be parents. It has been
suggested to me by those in my social networks that as someone with my condition, I lacked the
skills to be able to be pregnant, survive the psychological stress of the birth, and give the newborn
enough love so that I could form an attachment to my baby. Basically, it was assumed that I lack
the ability to raise a child because I have schizoaffective disorder. I don’t remember there being
such a side effect on the back of any of my medication boxes.

This is a very confusing state of affairs. Can I or can I not have children? Should I or should I
not have children?

Many doctors and nurses over the twenty plus years of my illness have suggested that I couldn’t
and shouldn’t have children. Other reasons given to suggest that I cannot have children are: that
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I could relapse and never be as well again; and/or the compounded stress of being pregnant and
having a baby could precipitate into a larger psychotic episode worse than I have ever
experienced before. I have heard people say, when talking to women with a major psychotic
illness, that they should consider the option of having their fallopian tubes tied. Similar
suggestions have been made about people living with Down Syndrome (ABC 2016). For many,
many years I was told both by family and professionals, that I could not and should not have
children. I was told that I am almost guaranteed to get post-natal depression. Also, apparently,
I won’t be able to breast feed.

Anyway, pregnancy and being a mother will be difficult. At the very least, I will need to take
extended time out with a lot of support, which will undoubtingly bleed me dry financially. What
to do? Should I bow to the accepted cultural norm of being a mother? Although, more and more
women are choosing not to be mothers; to have an identity separate from their reproductive
capabilities.

I went to see a psychiatrist earlier this year who specialises in pre, peri and postnatal care for
those mothers requiring psychiatric treatment. He stated that I was in fact able to have children.
I could stay on all of my medications. The only medication I would have to come off would be
Quilonum and that would only be during breastfeeding. The doctor said that I would just need
extra support during pregnancy and afterwards, just like – I imagine - a normal mother would.
Again, he emphasised that I was perfectly able to have a child.
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This was overwhelming news! For twenty years I have been told that I lack what is needed to be
a mother. Also, that due to having a severe mental illness, I should not have a right to have
children because I am incapable of loving a child. It is uncanny to label someone with
schizoaffective disorder as someone who is not capable of love. Other symptoms, yes. Lacking
the emotion of love, no. The emotion of love is omnipresent across all cultures, all faiths and all
values (Kleinman 1988). And – all illnesses and disabilities. The sad thing now, knowing that I
could have had children, is that I am reaching my biological limits on having children due to my
age. For many, many years I wanted children. For many, many years I was told I could not have
children.

It is often emotionally painful to hang out with my friends who have children. Some years ago,
I went for a trip to the coast with some very close friends, their husbands and children. In the
three days that we were away together I had one two-minute conversation that did not involve
pregnancy, stretch marks, birth, breast feeding and toddlers. After three days I broke down in
tears, I told one of my best friends that I didn’t think I had anything in common with my oldest
friends any more now that they were married with children. She rightfully replied that she is a
skilled engineer capable of running a sewage plant but did not know how to deal with her twoyear-old child. She needed to talk about her new experiences with her child so that she could
feel supported and gain valuable knowledge that talking with other mums could give. I thought
this was a good call. We have been much more understanding of each other since.

For many years those closest to me have attempted to console me because they thought I couldn’t
or shouldn’t have children. After talking with others about the ‘trials and tribulations’ of having
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a family, how fulfilled their lives are now and how life was meaningless before the euphoric
experience and feeling of motherhood, I would get a nod of condolence. “Don’t worry Rachael”,
others would say, “You can fulfil your mothering wants/needs elsewhere”.

So, I find myself reflecting, why is it alright for my friends to have children and not me? Why
have I found it so hard to find a life partner when so many of my friends have loving long term
relationships? Culturally, where do these questions lie? What values and beliefs are instilled in
my culture that dictates the definition of a fruitful life? And, more importantly, what values and
beliefs installed in my culture state that I lack the ability or capacity to live a normal, albeit
fruitful life? Obviously, I need help, medical help to change the way I am; a biological mishap.
Though, as an anthropologist, I am interested in the cultural perspective of being mad, and how
that affects my capacity, or results in incapacity. Why am I discriminated against? (Smith 2004;
Mordock & Hall 2002; Gladstone, Boydell & McKeever 2006)

I’ve had those closest to me question my capacity and ability to complete this thesis. They have
questioned why I am so determined to finish it and why I put so much pressure on myself. Their
concern comes from a good place. Yet, I feel defeated. My loved ones think that I must, of
course, be struggling. The very strong message I hear is that I am not able to live a full life. I
lack the capacity, capability, competence, internal resources and aptitude.

As well, I am disabled, handicapped and labelled by the State, via the power of medical science,
as requiring constant monitoring and measurement. I am required to maintain close contact with
my team of health professionals. If I do not comply, this entices the health professionals to
164

become suspicious and wary, assessing the risk of another psychotic episode and the possible
necessity of interventions and involuntary treatment?

I am in servitude. I am a subject of prejudice and judgement. I am in servitude and will be for as
long as I am sick, which will most likely be until I die. There is no end to my dependence on the
State. I am forever trapped into a reliance on the public health system where I need the State for
my highly regulated treatment.
.
I don’t think I’ll ever be free. I have certain freedom in my everyday life, freedom in so much
as my everyday experience of living with a major psychotic illness will allow. However, my
everyday experience includes quieting the noises in my head, and managing high levels of
anxiety about many things, such as, going to work, socialising, negotiating relationships, and
other things like heights, stairs and driving. For example, I cannot drive above seventy-five
kilometres, over bridges, long distances, or in merging traffic.

I still must see a mental health professional at least once a week. This commitment takes up five
hours.

Each week I see one or more of the following: a psychiatrist, psychologist,

neuropsychologist, Clozapine nurse, pathology nurse, dietician and/or the GP. At least a third of
the five hours spent with the health system is waiting. The people waiting with me are generally
unkempt, unhygienic social outcasts who do not respond to or engage with social niceties; they
seem really disabled from their illness. In my medical notes I am often described as “well
kempt”. I always feel misplaced as I sit and wait. I feel like I don’t belong. I feel isolated, in a
separate existence to the misfits. I know that the Clozapine nurse will bump me up to the top of
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the queue, as I usually must come to the clinic in my lunch hour. It shouldn’t be the case that
sometimes I go to the top of the queue. It’s not fair.

I feel terrible making judgements about my fellow Clozapine users. I do not know the various
facets of their lives, and what has happened to them to bring them to this point in time. I ask
myself, “Am I stigmatising the other patients? Am I categorising? Am I a misfit?” I think I am
a misfit too, not fitting into my chosen world of academia. I can very well be an academic misfit,
not meeting the standards with my limited and stunted cognitive functioning. Perhaps I am in
academic purgatory, wanting to come to intellectual heaven but am lacking the fundamental
tools, like a functional brain, so I slide back down to a life with limited opportunities. Living
with the label of “disability” makes sure that I have limited opportunities.

Mine is a disabled existence, possibilities are limited. I don’t want to say that a disabled person
cannot have a full and fruitful life, yet at the same time I want to acknowledge that having a
disability does place a confinement on what you are able to do. For example, with the use of a
wheelchair or hearing aid, things can be done, but they must be done differently. I will find it
difficult to complete a PhD. No mental health professional has said that I cannot complete a
PhD. Rather, they have said it will be harder and may take me longer than the typical PhD
student. I just must try different tactics, take extra time and go to hospital every now and again
to get a mental health service, tweaking the medication and my functionality. I just must keep
on fighting, trying to figure out the most likely reality as I go along.
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The possibility of a future hospital admission is always lurking in the back of my mind. Now
that I can go to Ward C (private) for respite if needed, without fear of poor treatment, with the
comfort of knowing the staff will treat me well, I feel some solace. (A description of Ward C
(private) is given in chapter nine.) The choices that money buys for you! Money eradicates
many ramifications of psychosis it seems. I don’t want to be that engaged with the mental health
system. As little engagement as possible is my desire. I have seen too many people with mental
illnesses come in and out of the wards, like a revolving door, with recidivism a way of life. I feel
dishonoured as it is by the structure of my treatment. I want to run away from being involved
in any sort of institutionalisation that facilitates recidivism – for me it is dehumanising,
pathologisi ng, disempowering and shaming the self. Being a part of institutionalisation, that is
being an inpatient semi-regularly or being engaged as an outpatient regularly, cements your
dependence on the State.

Be real. Does money really buy you better medical treatment? Are there better drugs, better
doctors and nurses and allied health professionals in the more expensive wards? Is the treatment
more holistic or does biomedicine reign where there is cash? There is less pressure to attend
group activities, and more opportunity to spend time on your own in your private rooms with
television and an ensuite. How is the culture of medicine, psychiatric medicine, different in
private psychiatric wards than say, for instance, in the Ward B (public)? (A description of Ward
B (public) is given in chapter eight.) Is being institutionalised by private medicine the same as
being institutionalised by public medicine?

167

It is fruitful here to employ a Marxist model of mental health service. I posit that the rich have
control over the resources that control their lives and the poor are subject to the owners (Bracken
& Thomas 2005; Grob 1990; Brown 1984.

July 2016

The strangest thing happened to me. I took note because it only happens once every two years
or so. I felt calm, at peace, content. The sensation just sort of came upon me. Not a wave, but
a centring. It was incredible. I felt still in my mind. I had what one might describe as clarity.
There was no noise in my head whatsoever. I remember thinking tonight that it is incredible how
much I take for granted. I have grown used to the noises over the years. I never really realise
how noisy it is in my head, until they are gone. I must say that the stillness is awesome! My
thoughts are quiet and still. My thought processes are lineal rather than chaotic. God it’s good
to think rationally and systematically instead of randomly and haphazardly! To think in order
rather than disorder.

I felt happy.

What a release!!
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I really have no idea why this came upon me tonight. I was out watching the grand final of the
local roller derby competition with some friends. Then it came upon me that my mind was still.
It lasted for about two minutes. Two minutes of clarity and bliss. Then it started to get noisy
again, in my head. Again, I felt overwhelmed by aural stimuli. After only two minutes of
stillness was I reminded of the hell that I put up with day in day out. The centeredness and sweet
feeling of peace gave me a taste of how I imagine the broader population thinks. Is it true that
most people live without noise in their head? It must be liberating having such a clear, lineal
mind and calm thought processes. I’ve never been so envious in my life, now that I have an
inkling of an idea of what life could be like. Oh, sweet normalcy! Oh my God what a
phenomenal feeling! And why on earth would it happen to me while watching roller derby with
friends?

Now of course, as I am writing, my gratifying oasis has passed.

Damn that noise!

Even though I have two-minute hiatus every two years, I will always be broken. My life to
various degrees, will always involve noises, paranoia, surrealism, anxiety, being fat, being a
subhuman, and being undervalued. I am an active, productive member of society. I work and
study, and have goals and aspirations and enjoy fruitful, beautiful relationships. Living with
schizoaffective disorder, I will always be shackled and under the scope of medical measurement
and observation, even when it seems that the mental health professionals are just going through
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the motions, finding their way in the dark. Has there been a definitive difference in my life after
diagnosis? With diagnosis, am I in servitude forever? I believe so.

170

CHAPTER SEVEN

WARD ONE – WARD A (PUBLIC)

OCTOBER 2012

There is a fundamental problem I have in life – trying to gauge what is real and what is not real.
And from that, who or what has power over me and my thoughts? A huge issue for someone
wanting a career in academia. Being an anthropologist who is in love with all things Foucauldian,
I can happily describe my knowledge as being socially constructed (Hacking 1999; Haslanger
2012). In fact, I would argue that all knowledge is socially constructed and acculturated. All
knowledge has an historical birth time and place, development and maturation. Whether the
knowledge is right or wrong, true or false, valid or invalid, is relative. Reality for a person with
schizophrenic tendencies is a subjective and turbulent phenomenon. (Foucault 1967; Szasz 1970)

My common symptoms are not being able to trust my thoughts, not knowing what is real and
what is not real, extreme anxiety and paranoia, poor memory, poor cognition and poor
concentration. Then there are physical side-effects: weight gain, dry mouth and decaying teeth
(Note: these are side-effects I experienced before I had started taking Clozapine).
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A nurse in Ward A (public) wrote in my notes, “[Rachael’s] anxiety is due to the constant chatter
of voices in her head which at times can become quite overwhelming and distressing.”
Sometimes I think people see me as vague as I stop talking mid-sentence, but it is because of all
the chatter in my head. Honestly, I don’t know which version of reality to believe.

This and the following two chapters comprise three narratives on a rough timeline from 2012 to
2014. These fit into an overall chronology of my illness, which is as follows:

Town A
1997 – First hospital admission – initial psychosis
1998 – Second hospital admission – more issues with psychosis
1999 – Third hospital admission – triggered by a relationship ending.
2000 – Presented to Mental Health services with thoughts of self-harm
2002 – Sudden episodes of collapsing. Episodes turned out to be psychosomatic. Recovered
well.

Town B
2011 (October) – Acute manic/hypo manic episodes.
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Town A
2012 (October) – Paranoia and anxiety and depression.
Admitted to Ward A (public)
During Ward A (public) stay - PAI (personality assessment inventory) assessment done

Town B
2014 (February)
Admitted to Ward B (public)

Town A
2015 (June)
Admitted to Ward C (private)
2015 (October) – Neuro-Psychological Assessment done.

In the years prior to this narrative, I lived in Town B and had been monitored by my psychiatrist
and GP for close to seven years. By then, my diagnosis was committed to that of schizoaffective
disorder. I had not been in hospital for 15 years. I had been mostly well in recent years. I had a
relapse of my symptoms in October 2011 when I became hypomanic/manic. I am oblivious as
to the cause. I always seem to be. During this time, I hardly slept, I worked ridiculous hours,
and I spent thousands on whimsical things, including commissioning a painting of myself entitled
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‘St Rachael of the Plentiful Milk’, because I drank a lot of milk at the time. I felt like I was
running a million miles an hour. I had never been so productive.

Mania isn’t sustainable. I managed until October 2012. By this time, I had exhausted my friends
and family. I remained dysfunctional in everyday matters. I was working two days a week due
to the restrictions of my PhD scholarship. I was so unwell. I took five months off work and
study. My supervisor and a close friend took time off work to look after me. Other good friends
in Town B also took care of me so I didn’t have to go to the Town B hospital.

I lived in constant anxiety and paranoia that I might offend someone or let someone down. I
wanted to get back to work and do a good job. I never wanted to offend anyone. I had been told
that I over apologise. It’s just that I didn’t know what was real and what wasn’t. So, I over
compensated, and this led me to detach from reality, becoming dissociated. At the time of this
admission I was working as a researcher and studying for a PhD and believed that my medications
were making my mind unclear, and that my concentration and memory were poor.

My manic symptoms had changed to anxiety and paranoia. My anxiety and paranoia were out
of control. My psychiatrist prescribed me Valium for such occasions. Up until now I only used
Valium about four times a year. I started using Valium when needed around the time of my
relapse, and soon enough I became tolerant and dependent. My psychiatrist had been decreasing
my doses slowly. I felt that my mood had become low. I had been depressed over the last few
months.

174

I had been seeing my GP in Town B. She noticed deterioration in my mental state and
recommended admission to a psychiatric ward. I reported briefly working in the psychiatric unit
in Town B and felt that this was a frightfully awful place to be. I therefore decided to come down
to Town A and to stay with my parents, until a vacancy arose at Ward A (public), where I had
been before. I was assessed in Town A and had been waiting for a bed on Ward A (public). Here
I felt safe.

My GP wrote a letter to the medical staff at Ward A (public). My GP stated that I had deteriorated
at the end of 2011 due to decreases in medication: I was managed as an outpatient by mental
health services and supported by my friends in Town B. This episode was different from my
previous deteriorations and had features of mania with little sleep, impulsive spending and
agitation. Valium, or its generic name diazepam, was introduced as part of the management
strategy. I stabilised over the last months and the psychiatrist saw me and discussed a weaning
regime off the diazepam from a starting position of 15 mg. This was commenced but it transpired
that I had been taking more than I thought, more like 30 mg a day, so again I deteriorated quite
acutely. I experienced intense anxiety and difficulty with thoughts – pervasive and negative
thoughts - as well as issues with cognition, with a possible suggestion of diazepam withdrawal
underlying the condition. My GP had taken the diazepam dose back to 20 mg a day with an idea
of stabilising me and then weaning me off diazepam again. My GP stated that my mental state
remained very fragile and that my medication needed to be reviewed and stabilised.

And so, I was accepted for admission to Ward A (public).
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And so it begins, again

Not long after admission, a nurse helped me identify some aims for my time in hospital. My
aims for this admission were to review my medication so that the symptoms, especially auditory
hallucinations, improve and so that side-effects are minimised (in particular, weight loss is
attained, and I am able to think more clearly when studying and working). My Town B GP and
psychiatrist believed this episode was due to a reduction of medication – olanzapine and
diazepam.

The Ward A (public) medical notes go on to say that I have been experiencing auditory
hallucinations for years, and I state that these have never really gone away. They take the form
of female or male voices that I do not recognise, who address me directly saying derogative
comments. At that moment these were soft voices, like whispers. I stated that I was pretty good
at ignoring these and not thinking about them.

One of the initial inpatient notes made in my 2012 Ward A (public) file was:
“Presented to [Ward A (public)] having returned to [Town A] five days ago - staying with parents
- has a list of diversionary techniques to ignore her thoughts.

Experiencing auditory

hallucinations for years – ‘has never gone away’. Was 23, 24 and 25 years when she was in
Ward A (public). She has very little memory of the events. For 12 years Rachael was moderately
fine and functional. Then in October 2011 suddenly became unwell and had five months off
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work and study. Rachael presented as hypomanic/manic. Has poor concentration and memory.
Works as a researcher and is currently doing a Ph.D. Is concerned about weight gain, as well.
Wants to be able to think more clearly so she can study. Has worked briefly on the mental health
Ward [in Town B] – finding it both frightening and awful. [Thus, the travel interstate to a less
daunting and more therapeutic ward.] Rachael also worked in a mental health rehabilitation
service and a dementia unit [in Town A], before moving [to Town B].”

I felt paranoid and anxious all the time. I had very good friends. I had to check with them
constantly - “Did that just happen, or did I imagine it?” I have had this constantly since the onset
of my illness, over twenty years ago, so I am pretty much used to it. I don’t know any other way
to think. I tried to work on myself to improve myself.

A nurse in Ward A (public) wrote these notes, “Rachael told me that she was the fourth child of
six children and the oldest girl. She told me her parents were in their 70s and found it difficult
to manage her.” Rachael said, ‘I feel terrible that they have to support me. My parents are both
sick with lung problems. They are very devoted parents; their lives are centred on supporting us,
that is, their children. I don’t like being sick and depending on them. I feel guilty.’”

Out of respect for my parents, I was committed to getting well in hospital. An important part of
the healing process on the ward was to commit to the ward program; to the ‘therapeutic’ and
‘rehabilitative’ ward activities. However, I disengaged with the ward program. I rejected the
notion that the ward program was good for all. I rejected that notion that biomedicine was good
for all. (A discussion of ward programs follows later in this chapter.)
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Importantly, it was at this stage in my healing, healing that is current up until now, that I turned
my gaze as an amateur anthropologist to the culture of biomedicine. Biomedicine was and is an
overwhelming paradigm in the science of medicine, a paradigm that epitomises the hard sciences
and dissuades the social sciences. Ward A (public), where I had my first mental health service
experiences, was the place where I began to conceptualise the methodology of autoethnography,
although I didn’t know what it was called at the time. It was at these early stages of my illness,
that I first gained some insight to what I was to call the Silenced Manifesto - the suffocating
silence of the shackles of the marginalised and the discourse that embeds it.

I first began to

understand how the Silenced Manifesto engulfs the institutions of mental health.

Day one - I am broken

Christ not again! Who’s saying that to me? I haven’t heard you being so loud in ages. Why are
you all being so cruel? Am I really so despicable, incompetent, stupid and hopeless? So, is it a
fact then? I am fundamentally a screw-up who is stupid and has no place trying to work in
academia. It’s a wonder I still have a job! What was I thinking?! So, it is actually true then?
Needless to say, my productivity was practically zilch as I was trying to quieten the noises in my
head. And then there are all the other feelings. The walls falling in on me, the people reading
my thoughts and seeing my soul when they looked in my eyes, the paranoia and escalating
anxiety, well, I had to try to ignore that because people would think I’m bonkers. Sadly, this is
the truth, and I couldn’t hide it like I have learnt to over the past 20 years of my illness. I have
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schizoaffective disorder. Basically, that means that I am broken, and often so. I also have bouts
of depression, which are more acute and less frequent.

I was disappointed to have to leave Town B. Though, Ward A (public) is a better and more
progressive loony bin than the one up north. Besides, I have a lot of support from family and
friends in Town A. Over the years I have learnt to hide my illness, to silence it as it is not socially
acceptable to be talking about noises in your head, or to repeatedly ask people what is real or not
real. Angrily I had to accept that I needed professional help.

I stayed with my parents and waited for five days to get a bed at Ward A (public). Meantime,
the community mental health team kept an eye on me. I felt a failure during this time. I had lost
the battle that I have been fighting since the last hospitalisation 15 years before. My sense of self
had diminished. I now had to put my faith in the mental health professionals that I had also been
fighting, or more likely negotiating with, ever since I was first assessed and diagnosed. My
psychiatrist in Town B fought with me for years to get me to modify my lifestyle, or slow it down
so to speak, so that I could avoid becoming unwell. She was concerned that my illness would
affect my reputation in Town B, specifically in my work culture. On returning to Town B, that
psychiatrist stated that none of her clients go to psychiatric wards and eluded that I find another
psychiatrist. I did do this, after I started taking Clozapine.

So, as I have said, I have lost the battle that I most hate to lose. Succumbing to mental health
treatment is like surrendering yourself to biomedicine. Almost like offering yourself up for
medical experiment. Mental health treatment relies very much on trial and error. The patient
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has very little agency. You surrender your freedom. You have few rights. If you show signs of
too much defiance and little signs of compliance, there is a strong chance that you may be
sectioned or given an involuntary treatment order.

Yet I was desperate to be admitted to the Ward A (public). I remembered the times I have been
admitted to Ward A (public) for treatment. I certainly didn’t feel safe by possibly being admitted
to Ward B (public). Ward A (public) seemed to the best option available.

During these times of illness, I admitted defeat. I submitted myself to the science and the politics
of medicine. I relinquished myself to biomedical treatment. I conceded to the orders of the
mental health profession. I forfeited my personal freedom to the current mental health discourse.
I handed over my basic human rights and became dependent on the State for treatment. I had
become a sub-citizen with little agency and what little agency I did have was dependent on
opinions in the mental health system. The socialisation of the mentally ill into the broader social
strata is heavily influenced by the psychiatric ‘expert’ opinion. This socialisation process
involves creating social stigmatisation of the mentally ill (Foucault 1967; 1973; Kleinman 1980).
And yet, I ached to be admitted, to feel safe – feelings that trumped any rights or personal
freedoms that I have in the ward. I was desperate to be admitted to Ward A (public). So here I
was, being admitted, once again, into Ward A (public).

Day two - yes, I am broken. Can being a psychiatric inpatient glue me back together?
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Well I am now officially in the loony bin in Town A because, yet again, I am having issues with
anxiety and reality. The situation had grown beyond my usual coping technique of asking close
friends and family, “Is that real?” or “Did I hear that right?” This is the fourth time I have been
in this loony bin. I am admitted to the same ward at the same hospital, but they have had a
refurbishment since I was here near 20 years ago.

After my admission yesterday, I awake after my first night in the ward.

I observe my

surroundings. The walls are lemon with feature walls of mustard. All the rooms are spread out
down a corridor with lemon walls also. The doors and the wall railings are finished with a wood
veneer. The nurses’ station is at the end of the corridor of rooms. The ‘sacred’ medication room
is a locked room by the nurses’ station. It is preferred that patients don’t hover around the
medication room as access to the site might be compromised. Who knows what mayhem would
arise if the patients compromised the sacredness and secrecy of the medication room? Each time,
the nurses must go through a rite of passage to qualify to give out some of the ‘dangerous’ drugs,
including diazepam, which I have become addicted to – thus my access to diazepam, what they
call a S4 drug, needs special vigilance. The rest of the ward offices make a rabbit warren where
the allied health professionals hang out. Further down the warrens are the particularly sacred
offices of the psychiatrists.

Each patient has a single bed, with a corner style unit desk and chair, a cupboard and drawers at
the end. Of course, there are no coat hangers in the cupboard. We may top ourselves after all.
There is, however, a full-length mirror in the door - a necessity for all girls. We may be loonies,
but we are still ladies! I was supposed to hand in all sharps and devices with cords, for example,
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nail clippers, tweezers, and hair straightener, but I have hidden them. I am also supposed to hand
in my crochet when not in use, but I have not done that, and no one has noticed. I attempt to
personalise my new space as much as possible. On my desk are some bush flowers I have picked
on my walks around the hospital bush grounds. I also have a large arrangement of dried flowers
from my sister’s friend’s wedding. I have a pile of necklaces, brooches and earrings. I have a
few weird toys that I am quite fond of due to their utter strangeness. The floors are carpeted in
blue. I have a quilt of mum’s and a teddy and pillow from my sister’s home that I sleep with
when I stay with her. I have two drawings from my god daughter on the wall, and a few
gorgeously cute drawings from other friend’s children, plus a drawing of a funny looking bearded
guy drawing to cover up a hole in the wall. All in all, my little alcove feels quite friendly.

Off the corridor where all the crazies sleep is a couple of lounge rooms with a TV, DVD player,
piano, games and old magazines and newspapers. You’re not exactly kept up to date in here.
The nurses’ station is the hub of the ward. Anything worth happening happens at the nurses’
station. It is power central. All major nursing decisions are made at the hub.

Outside is a beautifully landscaped garden with chairs warming in the sun. There is a smokers’
area under cover of the eaves, just in case in rains. Wet cigarettes are not very popular. This
was in the time before smoking was completely banned from health facilities.

Will this space glue me back together? The following days will tell…

182

Day three – my need to have control

I crave to feel safe. I crave to be in control. Having my schedule means that I am productive. I
can’t have control over my thoughts and feelings, but I have my schedule! Note nurses’ entries
below:
Nurse one:
“Settled, warm and reactive early in the shift. At approximately 11am Rachael reported feeling
agitated and anxious. Nil trigger identified. Regular 11am diazepam given. Seen shortly after reported that she felt ‘I had lost half an hour’. Concerned about this as it put her schedule off.
Minimal settling effect from diazepam. Reported visual hallucinations to medical student (walls
moving, changing colours). After lunch observed a lot of crying and agitation, paranoid about
people walking past her door, not sure what their motivations were. Upset about her ‘failure’,
felt that her schedule had not been able to stop her becoming unwell.”
Nurse two:
“Rachael has generally been settled this morning, using distraction techniques to manage anxiety
and minimise ruminations. Good eye contact, circumstantial at times although, has improved
from last week. She reports some feelings of things not being real. Rachael states that others
read her mind at times - and they talk to her when doing so. She wondered whether she was ‘just
making things up [symptoms] to get attention’. These thoughts were challenged, and the theory
was discounted.”
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Day four - will vanilla scent mend me?

The psychiatrist’s office has a lovely vanilla scent that I always comment on, probably ad
nauseam. I am always scared of seeing her. She is the ultimate sacred deity of my care. When
I first met with her, and the next few times, I tried to explain to her that I was paranoid, but she
didn’t believe me, thinking I was confusing it with anxiety - semantics. When the sacred deity
didn’t believe me, I felt disempowered and more broken because I was made to feel like I was
making up my symptoms. Paradoxically, and to make things worse, I get paranoid about reality
and whether I make stuff up or not. So, I am a disempowered stupid patient who doesn’t know
how I feel or view reality, unless my version of reality is supported by observant medical staff.
In fact, it wasn’t until a medical student observed firsthand one of my paranoid episodes, which
I told my psychiatrist about, that my psychiatrist believed that perhaps my constant anxiety was
due to my constant paranoia. She then instigated the process of changing my medications.
Finally! It seems like sacred deities only believe other deities. The nursing staff and allied health
professionals are further down in the mental health pecking order.

The patients are the

menagerie. I am fascinated by the power dynamics played by the health professionals – doctors
versus specialist nurses versus allied health versus students. The power dynamics are silently
respected and not obviously at least, contested.

Day five – is it real?

Nurses’ notes describe my incompetent view of reality in varying ways. For example, “Rachael
stated a number of times, ‘My brain is not working as it should’. I also challenged Rachael’s use
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of the words ‘have to’ and ‘should’ statements. Rachael then became quite confused and thought
she was making up her symptoms. I was able to identify a number of indicators that she is not
making up herself and after about 10 minutes of reassurance she accepted that I do not believe
she is making up her illness. The medical student later reported that Rachael believes I think she
is making it up”.

Day six – the schism of brokenness and belonging

I got up at 5.30am this morning, due to the luxury of setting my alarm I was the only one in the
room. The rooms are shared by two people. I keep my distance from the other ‘inmates’. I don’t
want to get caught up in the confusing and sick views of others’ realities. I struggle enough with
my own.
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The weekdays are filled with a rehabilitation program which I refuse to participate in because it
is frustratingly unchallenging, doesn’t develop any new insights for me and is rather simplistic.
I have tried to attend the activities and have grown so anxious by their simplicity that I now don’t
attend. The ward’s group activity program is an insult to anyone above the mental age of twelve.
It is based over a five-day period and consists of a community meeting every morning where
patients are granted the freedom to have their say in the running of the ward – in reality a very
little and tokenistic agency. Discussions are had, for example, about whether there is enough salt
in the kitchen. Then there is the group walk where about six patients go for a short ramble though
the bushland behind the hospital. No one really talks to each other, for various reasons. I tried
the group walk which I found terrifying as people were getting inside my head and seeing my
soul. Then just before lunch are the pinnacle activities of planning for discharge, life skills of
gardening, mood management and cooking. To complete the week, there is a psychology-based
activity for Friday.

Let me describe the basics of mood management (two hours of my life that I’ll never get back)
Q: “What’s a good emotion?” A: “Happiness”
Q: “What’s another good emotion?” A: “Excitement.”
Q: “What’s a bad emotion?” A:” Sadness.”
Q: “What’s another bad emotion?” A: “Anger.”
Sadly, that was about as challenging and exciting as the group got. After lunch is craft, an outing,
baking (again), and visits from the mental health foundation (a community based mental health
agency).
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In comparison, my self-designed rehabilitation program trains me in the skills and provides me
with the resources that I will need to return to work and study when I get well. I feel that my
self-designed rehabilitation program prepares me to be a full member of society. Writing practice
and reading is more useful for reintegration than the simplicity of classing emotions. The hospital
program ostracises the mentally ill deemed as lacking, lacking the skills and intelligence to fit in
to the rest of society, precipitating their identity as social misfits and sub-citizens.

My self-designed rehabilitation program involves a 5.30am start with meditation and
mindfulness, catching up with news from the outside world, showering and dressing, breakfast,
a half hour walk, more meditation, creativity (usually crochet – a bit more complicated, and I
find it more relaxing than other craft, and it helps with cerebral functioning (Brain made simple
2019)), reading, lunch, two hours of writing, another walk, then free time for visitors and catching
up with any activity I was unproductive with, for example reading. I then do another meditation
after dinner and have an early night.

My program is an effort. I have been putting off writing due to high levels of anxiety. I
painstakingly made myself write yesterday. Today was helped by a very fruitful meditation
session. I am listening to Triple J radio station in the background. Quite incredible because it
means that I am concentrating on two things at once – listening and writing – a miracle!
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Day seven – everyday lunacy

I slept in this morning until 6 am. The joy of staying in a communal ward is that you have personal
encounters with inappropriate people. First is the young woman that doesn’t seem to understand
that the shower cubicles have doors and not everyone needs or indeed wants to see you naked.
Another woman, who I just refer to as the crazy obsessive woman, has obsessive cleanliness
rituals that cannot be disturbed, in all places such as the bathroom and the dining room. No one
dares to interrupt her routine for fear they will be yelled at.

I have had a shower (didn’t beat crazy obsessive lady), washed my fringe so it is all over the
place, and haven’t put my make-up on. I haven’t had my thyroxine and I was told I wouldn’t get
it until 8am, so I can’t have my muesli until 8.30am, by which time will be famished! Oh, and I
haven’t done my meditation yet! What’s this topsy-turvyness coming to my world?

Later, a nurse took me for a walk off the ward. As members of the public walked past, I would
look away and then after they had gone, ask if they saw me. When asked why I didn’t want
people to see me I replied, “If they get in my head they will see what I am thinking and they
would not like it. They won’t like me, and they will see how jumbled my thinking is.” I then
apologised to the nurse for not looking at her or making eye contact, “I am sorry I can’t look at
you! I don’t want you to steal my soul”.
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I then went on to say that I didn’t understand why I had gotten worse since admission and not
better. We discussed the possibility of not having to keep up a front anymore, that Ward A
(public) was a safe place, and to work on getting better and not to be afraid to ask for help when
I’m becoming overwhelmed.

Day eight – an anthropology of loneliness: the emotional frontier

I do not get many visits apart from daily visits from my mum and dad; mum when she is well
enough. Jude (my ex-fiancé) comes in every second day. My sister has been in a few times and
one of my brothers visited once. There is a family birthday tomorrow when I will see the whole
family. That will be nice. Hopefully I won’t be too paranoid.

I am ashamed to tell my friends I am unwell in hospital and have them feel obliged to visit me.
Not only do I feel like a sub-citizen, but a sub-friend who my friends charitably include in their
social planning.

I felt so guilty yesterday, as people were being nice to me and I didn’t deserve it. I did three
meditations before taking 50mg of Seroquel prn (when needed). I can’t get the emotions of guilt,
shame, hate, disappointment, anxiety, fear... out of my head. I also feel like I’m a fraud, a failure,
a mean and selfish bitch, two faced and bloody ugly.
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I would like to argue that our emotions are a fundamental part in people making decisions of all
different types. We reason, but when it comes to the crunch, any decision made cannot be
separated from emotion; a gut based reaction. Emotions are decision makers. As are our senses.
As are our rationalisations – maybe all three separately, or together. Are individual, personal
feelings a social fact or phenomena? What are the discourses behind feelings and thoughts?
Behind anyone’s personal discourses of their feelings and thoughts?

Day 9 – fashionista

Another interesting theme I discovered in my medical records, was that I was commonly
described as “well kempt”, “well-groomed” and “well presented”. I thought it humorous how
the nurses noted on a few occasions the colours of my clothes. For example, my physical state
was described as “brightly dressed in green socks and a red top”. Another nurse ended her
medical notes entry by stating, “Well kempt. Dressed appropriately”. There seems to be a focus
on my appearance in many entries, especially my being “well-kempt”. What does being ‘well
kempt’ mean? And how is it related to mental health? Goffman (1963) stated that visual
presentation is related to mental health capacity. To be ‘unkempt’ is to welcome visual stigma.
To be ‘well-kempt’ represents potential capacity and healthiness. Is there actually a correlation
between being well-kempt and being mentally well?

Other comments in my medical notes include that I am “polite on engagement”, however at times
I will become “distracted and appear to respond to stimuli…pausing mid-sentence and looking
at a spot on the wall.” Numerous times I was also described as “warm” and “reactive”.
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Day ten – hell on earth

During my stay in Ward A (public), I began a withdrawal plan to get me off diazepam. I was
very keen to move back to Town B and resume my life again; though the mental health
professionals in Town A strongly suggested that I stay as an outpatient so that I could have
support in my diazepam withdrawal. I disagreed with the mental health professionals until my
first two weeks of the withdrawal. It was hell. I honestly could not have imagined how terrible
it was. So, I quickly changed my mind and decided to stay the extra two months. I remember
the pain, repeated, day in day out. My diazepam reduction plan, as it was called, outlines very
slow and gradual withdrawal over four months. By the time I was admitted to Ward B (public)
I was still on small doses of diazepam. I remember the pain and I promised myself I would never
ever get addicted to drugs again knowingly or unknowingly, if at all possible. Frustratingly
diazepam

Day eleven – being in the world

I will now tell you about my discovery of a marvellous super glue. It is based on the theory of
phenomenology and mindfulness, as described by Didonna 2009, that I first heard about on my
admission to the ward. Apparently I am not the first to make this discovery. In fact, mindfulness
and phenomenology are well grounded, researched and established concepts in psychology, as
well as philosophy and religion, and other disciplines. Many psychological therapies are based
on mindfulness and phenomenology.

For example, acceptance and commitment therapy,
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cognitive behavioural therapies and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Didonna 2009), and
in my case the use of meditation.

Lundh (2020) states that phenomenology can be defined as the scientific analysis of our
subjective experience of ‘being in the world’. Lundh (2020) describes how Husserl used a
phenomenological method to turn attention to conscious experience as such. As he formulates
it, this represents a shift in perspective from our usual natural attitude with its focus on the
world (and our practical engagement with things in the world) to a phenomenological attitude
characterized by a focus on our experiences of being in the world. Instead of focusing on the
objective world as it appears from our subjective perspective (i.e., our natural attitude),
attention is turned to the subjective perspective as such (a phenomenological attitude).

Meditation is an esteemed tool for mindfulness and phenomenology. It helps me to centre on the
present, accepting it for what it is. Mindfulness is about the present, not regretting the past or
projecting into the future, thus lessening anxiety. Mindfulness isn’t about punishment but about
a gentle and loving approach. Meditativeness mindfulness, for me, is like super glue for my
broken mind.

Meditative mindfulness has had a brilliant therapeutic effect on me. Funnily

enough, due to my illness, I read a big book on it but due to being so unwell I can’t remember
anything that was written! However, I seemed to have picked up on the gist of it. It’s about
being present in the moment, consuming my mind and all emotional attention. It’s also about an
ethos of gentleness, connectedness and forgiveness of the self and everything affecting the
tranquillity of the self. It is associated with a commitment to regular, at least daily, meditation.
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It is about meditation on the now and the experience of the now. Reality now. Feelings now.
The purpose and meaning of life now.

This view of reality marries transcendentalism with the physical, psychological, emotional and
the experiences of the senses now. We cannot change the past. We don’t know what the future
brings. We do know what is now. Any therapy that does not address any elements of mindfulness
is deemed to be inadequate (Kabat-Zinn 2006).

Day twelve – thoughts to trust

My main goal for the first four weeks was to trust my thoughts. This is an ongoing issue for me
as I battle to find reality. Below is an outline of the plan.

Goals/issues

Strengths

and Action plan

Who is involved Follow

supports
Medication

up

date

Dr

Trial and error

Team

(None made)

Nurse

Wean

off Team

(None made)

review
Come off Valium

Valium
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Clarity of thought Meditation,

Add

extra Me

to enable capacity mindfulness,

meditation

to think

minute of silence

middle of day

Manage anxiety

Nurses, me

Mindfulness,

(None made)

in

Me

(None made)

reading, writing,
including
writing to the
anxiety

This plan was made eleven days after being admitted. I am curious as to why such a plan takes
so long to develop. One possible suggestion is that the staff may have been waiting until I was
better, with more clarity of thought and thus more capacity to think in such terms. Their
perspective of my self-efficacy was influenced by what they knew of my symptoms; and
particularly about the insistent and persistent thoughts that were a major part of my presentation
when I was admitted.

Day thirteen – clarity of insanity

A report from a psychologist I was seeing on Ward A (public) stated that I had been practising
mindfulness and using distraction techniques when distressed and was finding this helpful. I
stated that I remained fixated on the belief that I had to be productive all the time, especially at
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work. I said several times, “I need to write well, I need to be productive”, putting emphasis on
the word ‘need’. The psychologist encouraged me to take rest and have some fun in my life as
this will help me to be more productive. I reported feeling stressed at the thought of doing
something fun and was very focused on returning to work, I noted that part of the reason I am
consumed by work is because it offers distraction from the fact that I am single and it helps me
to challenge my beliefs that I am not very bright and that I was and am weak. The psychologist
suggested that I believe I became unwell because I am weak.

It is very important to me to have firm structures and a detailed plan for productive work. This
is possibly because my world is so unclear. I continue to question whether things are real or not.
I need to control what enters my cognition. Knowledge is power and the more knowledge I have
secures my sense of reality and provides me with the foundation to live a fruitful life. My selfimage may be largely influenced by a belief that I am handicapped by my mental illness.

Day fourteen – AWOL

I was very apologetic about getting lost on my walk - walking for one hour instead of 20 minutes
- and it went as far as to say that I thought I may be punished for not returning on time. I required
reassurance and support. I was able to distract with meditation and a visit from my father. Staff
note, “When anxious, Rachael appears to be in an associative state, downcast eye contact with
anxious affect, and stooped posture, although able to be distracted with verbal prompts, nil
reported psychotic symptoms this shift, however reported psychotic symptoms noted in Drug and
Alcohol Clinical Nurses Consultant documentation dated today.”
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Day fifteen – productivity

I need to write well. I need to be productive.

Day sixteen - assessments

One of the assessments the staff at Ward A (public) administered to me to measure lack of
confidence in social interactions was called ‘The Holistic Assessment - Tidal Model’. This
assessment included some of the reasons that lead me to be admitted to Ward A (public). I had
poor clarity of thought, poor memory, and diazepam tolerance. I would describe my preadmission state as feeling crap and increasingly paranoid, which led me to use more and more
diazepam, and become less and less able to work and study. I resented having to come to hospital
again, but I recognised that I needed to be able to work again as well. I identified the needs of
my mission as having my medication reviewed and acquiring more management tools to cope
with my mental health. Most importantly I wanted to be able to trust my thoughts again.

My pre-admission mental state examination (MSE) showed that I was pleasant, at times anxious,
that I lost concentration at times, and had a dry mouth. I had no abnormality of speech and no
formal thought disorder. My affect showed some reactivity and anxiety.

196

My admitting MSE noted that I looked my stated age. Again, it was noted that I dressed very
brightly with red top and green socks. I was cooperative with good eye contact. My speech was
normal considering weight volume. My mood was subjectively and objectively euthymic, my
affect reactive. There was evidence of auditory hallucinations, but no evidence of delusions
today. “Rachael appears to have good insight”.

It was interesting to note that a risk issue included ‘risk to reputation’ specifically via ‘diazepam
withdrawals’. This insight depicts the intense socialisation of psychiatric care.

Day seventeen – Personality Assessment Inventory

Below is some context of my Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) used in my stay of Ward
A (public). (I repeat myself here and in chapter ten and in more detail due to the significance of
the material.)

“With respect to negative impression management, there are indications suggesting that
the client intended to portray herself in an especially negative or pathological manner.
Some deliberate distortion of the clinical picture may be present; evaluation of the critical
items indicates she is not malingering. Also, such results often indicate a ‘cry of help’, or
an extreme or exaggerated negative evaluation of oneself and one’s life. This exaggerated
negative evaluation is consistent with how the respondent describes herself in interview.
Regardless of the cause, THE TEST RESULTS POTENTIALLY INVOLVE
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CONSIDERABLE DISTORTION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AN ACCURATE
REFLECTION OF THE RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIVE STATUS – THE FOLLOWING
INTERPRETATION IS PROVIDED ONLY AS AN INDICATION OF THE
RESPONDENT’S SELF DESCRIPTIONS (Assessor’s bold and capitalised effects.)

“Despite the general level of negative distortion noted above, there are some areas where the
client described problems of great intensity... These areas could indicate core problems that stand
out from the general level of distress and dysfunction reported by the client, such problems merit
particular focus in further inquiry. These areas include disruptions in thought process; unusual
ideas or believes; feelings of helplessness; tension and apprehension; heightened activity level;
irrational fears; and compulsiveness or rigidity.” (See chapter ten for more discussion)

Some clinical notes from the PAI:

Self-concept
“The self-concept of the client appears to involve a generally harsh, negative self-evaluation.
She is prone to be self-critical and pessimistic, dwelling on past values and lost opportunities
with considerable uncertainty and indecision about her plans and goals for the future.”

Interpersonal and social environment
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“The respondent’s interpersonal style seems best characterised as a self-effacing and lacking
confidence in social interactions. She is likely to have difficulty in having her needs met in
personal relationships, and instead will subordinate her own interests to those of others in a
manner that may seem self-punitive. Her failure to assert herself may result in missed treatment
or exploitation by others, although, at this point, it appears that the strategy has been effective in
maintaining her important relationships.”

“In considering the social environment of the client with respect to perceived stressors and the
availability of social supports with which to deal with the stressors, her responses indicate that
both her recent level of stress and her perceived level of social support are about average in
comparison to normal adults. The reasonably low stress environment and the impact of social
support system are both favourable prognostic signs of future adjustment.”

Day eighteen – still broken

I’m having a bad day where I am disillusioned by the possibility of my recovery. I am puzzled
by the values and techniques of the staff and the biomedical model they seem to esteem. I haven’t
seen a lot of holistic therapeutic techniques. The group program is the closest attempt to a holistic
model, but it is ineffectual. Craft, a seemly panacea for mental health rehabilitation, does have
its therapeutic properties, despite my qualms and scepticisms.
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Final day – has the glue worked?

My inability to concentrate on anything for long may fundamentally ruin the validity of this thesis
unless one holds on to the postmodern/poststructionalist value of multiple and relative truths.
The discourse of the therapeutic processes of an inpatient in a psychiatric ward depends on the
biomedical model where doctors are sacred deities, nurses and allied health are their followers,
and the patients are inadvertently disempowered as they are not able to be taught all the holistic
skills necessary to live a productive life outside of the ward. They may not be able to be taught
all the holistic skills necessary for them to survive life outside the ward. This is due to the
possible deterioration of the cognitive functioning which that can happen to people with major
psychotic disorders. The token holistic allied health professionals do their best with the limited
resources available to them. The reality is that psychiatric wards have revolving doors for chronic
sufferers, of whom there are many. So, the cultural discourse of the psychiatric medical system
produces band aids for what they can patch up with medications, knowing full well that the
treatment is inadequate. The follow up treatment in a perfect world is taken over by the
community mental health team but much of their attention is based on crisis management not
chronic management. So, this had better be good glue to keep me together for a good while
longer. I hate being broken, a lot.

Below is a brief description of my 2012 discharge summary from Ward A (public):
“Rachael settled well on the ward. Champix [a medication to help stop smoking] was decreased
then stopped since this may exacerbate psychosis. She was started with a nicotine patch. Her
medication was changed. She was seen by the Drug and Alcohol officer, who advised to reduce
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one of her daily diazepam doses by 2.5mg every other week. She was encouraged to structure
her day and take regular exercise. She was seen by the ward psychologist. She made good
progress and leave went well. She has decided to ask her employer whether she may be able to
work from home until the end of the year. Upon discharge Rachael had no paranoia ideation.
Rachael is currently considering whether she would like to spend further time with her parents
[in Town A] or go back to Town B.”

There was also a description of current, revised medications on discharge, a brief description of
my social situation which included living arrangements, nurturing relationships with friends and
family, and employment, and a list of the mental health professionals I had to see.

Risks to reputation and of misadventure have been noted several times as possibilities in my
notes. This illustrates the hazards of stigmatisation of the mentally ill (Goffman 1963). These
points were made aside notes of my mental state.

These included descriptions such as:

“disorganised, latency of speech, tangentiality and loosening of association, disoriented,
cognitive deficits apparent, circumstantial in speech, and reports poor memory”. The notes
acknowledged that I experience auditory hallucinations but stated I had strategies in place to
manage them.

My medical notes go onto say, “Rachael reports feeling paranoid at times, feeling as if people
are out to get her. She hears voices of different people, of both genders, but thinks that the voices
come from inside her head. She feels at times that everything is surreal, that sometimes the world
and things in it are holograms. She tends to incorporate higher philosophical knowledge into her
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thinking and complicates her thoughts in this way. She has been encouraged to simplify her
thoughts and is finding that she can best ground herself using her sense of touch.”

Reflections

There are about seven voices, of different sexes and ages, living in, but not attached to me. I
don’t like to call them ‘voices’, this feels too much like schizophrenia cliché for my liking.
Instead, as previously mentioned, I prefer to call them ‘noises’.

I haven’t named them

individually, on purpose. I don’t want to empower them with an acknowledged identity. Usually
they all remain a whisper, and it is easier to control them. I’ve spent twenty years training myself
to disassociate from them; to negate a reality.

From my understanding of Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind, consciousness (what I like to
extrapolate as ‘reality’) is what your senses (smell, taste, sight, hearing and touch) tell you.
Aristotle (in Evans 2001: 42) states that you can’t experience your senses separate from some
kind of reason or rationality of them. Senses are the data and enable reason to de-code and
transcribe. My senses were not sensing what they are meant to, according to mental health
professionals, and my reasoning was completely paranoid. I didn’t trust my sight, smell, hearing,
taste, as these senses are arguably more subjective. I did trust the sense of touch because touch
was the only sense that grounded me to reality. Even sick people have their version of the
postmodern relative truth, but their truth is often ignored. What sane person would have faith in
the insane?
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It is assumed by my mental health professionals, a priori, that my knowledge and constructions
of reality are unfounded and obsolete. The mentally ill cannot be trusted; their opinions are
invalid. What makes the production of knowledge so consequential is the power play that it is
founded on. As I have already been categorised as subhuman, my knowledge is inconsequential.
Knowing that I am subhuman everything that comes into my ‘disabled’ mind is largely ignored
by health professionals. I suffocate in the desperation to be heard. I would like my voice heard,
not judged by the approximately seven noises that I hear or belittled by the mental health
professionals that essentially have my life in their hands. I would hope that I have some
intelligence or some credence of knowledge that I have been socialised into. How has having a
mental illness, a schizo illness at that, enculturated, categorised, made (dis)ease and dehumanised me?

The mentally ill are disempowered, similarly to groups in the present and the past, like women,
Indigenous peoples, homosexuals, and slaves. Said (1978) spoke about the concept of the ‘Other’
in describing how the West view themselves as having power over the East. For example, this
idea relates to how after the World Wars I and II the West effectively drew on maps where they
thought countries should be, defining and delineating colonies according to their Western
mandate.

The Other includes the disabled, like the mentally ill. While the mentally ill are classified as
Others, the mental health professionals including policy developers, are the Us. The mental
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health professionals have power over the mentally ill. Us are perceived as having knowledge
and power over the Other (also a concept developed by Foucault).

There is an air of patronage, superiority and supremacy in the way the mental health staff relate
to you. At times they are dismissive and vague, like they are not really listening to you. At
other times they are paternalistic, as if they are hearing only what they expect to hear. The health
professionals disengage from the plight, the reality of the patient, by not really listening. They
only hear what they have to hear to be able to classify the mental illness that the ‘disabled’ person
is defined as having.

Fortunately, there are some mental health professionals who are committed to improving the
quality of life of those living with a mentally illness in ways that do show a true desire to listen
and to hear the mentally ill as people not just patients. There have been countless times over
the years of my illness when I feel like I am choked, paralysed and muted, unable to
communicate to doctors, psychologists and nurses how I am feeling and what I am thinking.
What is at most an issue is the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health
patients receive when they are an already marginalised and subjugated group.
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Above is a drawing of Ward A (public). It is based on Bentham’s model of a prison, where the
inmates could be monitored efficiently and effectively from within a hub. All the wards in this
thesis are based on a similar model.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

WARD TWO – WARD B (PUBLIC)

FEBRUARY 2014

Day one – a very bad day; a very long day

Five months on...the worst thing ever...the glue has disintegrated....and I’m back to Town B.
This has really come out of nowhere. I cannot think of any real cause. I seemed to have snapped.

This is bad. This is really really bad. Fuck!
I’ve lost again. Damn it!
The world is caving in. I cannot breathe. Noises are so darn loud. I cannot escape them. Stop
it!!! Get out of my head!!!

Damage control needs to step in to now.
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One thing at a time Rachael. Breathe. One thing at a time.

I need to see Dr P, my GP. She will help me, look after me. Past seeing her, I don’t know what
will happen. Focus on Dr P. One thing at a time. One thing….

I have managed to drive to the GP. My GP is four hundred metres down the road, yet it is too
terrifying to walk the distance in the open spaces – too much stimulation in the wide spaces for
me to handle. The world whizzing and spiralling out of control around me.

Breathe.
Breathe.
Walk through the door.
You can do it.
Breathe.

I’ve somehow made it to the GP’s surgery. My body has taken over. I am shaking; trembling.
I go to a corner of the waiting room and hide there. The noises are too much! I am flinching
away from the noises. It is so noisy I cannot cope. Aarrggh!!
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I didn’t think about checking in at reception. The staff know me and would have taken note. I
have been seeing Dr P weekly for a couple of years to manage my mental health.

The noises make up some of the racket. I am dodging the noises. They are terrifying me. Stop
saying those things! I am disorientated amidst the noise of deprecating yelling – the noises – and
the everyday noises of the GP clinic. I don’t know what to listen to! What is real? I dissociate,
a technique I use to protect myself from these very situations.

I cannot engage with my mind.

I feel so detached from the here and now.

It is like I am

drowning in air, with the world sweeping, spiralling and crashing in on me, from all and no
directions at the same time, smothering me, choking me, and overwhelming me from any possible
escape, completely disorienting me, taking away any sense or comprehension of reality.

Dr P comes out to see me. I flinch away at the noise that her saying my name makes. Dr P’s
voice cuts and pierces through the intensity and screams of the noises. The impossible task now
is to make it to her room. I hold on to the wall as I slowly make my way. God it’s petrifying!
So many threats and dangers. The noises are everywhere. I am engulfed; captured!

When I finally make it to Dr P’s room, I cower in the corner, I start rocking back and forth and
chanting something in time (not sure what) to the rocking, hoping to make the noises go away,
and the room stop collapsing in on me. I remember feeling desperate. I didn’t know what to do.
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I was lost, but I do remember that seeing Dr P was my best bet at getting rid of this panic, anguish
and extreme anxiety.

I think Dr P was a little desperate herself. The way I was acting was definitely in the ‘too hard’
basket. With reflection, I know that she cared about me and was doing everything she could to
help me. Dr P rang up the mental health team straight away. I heard her make this call and
panicked. She was negotiating what she should do. I heard her talk about sectioning me under
the Mental Health Act (as per the state). As discussed before, that is when a patient is put under
care of the State and forced into treatment. I used to be a nurse working with the mentally ill, so
I am aware of the system. My nursing experience both equipped and disarmed me from dealing
with my mental illness. Seeing my distress, Dr P assured me that the main reason she was going
to section me was so that there would be someone looking after me all the time. She rang the
ambulance, and after what seemed like a decade, but was really minutes, the ambulance came
and collected me. It was terrifying walking with the ambulance officers to the ambulance and
then strapping myself in, under close guidance from the ambulance officers. I likened it to
walking the infamous Green Mile, walking closer to my imminent death.

I was to be transported to the Town B Hospital. It seemed to me to take hours, when it was really
a ten-minute trip. Detachment from time seemed to be symptomatic. There is no other alternative
for individuals suffering psychosis in the Town B region. I had to suck it up, despite my pure
fear and despair about having to have any association with the Ward B (public). I was in a state
of hopelessness and absolute devastation. Being connected and linked with the Ward B (public)
was my worst fear come true.
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When we got to the Emergency Department, I was escorted by the ambulance officers and two
nurses to a private room. It was like I was in a medical factory. There was machinery and
apparatus everywhere, making beeping and meeping noises that overwhelmed my heightened
senses. I paced up and down the room as fast as I could. This was my attempt to manage the
stimulation, with exercise and the production of adrenalin. I was also evaluating the room and
its threats. I remember trying to assess the obvious threats to my safety or supposed threat/s at
least. I remember feeling very suspicious and guarded about my surrounds. This was a new
experience for me, being ill in Town B was very different to the system they have in Town A.
At this time, I had never been sectioned before, so I was extremely distrustful and dubious. I felt
that my life was threatened by the strangers made to look after me.

I was convinced that the people assigned to look after me were looking into my soul, reading my
mind by looking into my eyes. As such, I didn’t engage in eye contact. There were two nurses
who stayed with me. There was also a security guard. The guard petrified me; I felt extremely
paranoid that he was a threat to my safety, and he was ganging up on me with the noises. I could
sense his thoughts and his desire to catch me off guard. I kept hiding from him, behind the
machinery. I was panicking. Seeing how distressed I was with the security guard; the nurses
asked the security guard to watch me without me seeing him. I heard all of this and was trying
to negotiate the obvious conspiracy that was looming. I remember preparing myself for an attack.
I doubted the motives of the nurses, and I especially doubted the motives of the security guard.
How could I be safe when there are all these people creeping up on me to capture me, take control
of me and imprison me, to drown me in this new world of powerlessness?
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The nurses gave me some medication that dissolved on my tongue. Within ten minutes I began
to calm down. The medication was five milligrams of olanzapine – an anti-psychotic. I was
given a number of these wafers in this first night, as well as diazepam, to help calm me.

I now had some of my old reliable insight back. It was always there, somewhere, trying to make
sense of the foreign world around me.

I was able to sit on the bed in the medical factory room and stay there for a few minutes at a time.
Yet I was still twitching at the quietest noise. I did feel less threatened yet remained very
suspicious and paranoid. The edge was just taken off.

The mental health clinical nurse consultant came around and examined me for potential risk: to
self and/or others. After seeing none, only a horrified shell of a woman, she lifted the section.
With that, the security guard went away, as did the nurses. The magical powers of Mental Health
Clinical Nurse Consultants! I wonder who grants them this awesome power? The State. For
what reasons?

It seems as if the mental health system is a clinical arm of the State and the State’s bureaucracy,
creating cultural artefacts/biofacts from various (culture associated) measurements of the
mentally ill. This is so that bureaucracy has control over the knowledge generated, and the power
it develops (Lea 2008). The mentally ill are dependent on the State for affordable health care
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and medicine. When you’re in the system - having to get your medication from the Government,
such as I do because I take Clozapine - you are totally a ward of the State (Biehl 2005; Kleinman
1980; DiGiacomo 1987; 2010).

I was then escorted to what was obviously a room reserved for the insane. It was coloured beige
and had smooth, corner-less couches – the purpose of which is to safe-guard against injury or
self-harm. It is interesting that the mentally ill require a room created under such a different
paradigm of medicine. The ‘medical factory’ hell I was in at the beginning of my encounter with
Town B hospital, with its noisy medical technology to measure and cure people, can be compared
to the beige medical wasteland of mental health. Here there is no objective technology for
measurement or cure, and no other intervention or noises discussing my position and plight, other
than the chaos of what is in my head.

Ironically, it was in this room that I regained some composure. I decided to contact a couple of
friends. My friend A dropped everything and came straight away. My hopeless boyfriend just
wanted to be kept informed. This was mostly due to his sense of shame in having a loopy
girlfriend who was admitted to Ward B (public). Ward B (public) is heavily stigmatised in Town
B.

After what felt like days, the psychiatric registrar came to assess me. He wanted me to go to the
dreaded and horrible Ward B (public) I had hoped so much to avoid. It was known around Town
as ‘the arse end of the world, where the arse holes congregate’. The local stigma of mental health
was amplified by horrific urban legends. Ward B (public) was basically the last resort for
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society’s greatest misfits and deviants. If there are sub-citizens or subhumans partaking in antisocial behaviour, they were taken to the Ward B (public). Anyone who gave the community a
bad look was expelled via police to Ward B (public).

I did not want to go! I was adamant! The registrar was adamant too. At this point, with the
release of the section on me, I still felt I had a degree of agency about my own health. The
registrar ‘reasoned’ with me. He negotiated with me, or at least that was what I thought we were
doing at this stage. He stated that I needed admission to the Ward B (public) so that I would
never have to go through this again. I also needed my medications reviewed. He said we could
work together to get me well and keep me well. Part of the selling point the registrar made was
that I could smoke there. I trusted the registrar. We had reasoned well with each other. Still
thinking that it was my choice, I agreed to stay in the Ward B (public) for at least one night, for
now. The registrar left, content that I was going to Ward B (public).

Hours passed. According to my medical notes it had been about eight hours of waiting. Every
so often a nurse would pop their head in the door, sometimes accidentally. Thank God I had
friend A with me. I was in desperate need of a friend, someone on my side. I was suspicious of
the medical staff. Paranoia is a huge part of my mental illness repertoire.

The noises had quietened but were still a threat to my sanity.
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Midnight came. I was escorted to Ward B (public) by two huge security guards, a nurse and a
psychiatrist. Four strong and well-equipped adults ready to use their self-defence skills on me in
case of any threats to safety. Apparently, I was deemed a threat to someone or something such
that I require such an escort. One of the security guards knew me. He was a boyfriend of a
friend. He tried to spark up conversation, somewhat unsuccessfully. I was focussed on entering
the locked Ward B (public). I remember trying to be congenial, for the sake of my reputation.
Damn! There is no anonymity in this town! I cannot hide my failed mental health. I was
paranoid that my insanity could affect my trusted friendships. Mental health is such a stigma,
placing me in the subhuman category. I just didn’t want to become an obligation to my friends
– subhuman becoming subfriend.

I made it to the ward. There were four locked doors we needed to negotiate.
I wanted to run away at every turn of lock.

Four. Oh God!
Three. Shit!
Two. Close my eyes.
One. Close my heart and hope for recovery and freedom.
Lock negotiation complete. Now let me out of here!
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The nurse on duty was tired, cold, stern and non-obliging. It was 12:30am and the ward was
quiet, except for me. Apparently, I was shouting. The nurse took my basic observations – blood
pressure, temperature, pulse, respirations, and weight. The registrar had ordered me my usual
medication (as noted by my GP), as well as some extra medication when needed, ‘prns’ as they
call them, to calm me down. I took the medication. I knew the ramifications and risks of not
taking the drugs of course - I used to be a mental health nurse. After I took my medication, the
night nurse ordered me to go to bed.

My friend A had not yet come with my bed clothes and toiletries. I wanted to wait till they
arrived. The nurse coldly and firmly ordered me to bed again, as if I was in a prison rather than
a safe environment. She should know that safety and security are foundations of care, especially
needed for the psychotic. As I was to discover later, she had a default punitive manner with
patients.

I said that I wanted a cigarette. I knew that it was hospital policy not to smoke on hospital
grounds. However, I had a caveat - I repeated what the registrar had said – that this was allowed
for me. The registrar then lied – to my face - and stated that he never said that was an option. I
couldn’t believe it! This lie concreted my psychosis for the nurse – I was obviously completely
loopy, making up conversations. My reaction definitely warranted her (questionably effective)
punitive approach. This angered me. I said in a loud stern voice that I wanted to leave. The
registrar said that if I left, I would be sectioned, or else I could go to the high security forensics
ward where insane criminals are ‘managed’.
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So, if I stayed, I was accepting the label of uncontrollable lunatic, hearing untruths from doctors.
Or else if I tried to leave, I would be sectioned. Either way I was imprisoned at Ward B (public),
completely disempowered and demoralised. There was nothing therapeutic about the nurse’s
dealings with me, or in the pretence that the registrar entrapped me. To appease me, the nurse
offered me a (plastic) cup of warm milk. I was more humiliated and concretely labelled a subcitizen/subhuman/social misfit without self-determination or free choice. Psychiatry is unlike
other forms of medicine. As Szasz states (1970: xxiii), “In the changing attitudes towards
witchcraft, modern psychiatry was born as a medical discipline”. Psychiatric patients are
assumed a priori as lacking and unable to rationalise or negotiate their own treatment. Psychiatry
deals with the whole of the patient and not just the biomedical facets. For example, psychiatry
claims to concern itself with the risk of loss of reputation – the whole of the person.

My friend A, the darling that she is, finally made it to the ward with my stuff. It was about 2am
by this time. She couldn’t enter the ward due to high security. I wasn’t allowed to see her. I had
to wait till visiting hours. That was the ironic nail in what felt like a coffin, fastening me to this
seemingly punitive treatment at Ward B (public).

Friendship with darling A was more

therapeutic to me than a plastic cup of milk – yet this was being controlled and limited. She told
me later that she had walked to where I had left my car at the GPs and driven it home.
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The nurse admitting me took all my belongings from me. Below is a list of my confiscated
belongings:
•

Handbag containing:
o Wallet containing various cards, including Visa, student card, health care
membership card, bank key card, Medicare card, driver’s licence
o Coin purses
o Memory stick
o Half a packet of cigarettes
o Three lighters
o Tissues
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o Lipstick
o Mascara
o Four pens
o Notebook
o Glasses
o Sunglasses
o Nurofen
o Mylanta
o Pocket mirror
o Bandaid

From reading my medical notes from that first night, I found out that the nurse admitting me
thought that I was not capable of comprehending at least a third of the admitting paperwork. I
was apparently too confused and verging on aggression and could not be reasoned with. This
was her reality, mine was that I was defeated by a lying registrar and devastated that I had lost
another battle with insanity.

My friend bought me three chocolate bars when she dropped my things off at Ward B (public).
The admitting nurse did not allow me to have these chocolate bars. The next day, a more
agreeable nurse graciously allowed me one chocolate bar.
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It is hard for me to believe that I was incapable of going through the processes of being admitted.
What I did find to be the case was that I was patronised by a registrar lying to get me to come to
Ward B (public) and a nurse who is focussed on managing behaviour not treating psychosis. I
was very, very unwell, but I am really, really not completely stupid (or I would hope to believe).
I have insight to my illness, unusual insight. I was 23 when I was first diagnosed, I’ve lived with
my illness for long enough to know when I am being patronised.

Day two – a rude awakening

Upon waking the next morning, I realised that my worst nightmare had come true. I really was
an inpatient in Ward B (public). I was now committed to be in a ward that I had run away from
five months earlier. How the hell did this happen? I thought I was smart enough to negotiate the
mental health system and find it therapeutic. I thought I had some power, some rights to selfdetermination. It seems that I have been treated as I would have been centuries ago. Punished
for being a heretic; punished for being mentally ill. My voice had been muffled and silenced.
My freedom shackled. (Somewhat congruent with the Silenced Manifesto.)

I don’t think I have ever felt more alone, helpless, powerless and ostracised before in my life. I
was terrified, imprisoned by my psychosis and imprisoned by my horror that I was actually an
inpatient of Ward B (public). My psychosis amplified my terror. The walls were caving in on
me. I looked around my room for the first time. All the furniture was bolted down to the floor
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– a single bed and a bed side table. There was also a small built-in robe. The furniture edges
were rounded and padded to eliminate the temptation of self-harm. The colours in the room,
beneath the stains and dirt, were beige and pale green. The walls were covered in graffiti. The
bolted shut tinted windows had satanic messages scratched into them. One that was repeated a
few times, for purposes of clarity perhaps, said ‘Die you fuck!’ In the ensuite was grime that
seemed to have festered there for years. The water in the shower was tepid only, again for the
purpose of minimising self-harm. With all these precautionary ‘decorating’ features, it was hard
to imagine how one could be healed and grow in such an environment. I remember comparing
the conditions to inmates in prison (through a work project), wondering if prison was more
supportive of the socially unwell than the mentally unwell in Ward B (public), both populations
defined as misfits.

I was panicking, petrified! How do I get out of here? It all seemed like a whirlwind of horror,
my sense of reality and grounding spinning out of rational control. I was trying to deal with
psychosis and negotiate the health professionals at the same time. It was too much for me. I
recall the events of the night before, my first minutes of being in this ward. I couldn’t believe it!
Dr: “You will be a voluntary inpatient.” Me: “Good. I’ll leave then!” Dr: “If you leave, I will
section you.” Me: “So I have no choice! I am stuck here!” I panicked! I recall the nurse’s
paternalistic and derogative tone, the registrar plainly lying to me, making me seem crazier,
making stuff up. Dr: “You are a voluntary patient.” Either way I was to be admitted.

That first morning I hid in my room, behind the bed. There was a knock on the door. It alarmed
me, making me jump, adding another source of confusing stimulations to my hallucinatory world,
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sort of like being slapped on the face. The person behind the door knock was a nurse telling me
that breakfast was ready. I would have to come out of my room into what was called the dining
room.

The Ward B (public) looked different in day light. I walked out of my room with the nurse, my
door was to be locked for the day, so the nurse told me. I walked with my head down, scared
stiff of the sight of my new surroundings. I still to this day walk and sit with my head down, my
body slouched. Hiding? The world was spinning. I felt like I was going to implode with fear.
I tried to take in all in. My noises were loud. I was finding it extremely difficult to process what
was happening. It seemed like a horrible, surreal nightmare! Panicking again, I was finding it
hard to breath. I was stifled with the plethora of stimulation to process.

I laid low that first day on the ward, doing my best not to communicate with anyone. It was best
that I do that, minimise any potential damage, or other interactions with cranky nurses or lying
registrars.

Day three – they’re watching me

Third day and, despite still being suspicious, I was well enough to take in the layout of the ward,
even though it was explained to me yesterday. It was based on like a hub and spoke model,
where all corridors spread out in arms from the nurses’ hub in the middle. The ward consisted
of a central glass hub bowl, the staff centre, where staff could monitor patients safely. The hub
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was locked and secure. It reminded me of architecture described by Foucault - Bentham’s
Panopticon. The Panopticon was designed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). It is a tower from
which wards men, doctor, teacher, or foreman can spy on and penetrate behaviour. The subjects
under surveillance never know quite when they are being watched, and so effectively police
themselves (Horrocks and Jevtic 2004: 118).

Patients in Ward B (public) could speak to staff through a small slit in the glass of the hub and
voice their concerns. With the staff hub at the centre, with views across the ward of the lounge
room and dining room were like spokes. Off the dining room was the courtyard. Morning
meetings were held in the lounge room. There was a TV in the lounge room, which was
monitored and not left on during the day when patients were to be attending activities. The
activities room was through one of the locked doors, opened for patients at set times during the
day. Patients were encouraged to participate. The activities room was the litmus test for good
mental health and looming discharge. If you were seen to go and participate, and remain
congenial, then you were successful in playing the power game with the staff. It seems odd to
me that one’s wellness depends on your ability to make a bead necklace or to ride on an exercise
bike. Wellness is dependent on health cultural artefacts – technologies/apparatus, and they may
be gendered. These skills, to me at least, do not equip the mentally ill with tools to attain and
maintain rehabilitation and be an active, fruitful member the community. Skills and tools are
needed to manage good health. The non-biomedical tools I use to manage my own good health
are dissociation, mindfulness meditation, yoga, good diet and exercise, talking therapies, and
supportive relationships. These were part of my self-designed rehabilitation program.
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There were twenty rooms and about twenty-five patients. The other patients in the ward were so
publicly unwell that the ward seemed like a showing at Bedlam, a little bit like a madhouse of
old. And here I was, one of these madmen! The stigma of Ward B (public) was genuine and
true. To add to my paranoia, I noticed that there were security cameras covering the whole ward.
Whether it was a hospital policy to have cameras throughout all the wards, I did not know. I was
too paranoid to comprehend.

I was trying to focus on what the nurse was saying, despite the noises and sensations engulfing
me in a crushing world. I recalled that the ward was not that unfamiliar to me. Years before I
worked casual shifts for a nursing agency. I worked some shifts in this ward. I remember how
chaotic and disorderly the ward was. I remember the nurses’ frustration with the patients. Some
nurses even seemed to resent an unwell patient for making their shift that much more difficult,
as if monitoring someone for suicide risk was a hassle. The ward seemed to me to be a turbulent
and tumultuous social creature, whereby the hierarchy of medical staff breathed the breath of
punitive treatment and behaviour management into the patients.

As I have mentioned, I worked for a mental health non-government organisation. One of my
clients in that organisation was now in Ward B (public). She was oblivious to me being there,
sleeping most of the time on the ward couches. She is the definition of recidivism; someone who
rarely, if ever, recovers. Other patients, apart from the ones yelling, pretty much kept to
themselves, although it was clearly visible that these people were unwell. For example, those
patients with psychosis looked as if they were responding to noises or voices external to
themselves.
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Day four – learning to play

Ironically, the medical hierarchy who assume such power and authority as to imprison someone
against their will, themselves have little to rely on and validate their roles and work on the
questionable medical ‘facts’ of modern psychiatry. These facts validate the mental health
professionals’ hierarchy. Facts and knowledge go hand in hand with power.

The Ward B (public) staff can be defined as demi-gods, they are so outstanding and powerful in
this context that they are close to the divine. The hierarchy of power in the ward goes as follows:
the highest demi-god is the psychiatrist, then the psychiatric registrar, medical intern, clinical
nurse consultant, senior nurses, junior nurses and enrolled nurses. Then what Foucault (1967)
calls the underdogs - subhumans, the patients – the plebs. The medical staff decree that the
patients deserve little to no power. The only way the patients can gain power is to obey the staff
and their own visions around what constitutes therapy, like their vision about the power of craft.

Otherwise, and not uncommonly, the patients are deemed as misfits, unfit for society. Perhaps
these misfits are unable to look after themselves. They go against the norm; so much so that they
are deemed incompetent and incapable to manage their mental health.

According to SANE Australia (2017), a national mental health charity, there are circumstances
where you can be legally hospitalised for a mental illness without your consent. You can also
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be legally compelled to receive treatment — medication and/or therapy — without your
consent. This isn’t rare: in 2014–15, just under a third of all mental health-related stays in
Australian hospitals with specialised psychiatric care were involuntary. The laws covering
involuntary hospitalisation vary from state to state, but generally, you can only be hospitalised
involuntarily if you’re judged to meet all of the following criteria: you have a mental illness;
you need treatment; and you can’t make a decision about your own care. Plus one or both of
these criteria: you are considered to be a danger to your own safety; you are considered to be a
danger to someone else’s safety (SANE Australia 2017).

Interestingly enough, and an example of marginalisation in one territory, the Northern Territory,
52% of admissions to mental health inpatient facilities are Indigenous (Department of Health
2014) and only 18% of all inmates are voluntary. The estimated number of involuntary
admissions has been increasing steadily (Anti-Discrimination Commission n.d.).

I had yet to learn the power play apparent in the ward, such that I could claw my way back to
freedom. The ward was completely un-therapeutic. I was to find that Ward B (public) was a
parent State. I had to obey the staff and heed to their power structure, otherwise I would become
a ‘ward of [this] State’. I had to play the game.

Ward B (public) aims to manage and assimilate their social misfits and deviants so that they may
be situated and developed to be a part of the community. The only methods deemed efficacious
for managing the deviant is by prescribing and administering medication, as well as the threat of
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the forensic ward and loss of all freedom – this ward is already a locked ward, but the forensic
ward has even stricter security.

Day five - smoke and power

Values of self-determination, empowerment and agency - all essential for therapeutic healing
from mental illness – were dead here. I was choking, gagging. My spirit was rotting. I was
dying.

Punitive action often trumped therapeutic action. I remember watching an encounter between a
nurse and an Aboriginal patient, not an unusual encounter. The patient wanted a cigarette and
was getting extremely anxious because he was told he could not have one. The nurse suggested
he use a nicotine substitute. The patient was getting more and more agitated. The nurse was
getting more and more angry. The nurse was getting more and more patronising too, speaking
in slower simpler language, despite the patient speaking perfect English. It seemed that when it
came down to it, ‘therapeutic support’ on the ward was actually simply behaviour management.
Behaviour management, in a child-like State, was simply about belittling the ones that need
support the most; about disempowering the already disempowered; about disarming the ones that
most need the resources to keep them well, taking away any form of self-determination possible.
The staff on Ward B (public), seemed to be concerned more with behaviour management then
with therapeutic treatment (DiGiacomo 1987; 2010).

226

Day six – a day in the margins

Having been a nurse working in mental health, I was probably better equipped than other patients
about the inside knowledge of psychiatry, and about what is considered therapeutic care, albeit
appropriate care at a minimum standard.

That is what makes the tragedy greater. If you are an Aboriginal person, you are already
marginalised in society. Just as it is not uncommon to be marginalised by the dominant
population, it is not uncommon for Aboriginal inpatients at Ward B (public) to be further
marginalised. For example, Ward B (public)’s inpatients can also be socialised within a certain
ethnicity, disability, race, sexual orientation or some other category of sub-citizen. I remember
watching the other patients, most of them were Aboriginal. Many of the patients from remote
communities had an escort with them, usually a relative They were often cowering in the lounge
area, playing music (if permitted) or hiding from themselves and others throughout the ward.
Those who were well on the route of recovery were engaging with the craft program and the
exercise program. Recovery meant the same for everyone, that is, making beaded necklaces and
completing three minutes on the exercise bike. I managed to make my niece a necklace but failed
at the exercise rehabilitation method.

Below is a typical day for me in the Ward:
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0530hrs

Wake and read novel

0700hrs

Breakfast

0845hrs

Ward meeting

0900hrs

Group activities in gym.
See health professionals as required

1200hrs

Lunch. Bedroom unlocked till lunch is over

1300hrs

Group activities in gym

1500 – 2000hrs

Visitors allowed

1730hrs

Dinner

1830hrs

Free time

2130hrs

Bed

There is some flexibility in the schedule. I spent a lot of time relaxing and contemplating in the
courtyard. I also spent a lot of time reading and writing. If I had my wits about me earlier, I
would have realised that the quickest way out of the ward was to do what the nurses wanted you
to do, which is to participate in group work.

I have never found any extensive peer reviewed evidence supporting group work as being so
important, nor how group work is supposed to fit in so well with the culture of the inpatient
unit. Therapeutic care, as decreed by ward staff, epitomised the perceived value of group
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work. It seems that group work relates to the symbols and semantics of an apparent or assumed
culture of healing, and there is a power associated with that. The staff stand behind these
symbols and use them to protect themselves. I wondered if I was being marginalised because I
did not participate in group work enough.

Day seven – out of mind, out of sight

I felt alienated and alone, like I was wrongly imprisoned. I was not like the other patients. I was
functioning within the economy. I had a job, family, boyfriend, friends, a place of study, a secure
home. Amongst other patients, many lacked basic hygiene, unable to wash their hair let alone
comb it. They wore the same clothes day in and day out. I don’t know why this is. Perhaps it
was because they didn’t have any other clothes, or couldn’t afford them, or perhaps because they
had no family or friends that could bring them some clothes. Or perhaps wearing clean clothes
was not a priority for them. I guess that personal grooming and presentation becomes less of a
priority once you are categorised as sub-citizen and a social misfit. I think most likely that they
were defined as social misfits, not belonging anywhere, categorised as sub-citizens, not being in
the right place and not accepted within the wider community.

Being a social misfit, deviant and sub-citizen is part and parcel of the socio-cultural identity of
being an inpatient of this ward. We are shamefully hidden from the community, ignored by the
public, ignored by those that love you the most. My boyfriend could only manage a quick visit
once, because of the huge stigma associated with the place. Ward B (public) was part of local
cultural image management, hiding the misfits and deviants from sight and keeping the
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community image serene. It was general consensus in Town B, as an example, that ‘anti-social
behaviour’, is behaviour deemed as inappropriate and unacceptable by the broader community,
was caused and instigated at least in part by the mentally ill (Department of Health 2014).

There is a desire to hide the mentally ill, they are not pretty, they are not pleasant to listen to.
The mentally ill should be put somewhere out of sight. There are not many options for hiding
mentally ill sub-citizens. A public ward is the only option in many cases. The ward also,
temporarily, assists with the problem of homelessness of these misfits. They are tied to many
social and social welfare issues, signifying and highlighting the failure of society. They do not
belong anywhere (for example, so is the case of the Northern Territory Government Department
of Health, Northern Territory Mental Health Service Strategic Plan 2015 – 2021). This kind of
provision of shelter for misfits is not a long-term solution. In this system, misfits have no place,
not even in the outskirts of society.

From a Marxist perspective, the severely mentally ill are considered to be non-contributing
members of the community. Although there are now organisations that support the mentally ill
in finding and keeping employment, there are those considered grossly disabled by their mental
illness and unable to work. There is seemly not a place for the mentally ill in the workings of
our economy. Their economic role is passive and dependent of the social welfare of the State for
survival. For several years after I was first diagnosed, I was seen as unfit to get a job and keep a
job. During these years, I did not contribute to the functioning of the economy. I did not own or
have control over any resources affecting my life. I lacked agency to contribute to society
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because I did not have an active role in the economy. The disabled mentally ill are wards of the
State.

Day eight – code switch

I wanted to limit my engagement with anything that would lead me to form an attachment with
the ward experience.

At first, I was (passively) hostile to the nurses at Ward B (public), mirroring their hostility to me.
Then I realised that I had to learn how to engage with the hierarchy of ward staff. They were my
ticket out of here.

Mental health professionals say that they shy away from both strict diagnosis and one size fits
all treatment. I have heard them say that mental health is a kaleidoscopic phenomenon to which
there is no one answer or ‘truth’ in treatment. “Madness has in our age become some sort of lost
truth” (Foucault 1967: vii). Ironic again that truth is relative to the socialised illness of the
individual. Mental health is in fact perhaps the most postmodern of all Western medicines. There
is not an exact method. There is not an exact truth, but fluid truths. It is relative to the pathology,
the aetiology of the individual’s experience of the illness.
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Day nine – pharmaceutical play time

I counted nine times when the nurses made mistakes with my medication. I questioned these
mistakes, and I was quickly silenced.

The head nurse assured me that the mistakes were

harmless. Only four of these medication mishaps were documented in my medical notes.

On one occasion, the nurse was dispensing medication on her trolley with the drug charts open,
I read on my medication chart that I was prescribed an injection used to calm the typical violent
inpatient. I questioned this prescription, as completely unnecessary and totally out of character
for me, I was told that it was protocol. All patients were assumed to be a threat to the ‘calm’
functioning of the ward. This prescription protocol defined the inpatient fundamentally and a
priori as a threat, the focus being on the lacking and deficit of the patient, not the potential and
strength to heal. Every measure was taken to guard and protect, not heal and support. I was so
frustrated by the derogative and patronising manner of the nurse that I started crying in despair.
The nurse then snapped at me, saying “For goodness sake Rachael, if you’re going to cry, go to
your room! You’re upsetting people!” (Ironic, because we weren’t allowed to spend time in our
rooms during the day.) Another nurse then spoke to me. I explained to him how this attitude is
not empowering or therapeutic in the slightest, and that many of the nurses were burnt out and
jaded. This nurse ignored the gravity of what I was saying, stating that all the nurses work here
because they are nurturing and caring towards others. It was obvious that the nurses’ closed
ranks around each other. Staff priorities are number one. The patient priority? Who cares?
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On another occasion, the nurse distributing medication didn’t have my correct dosage of
Quilonum. The nurse wrote in my notes, “During 2000hrs drug administration patient had an
order of 900mg and I administered Quilonum modified release 250mg x 3 and patient refused
the other half to make it to 875mg...” I would expect that a psychiatric ward would stock a
common drug such as Quilonum. A following nursing note stated that I was ‘surly and sullen’
and difficult to engage with. When asked if I was okay I stated, “How could I be okay here?
This place is horrible!” Apparently, I was mildly verbally abusive to the nurse administering the
medication, who tried to give me Quilonum from the stock that she had. I was given the wrong
medication. The smaller size Quilonum would have been acceptable, but this was important
because I had always had it drummed into me that it was important to keep my Quilonum levels
stable (as measured in blood tests). According to my medical notes, a risk assessment was
completed, and the doctor was informed.

Another interesting note was that the psychiatrist clearly stated, and even underlined the order in
my notes, that I was not be given diazepam (Valium). Yet that same day, I was given 10mg by
a nurse, which I accepted, but not to my knowledge did I take Valium. A further medication
mishap was that I was withheld my dose of Prothiaden as there was none in stock on the Ward.
The impact of these medication mishaps meant that they played havoc with my self-confidence
and self-belief. I was encouraged to believe that what the staff said was gospel. As such, I
perpetuated my given label as stupid and lacking and unable to negotiate my own health. The
mental health professionals assumed and reigned supreme.
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Day Ten – Splitting Personalities

It appears, from my medical notes, that some of the Ward B (public) nurses believed I
exaggerated and exacerbated my psychotic signs and symptoms when I thought I was being
watched. Below are some observations from some nurses:
“Has spent a lot of time talking on phone, paranoid at times, jerking bodily movements
exacerbated when anxious or in view.”
“Jerking movements not visible when alone or with visitors, more exaggerated when being
observed.”
“Body movements, left hand shaking, eyes darting suspiciously around, and jumped as if to get
a fright displayed during discussion with Rachael, however writer observed her texting on her
phone, watching TV for a long period of time with nil body movements seen.”

Stemming from my supposed exacerbated signs and symptoms, the nurses started to note how I
was ‘staff splitting’. This means that I played the nurses off each other. Like a child who is not
able to get what she wants from one parent, so they go to the other parent for better luck. A quote
from the medical notes is below:
“Rachael became very teary and upset with the medication nurse this am after discussing prn
medication. Rachael then stated that this space is not good for her mental health...staff splitting
noted. Long discussion with Rachael about her medication and hospital policy.”
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The reference to hospital policy was regarding my defiance to accept the medication prescriptions
policy. Here I would like to note the power of bureaucracy and how the strength of the magical
red tape, and the seemingly ritual practice of ward governance, supports hospital treatment.
There is a schism between bureaucracy and what happens on the psychiatric ward. Often
different languages are used. Often misrepresenting what is meant between Ward B (public) and
hospital policy. For example, there is a hospital policy to rehabilitate Ward B (public) patients
where possible, but I did not hear about any goals of rehabilitation until the day before I left.

Day eleven – tensions over the fruit loops

I was considered defiant by staff.

Here in this locked public psychiatric ward ‘management issues’ seemed to be a focal point.
Note that the management issues are regarding behaviour not so much signs and symptoms. It
seems, through reading my medical notes from the Ward B (public), that I displayed some of my
own management issues.
One nurse noted, “She [Rachael] refused to participate in unit activities”. [Yet in the afternoon]
“maintained a high profile in gym doing craft”.

One incident that was not written about in the notes occurred during breakfast on day eleven. I
didn’t want to mingle or socialise with any other inpatients or staff, so I took my bowl of cereal
outside into the courtyard. There I could get some quiet and peace. I found the plants calming
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and helped me gain some stillness within this otherwise horrific experience. My solace was short
lived. Again, what I thought could and should be promoted as a therapeutic environment was
not the case. A nurse told me, quite roughly, that I had to eat my breakfast inside at the dining
table. I asked “Why? I like it outside. It clears my head.” The nurse said, “You just have to!”
I asked calmly, mainly because I didn’t understand and was curious as to her reasoning, “But
why? It is obvious that eating in the courtyard makes me feel better, and this ward exists to make
the mentally ill feel better.” The nurse responded, “You just have to eat in here. It is the rule
and the policy!” I stated that I would like to see such policy. It was obvious that our banter
wasn’t going anywhere, so once again I acquiesced and continued to play the game.

Day twelve – rehabilitation?

The only way I could retain some self-respect during my admission was to employ my skills as
an anthropologist. As did DiGiacomo (1987), I started to unpack what I was seeing around me,
what I was experiencing and how people were relating to each other. I observed negotiations of
power, which defined the mentally ill as colonised (Smith 1999).

In Ward B (public), the colonialist parent State clearly confines and defines the inpatient as in
need of prescribed direction. The patient cannot have agency. The only means for ‘recovery and
rehabilitation’ is to play the game, pander to the nurses of note, don’t say anything that is in
defiance to the biomedical model, be subservient. Once I accepted my subservient role and
played the ‘game of recovery’, in complete compliance with the nursing staff, I began to be
treated as more of a human. Seemly, good treatment is granted only if subservience is given.
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At the end of my admission, I had an appointment with the rehabilitation nurse. I raised my
perceptions of the ‘game of recovery’ to this specialist nurse. I told her that I felt disempowered
rather than empowered by my experience in the ward. I went on to say that I hadn’t heard the
word ‘empowerment’, ‘rehabilitation’, or any other such hopeful words in conversations in the
ward. I explained how my time in the Ward B (public) was despairing. She was shocked, and
started to say that it couldn’t be so, as if to say, “surely it couldn’t have been that bad?” I had to
convince her of the reality of my experience of this culture shock rehabilitation?’ The resources
I had to rehabilitate were my own, developed by me with support from loved ones and intelligent
ones. If anything, Ward B (public) disarmed me.

Discharge – thank God!

On the day I was discharged from Ward B (public), I was released with a change in medication.
I was back on olanzapine, 10mg in the morning, and 15mg at night. I had been weaned off the
quetiapine and was still taking a little diazepam. (I was to be prescribed more drugs once I started
taking Clozapine.)

The discharge notes summarised my reason for admission. Let me quote:
“Referred by GP after she presented with extreme distress, saying that she is not safe and that
she cannot control her thoughts and the thoughts are taking over. Rachael tended to engage in
repetitive movements in an effort to control the thoughts.
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She said she had auditory

hallucinations, only varying in intensity. They were critical and distressing. She presented to
the Emergency Department today around 1535hrs. She had 10mg of olanzapine which she said
helped her with the voices a little bit. She says she hasn’t been feeling well after her recent
medication change post discharge from [Ward A (public)] (Admission in October 2012). The
auditory hallucinations have increased and became more distressing over the last few days. On
reviewing Rachael, she was very distressed and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli.”

My admission Mental State Examination was as follows:
“Appearance: 39-year-old Caucasian lady, appropriately dressed and groomed. Appeared very
distressed and responding to internal stimuli.
Behaviour: No eye contact, was constantly hyper vigilant, looking towards the corners.
Appeared paranoid and suspicious.
Speech: Normal tone and volume. Slightly pressured.
Thought form: No FTD (Formal Thought Disorder)
Thought content: Very distressed by the noises in the Emergency Department and voices of
people talking to her over the last few days. Paranoid and distressed. Didn’t want to be admitted
to Ward B (public) initially as she thinks it is a ‘scary madhouse’.
Perception: Admits to auditory hallucinations over the last few days, sometimes of people talking
to her and making derogatory comments of ‘how much of a crappy person she is’. Says she’s
been hypersensitive to noises and music as well. Says certain beats on radio music sounded like
‘codes’. Denies that the voices are telling her to harm herself or others.
Cognition: Grossly intact
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Insight: Good insight into her illness and her medication changes. She’s aware that she needs to
commence on a different anti-psychotic [medication].
Judgement: Reasonable.”

My progress whilst in hospital was as quoted below:
“Rachael was admitted and commenced on olanzapine again. Her quetiapine dose has also
decreased gradually throughout the admission. She was kept on 2.5mg diazepam nocte. Her
mental state improved throughout the admission. She wanted to be followed up by her GP and
her private psychiatrist.”

Conclusion

My admission to Ward B (public) was more detrimental to me than being an outpatient. As an
outpatient, I would have been managed without as high a degree of stigma. As an inpatient, I
was treated and defined as a subhuman. Relationships I had were damaged from me being an
inpatient at Ward B (public) - it was that much of a stigma. There was not a culture of
rehabilitation in the ward. Instead, the care was somewhat punitive, addressing behaviour issues
rather than treating the patient’s health holistically.

I had my last meeting with the registrar. I hadn’t forgiven him from lying to me about smoking
and making me look even more crazy than what I was. He really didn’t get me. During my stay
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at Ward B (public), I carried around a little green suitcase with me – a handbag. When he asked
me why I carried my little green suitcase around with me, I told him that it was because we
weren’t allowed in our rooms during the day, and I wanted to carry my books with me. The other
patients didn’t seem to have the same need to carry their own little green suitcases of books.
Obviously crazy behaviour!

Above is the panopticon version of Ward B - Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon (late 18h century).
The sociological effect in the context of this thesis is that the mentally ill patients are aware of
the presence of authority at all times, a system of control without knowing how they are being
controlled (Mason 2019).

240

CHAPTER NINE

WARD THREE: WARD C (PRIVATE)

JUNE 2015

I returned to live and study in Town A in August 2014. It was about a year on.

Things just haven’t been good in the last few weeks. The noises are getting louder, unbearable!
They keep saying things like, “You stupid idiot!”, “Who is ever going to like you, let along spend
time with you?”, “You m’ose well die now and stop annoying everyone!”, “Die you stupid bitch
die!” The noises talk over each, shouting coming from all directions. Different voices,
penetrating. At least they don’t give me details of how I should degrade myself or die.

I’m super paranoid, not knowing what is real and what isn’t. I’ve been trying to hold it together.
Damn it! I hate losing! My anxiety is through the roof! I’m having panic attack after panic
attack. It is unbearable, intense. I am being crushed. I can’t breathe with the overwhelming
panic that consumes me.

241

I had some good years, but these last two years have been terrible. All the tools and techniques
I have developed over the years are no use to me now. I used to be able to control my anxiety
with meditation, mindfulness, healthy lifestyle, breath awareness and control, cognitive
behavioural therapy (although I’m not a big fan) and sometimes avoidance. Avoidance is not
considered a useful technique to battle anxiety as it negates the cause and solution.

When I was not able to figure out what was real and what was not real, I could ask close friends
and family – “Is that real?”, “Did you hear that?”, “Is that person looking at me?” Managing my
psychosis was definitely made bearable by the support and feedback given to me by my loved
ones. I could tell I was getting more unwell if I had stopped trusting my loved ones. Then the
paranoia increased. My psychiatrist in Town A believes that my anxiety is linked to my
psychosis.

I’ve rung the mental health team to make an emergency appointment with my psychiatrist. I
have made an appointment for tomorrow.

Tomorrow has come and somehow, I manage to drive there okay. I lose it though once I get to
the mental health service. “What?” “What was that?” “Who is that?”. Screaming and blaring in
my head, ear splitting, deafening me. “Who do I listen to?” “Who is real?” “What is real?”
Again, when I get unwell, the world crashes in on me! I can just remember the seemingly loud
noise of the elevator, and of people getting in. I could feel the penetrating eyes of the other
people in the small elevator, looking at me, scrutinising and piercing their sight right through my
to my soul with their powerful and terrifying eyes. I could tell who staff are and who are not. I
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always try and make an effort to dress well and put on make-up – counteracting the possible
visual stigma. This sometimes confuses people into thinking I am an employee not a client.

I am mostly insightful. When I am well, I can recognise my qualities and purpose. I am usually
calm and even keeled – many years of taking Quilonum. I have a silly but mostly black sense of
humour, coming from years of working in aged care. I have a strong sense of loyalty to family
and friends and I would do anything for those I love. I am ambitious and meticulous, painstaking,
fastidious, and thorough. I am also patient and tolerant, persistent and stubborn, and this is why
I mostly win my battles.

Many people who meet me are shocked when I disclose to them about my schizoaffective
disorder. Not that I tell people generally, but sometimes, rarely, it comes up. I actually hate
disclosing. Often employers demand that I tell them. I’m not sure if this should be permitted,
whether it is their right to know about something very private for me. I can understand the need
for managers to be able to look out for the interests of their staff, but it is a basic human right to
retain security. As per section 25, part I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Assembly
1948, “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
him/herself, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other
lack of likelihood in circumstances beyond his/her control” (My emphasis).

With regard to feeling secure with my disability, I need to feel safe and comfortable in living
with a disability, in my case, a major psychotic disorder.
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Doctor T, my psychiatrist, comes out to the waiting area. Hearing her voice “Rachael”, startles
me away from the noises’ deadly repertoire, and my great efforts to silence them. I get up slowly,
and timidly walk with the doctor, my head hung low. The doctor asks, “Do you mind if we have
a student doctor sit in on us today?” This freaked me out! I fearfully started to ask the doctor
about whether the student could look into and read my soul when she saw me. Doctor T knew
not to push the matter, and when we arrived at her room, she asked the student to leave. I asked,
“Is she angry with me? “She saw into my soul, didn’t she?!” “She’ll come after me now and
punish me! That’s what they [the noises] say.”

I sat down on the chair. It had started again. I started cowering and trying to hide myself
somehow within the limits of the chair. I was tapping again too, tapping my fingers against the
chair arm, against my face, my head. The sense of touch was the only way I knew how to centre
myself. Touch seemed real.

Shit! I hate losing it!
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Bloody hell!

It seems that I am going through another psychotic episode.

Damn!! Usually I can handle the milder psychotic episodes, but this one is beyond my control.
I have won the fight against many, many psychotic episodes over many, many years, but there
are some I cannot manage. I cannot master this one. I need a hospital stay to get back on track:
to control my anxiety, my psychosis causing anxiety; manage my paranoia; address my cognitive
functioning disabilities; cement a healthy diet and exercise regime including meditation and
yoga; and healthy; and to develop a sound work/life balance.
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Cognitive functioning is

paramount. I need to trust and believe in my thoughts and thought processes. If I don’t have
control of my thoughts, I cannot be an academic or a policy advisor or even a giraffe breeder.

Doctor T asked me, “Has anything happened? What has changed?” “I don’t know, don’t know,
don’t...” I said.

Looking at me, seeing how fragile and unstable I was, Doctor T said that I

needed to be in hospital.

I don’t know why I became unwell again. There isn’t always a reason. There was no apparent
reason this time. However, now I was having a relapse, a psychotic episode, causing incredible
anxiety. My psychiatrist wanted me to go to hospital. My medication needed adjusting. Doctor
T started ringing the psychiatric wards in Town A. There were no beds available right away, so
I was put on priority listing. The helpful thing was that I now had full private insurance which
essentially increased my chances of receiving care.

My boyfriend at the time, with the help of the community mental health nurses, took me home,
a safe place, to wait until we received notice of a spare bed in any hospital. John, my boyfriend,
looked after me that night. A community nurse came by to check up on me and give me
medication. It was a waiting game. I remember feeling disassociated, detached from reality,
disconnected from the world and being in it. I was distant, not belonging anywhere, frightened
of what lay ahead of me.
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I think my boyfriend felt the same in many ways. He had never had a crazy girlfriend before, let
alone one that had to be hospitalised. He didn’t know quite what to do with me or say to me.
That makes two of us, although I’ve had twenty more years experience with it. I was very worried
and concerned about John. He is very resilient and strong. He was at first supportive.

It is sometimes very difficult for people conversing with me to get any sense from me. When I
talk it is tangential and all over the place, finding it almost impossible to follow a conversation
with clarity and direction. For example, a group of friends could be talking seriously and clearly
about buying motorbikes, when the next sentence from me will be about dentistry, a completed
and unrelated topic, but seemingly logical to me. Sometimes I must explain my thought
processes to friends because they are confused and don’t understand my flow of cognition and
communication. My memory and my ability to contain knowledge has been diminished. I often
have to ask the same questions half a dozen times in a few minutes. The chop and change in
conversation makes it complicated, gruelling and confusing for others. Then there is the issue of
me not hearing what is being said, partly because of the noises in my head taking up so much
capacity adding to my confusion.

I remember feeling uncertain of how John might react. He hadn’t in the past understood when I
tried to explain my schizoaffective disorder it to him. It is different to describe common mental
health disorders, like depression, which seem easier for people to relate to, understand and
therefore deal with. This makes it even more confusing and scary to describe uncommon and
complex mental health disorders. I did my best to find a lay person’s book on schizoaffective
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disorder, with very little luck. The book I found was directed at young children. The DSM-V
would have been too confronting.

While waiting for a hospital admission, we decided to watch some movies, to bide the time away.
John annoyingly banned me from watching horror films – just in case I get any ideas while I’m
having a psychotic episode. As if I could be influenced by Jack Nicholson’s part in ‘The
Shining’.

Somehow, I got to sleep that night... I’m not sure if John did.

In the morning, at about 9am, I received a call from Ward C (private), the administrative wing
of the Ward C (private), stating that they had a spare bed for me, and could I please come in at
1300hrs. And so, we did.

I remember arriving at the private psychiatric ward, Ward C (private), at 1300hrs, as directed,
and being given a pile of paperwork to fill out. It was a significant step in my relationship with
John, as he wanted to be recorded as my emergency contact. I was pleased.

I was worried, however. John was a mental health virgin and had never been in a psychiatric
ward, let alone helping to admit his girlfriend in to one. I was very anxious about him and I’m
afraid the anxiety consumed me during this admission.
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The walls are painted beige with green skirting boards. There were pot plants around the wall
for aesthetics. There were cameras on the ceiling, in the corners. Also, the obligatory smoke
alarms. Being a Catholic hospital, there was religious iconography around the ward, mostly in
the forms of paintings and statues. Icons were displayed in the common areas, such as the dining
room, group rooms and television/relaxation area. Being a patient in a Catholic hospital facility
meant that I must take my own contraceptive pill, as contraception aids are forbidden in Catholic
facilities. I have had friends refused vasectomies in the same hospital as it is against the teachings
of the Catholic Church.

After a few days in a highly monitored room, I graduated and was allowed into a room of my
own. I had my own bathroom, television, wardrobe, desk and bookshelves. The television was
situated above the bed for easy viewing when lying down. A far cry from the graffitied insanities
and punitive treatment in the Ward B (public). Ward C (private) also contrasted with Ward A
(public) where I had to share a room, bathroom, television and everything else. Perhaps it is
considered more therapeutic to have your own room.

The staff at Ward C (private) were amiable, understanding and patient. Not prerogative,
patronising and superior, and considering themselves as privileged. The Ward C (private) staff
respected me as an equal, appropriately suggesting advice when suited.
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This ward is a private mental health ward. For the 17 days I spent there, it cost over $10,600
AUD. The care was very good. The nurses were supportive and understanding. It seems that
only the privileged can afford good health care. Seventeen percent of my wage goes toward my
mental health costs. And I receive free psychiatric, psychological and Clozapine care. If I was
paying for all my mental health costs, I would conservatively spend 31% of my wage on my
mental health. (I have not included the costs of my physical health, which involves yearly
medical imaging decreed necessary by the medical profession’s need to measure,
compartmentalise and evaluate.) There is a financial burden to having a mental illness. It is hard
to reason that the chronically mentally ill, spending a third of their income on managing their
disability, does not contribute to the economy of the community.

Arguing from a Marxist perspective, I am committed to a position of servitude and dependence
on the health system and the State, forced to surrender any true agency as I do not control the
resources and health commodities, I need to survive. It is ironic that the path to my freedom is
actually the path to my imprisonment. I need freedom, but I cannot be free without being defined
by the language/s of being captured. These are the language/s of economy and the access to
resources. The economic resources that I need to own to live a full life are controlled by politics
and culture. I need these resources to function in society; I need these resources to survive.

Ward C (private) is seemingly the ward of the privileged, socially acceptable mentally ill. Most
of the patients there are sick with first world illnesses such as anxiety and depression. There is
not the degree of stigma with anxiety and depression as there is with a psychotic illness. There
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were no overtly psychotic people in the ward. ‘Schizo’ patients are hidden from the social arena,
even in this hospital.

The cultures between Ward B (public) and Ward C (private) cannot be more different. On my
first day at Ward C (private), my allocated psychiatrist asked me, “What has it meant to you,
having this illness for so many years? Has it changed you? Has it meant that you couldn’t live
the life you wanted?” I couldn’t believe it! I was stunned! I said in shock, “No one has ever
asked me that before!” I umm’d and ahhh’d a little. Then I began to sob. I was unsure, because
I spend a lot of time trying not to think about what could have been. I don’t think I would ever
get out of bed if that were the case. Then I said, through the tears that had started to flow down
my cheeks, “It has changed my life fundamentally! I have lost relationships, my chosen career,
my healthy body, my mind and intellect, my memory, my zest for life, my effervescence, zing
and joyful demeanour, my hopes and dreams, my confidence, my self-esteem, my capacity and
competency.”

My life without schizoaffective disorder. Wow!! I can’t comprehend that! More than half my
life has been defined and confined by my mental health. I feel imprisoned by my diagnosis and
prognosis. I am no longer in charge of my own life. I have limited or no agency. Having a
mental illness can make you a ward of the State if you do not comply with the mandate of mental
health professionals. I am empty with schizoaffective disorder, though I don’t know how to live
without it.
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My life has been turned around and spun on its head. I am not the young woman I was, with
dreams and aspirations and a thirst for a exciting future.

What I have left is the shell of a fat forty-year-old (odd) woman, who asks herself every day,
“How do I get out of this black hole?” I am imprisoned by a shield of anxiety and psychosis that
encases me tightly. I can see the outside world, and vaguely hear what a normal life sounds like,
but I am disabled and unable to reach, breath or smell normalcy. No one can hear my cries. No
one can feel my pain. Could this all be made up by me? Is this real? I am forever afraid that my
friends and family will have enough of me because I am so needy and demanding. I feel like a
shell of who I used to be. I am persistently worried that every relationship I begin will end
because I am crazy. I would break up with myself if I could. I also stay in relationships much
longer than I should because I am convinced that I cannot do any better.

At Ward C (private) we were encouraged to attend group sessions, though, happily, we were not
dishonoured by a decision not to attend. The staff explained why group work was important,
speaking to you as an equal. There was nothing punitive about my treatment. If we chose not to
socialise with others, we were not forced to socialise. Such luxury! Compared to Ward B
(public), it was a holiday resort! It was also a step up from the other Town A ward. We had
choices, and a degree of self-determination. It seems that not being forced to socialise with others
is therapeutic and less anxiety provoking, at least for me.

There were some things in Ward C (private) that reminded you that you were in a psychiatric
ward. You were regulated about when you could leave the ward. When you are first admitted,
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you are not allowed out. Then after a couple of days you are allowed out for a walk with a sober
adult. Leading to the ultimate leave, overnight leave, also with a responsible adult.

During my stay at Ward C (private), I had a brain MRI to better diagnose my anxiety. They
found seven lesions in my brain. I waited for days for these results. I thought I may have a
reason, a cause for my mental health condition. Finally, a doctor and a nurse came to speak with
me in my room. Apparently, the lesions were insignificant and not related to my mental health.
I went to the neurologist who claimed that the lesions were not the cause of anything. The
condition was called “Radiological MS”. That is, I have the lesions someone with multiple
sclerosis may have, but without symptoms. I must have a regular brain MRIs for a few years to
see if there is any change. (Note that one year later, that is 2016, my ‘without symptoms’
developed into ‘symptoms’, with arm and leg spasms. As of 2019, the spasms are getting worse).

A typical day in Ward C (private) involved:
0700hrs

Get up, mindfulness, meditation, shower and dress

0800hrs

Breakfast

0830hrs

Reading

0900hrs

Walk – by myself

0945hrs

Reading mindfulness meditation

1000hrs

Group activities (I sometimes attended)
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1200hrs

Lunch

1300hrs

Group activities

1400hrs

Writing, mindfulness, meditation

1500hrs

Visitors permitted

1800hrs

Dinner

During the day, there was always time to see the doctors and to complete activities of daily living,
such as washing clothes.

This admission was different to those in the other two psychiatric wards, completely different. It
was almost like a hotel. The nurses wore normal respectful clothes, they were considerate and
attentive to my needs. The staff normalised my position, speaking to me as if I was intelligent,
not assuming I was a sub-human.

That was the primary difference between the three wards: the private psychiatric ward
acknowledged my humanity. I was not subhuman; a sub-citizen. I had agency and a voice. Why
should Ward C (private) have more empowerment for patients than Ward B (public) or Ward A
(public)? Could the only reason be because it is privately funded?
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The private ward had the typical mental health ward lay out, with the central hub housing all the
sacred notes and policies. The hub was different to Ward B (public) in that there was not a glass
pane separating patient from staff in Ward C (private), separating the misfits from the esteemed
and protected staff. Despite this seemly common panoptic ward design-type, the allied health
professionals, psychiatrists, pastoral carers, group coordinators, and the administrators all shared
offices spread around the hub.

I was an inpatient on the ward for 16 days.

Above is the Ward C (private) version of the panopticon.
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CHAPTER TEN

THE ART OF MEASUREMENT

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

“A point to consider: the space to produce knowledge and the way this space is or is not
heard.”
(Field notes June 9th, 2014)

I agree with the concept that all things are born and understood from socio-cultural phenomena,
and not solely understood through positivist natural sciences. Indeed, the label ’schizophrenia’
only came about in texts in 1908 (Hacking 1999: 9). This is when the social sciences were
developing. It goes to follow that what we know as schizoaffective disorder, pre social science
and psychology, was mainly defined within the realms of hard science. The confusion between
the old school of understanding of schizophrenia, which was born from the biomedical model,
led to some confusion that stood to believe that schizophrenia is a scientific delusion (Hacking
1999: 112-114).
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A factoid is a socially created fact, assumed by the powerful. The powerful factors surrounding
the social construction of reality, as stated by Lea (2008), are numbers and graphs. Numbers and
graphs are deemed honourable. Historically, the social-scientific facts and factoids are not as
honourable as quantitative methods. Again, the biomedical realm has historically encompassed
mental health, but mental health biomedical science cannot be understood separately from the
social construction of reality. For example, during my admission in Ward B (public), I was
desperate to have social contact. Social contact fuels me so that I have the courage to go on. It
helps me to stay strong. However, admission to Ward B (public) was highly stigmatised in the
Town B community. Due to this stigma and keeping my reputation in high regard, I had to be
careful about who I told. For example, some of my friends were not told due to the stigma and
shame they felt, and the consequent feeling of intense shame that I felt. I was dishonoured. I
was made to feel like a social misfit and deranged then.

Mental health is commonly pathologised, but it is also socialised, creating a foundation in a social
construction of reality. I am interested in looking at the examples of two assessments that best
encapsulate my experience and relationship with measurement. These examples best capture the
confounding factors in psycho-metric testing, and how potentially inaccurate they are in their
representations of the mentally ill, and thus the tools accuracy altogether.

I was a subject for the Neuro-Psychological Assessment and the Personality Assessment
Inventory (PAI). I'm interested in the ‘measurements’ of those living with schizoaffective
disorder or major psychotic disorders and what that means for them. I am interested regarding
my own contribution to the cultural archives (Foucault 2013), to know the perceived truth that
comes from my own psychometric testing. These measurements have proven to be the most
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significant anthropologically, that is, in context of my (dis)empowerment of the mentally ill.
Which brings me to wonder, how was I categorised from these measurements?

I feel very strongly that my cognitive functioning has diminished substantively over the many
years of living with my psychotic illness. I know that my memory is terrible, my concentration
is lacking, and my ability to analyse data is stunted. I was hoping to get some constructive
suggestions and tools to assist me to retain, or hopefully improve, my cognitive functioning, and
I did. The person who administered the testing in Town A was a very intelligent and an
experienced neuropsychologist.

Measurement and mental health

Measurement and assessment in mental health is vastly different from that performed in other
arms of medicine. Exactly what is it that mental health assessments are trying to assess? Are
the measurement technologies used in mental health different technologies than those used
elsewhere in medicine? The measurements performed in psychiatry are subjective and esoteric
in many ways. The brain, the organ most referred to in psychiatry, is an enigma. I must note,
however, that psychiatry also has a hand in more holistic medicines. Treatment for psychiatric
disorders are varied, and somewhat of a trial and error situation for each person living with mental
health disorders.
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From what I gather, psychometric testing is circumstantial. The tests are shady, giving a
confounded result.

Mental health professionals perform the usual assessments that other

branches in medicine perform. However, the psychometric testing and other smaller assessments
performed on mental health participants are unique. So, in becoming a consumer in a psychiatric
ward, I am in some way enculturated into the inexact science, further becoming a subject to the
culture precipitating the labels of subhumans, sub-citizen and social misfit. I am conflicted about
whether I should participate in a subculture which disempowers me. Biomedical treatment is
better treatment than none. Again, I am dependent on the system which disempowers me. Again,
I am dependent on the State, with the hope that the testing will help me be okay.

The Neuro-Psychological Assessment I participated in illustrated how the factoid was given
agency and, in some ways, has been anthromorphised. Through this tool, I was categorised and
labelled. What I thought would be an empowering experience, learning about my strengths, in
fact further inhibited me. It was official. The psychotic episodes I have had over the years have
limited my cognitive capacity. Now I am being monitored and reviewed regularly by the State.
Each month, and often more frequently, I am measured. Legitimised and given authority by
these measurements, I am a part the institutional apparatus and infrastructure of these
measurements, as a cultural artefact and product. As I was unwell, and needed treatment, I had
little choice but to succumb to a system of disempowerment. The measurements develop from a
technology of knowledge production to an object of governance (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007).
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Excerpts from the neuropsychological report

Below is a passage of the neuropsychological report testing me:

“At the time of neuro-psychological assessment, Rachael was 40 years of age, in the fourth year
of her PhD and working part time in a quality assurance role. [She was referred from her
psychiatrist] to assist with perceived cognitive difficulties she was experiencing that were
causing concern in relation to her studies. During these sessions, she requested to undergo a
neuro-psychological assessment to assist further with her post-graduate study and her work.”

“Rachael currently reports memory difficulties with problems ‘retaining’ new ‘knowledge’, even
if she re-reads information she has encountered only two hours earlier and can be repetitive in
conversation. She felt her concentration is lacking and finds it difficult to focus on task. When
reading, for example, it feels like her mind goes into a sort of ‘suspension’. She stated that she
is unable to process the material, such that she seems ‘dissociated from my thinking’. She
currently feels that her thinking lacks ‘clarity’ and feels limited in the quality of her ‘analysis’
skills such that she feels like a ‘below average student’ at present. This is against a diagnosis of
schizoaffective disorder, which Rachael has been living with since her early 20s. Current
assessment was timed to allow for recovery from a relapse in her condition.”

“On presentation, Rachael was a pleasure to work with and she appeared to apply her effort
throughout, which was supported by the pattern of results across psychometric indicators of
effort. On observation, she appeared to have difficulties sustaining her attention at times, with
an impact of her general ability to process information (for example, instructions). She appeared
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to have good insight into her health and communicated her lived experience of schizoaffective
disorder in a way that demonstrated self-awareness and self-reflective capacities.”

“Results of formal cognitive testing demonstrated variability amongst Rachael’s current
cognitive skills. Verbal intellectual skills were high average, congruent with expectation and
Rachael had a particular strength in her general knowledge. Working memory capacities (that
is, the capacity to hold and manipulate information in mind) were average and within expected
limits. Speed of information processing was high average range and congruent with expectation.
Perceptual problem-solving skills were low average, and whilst within normal limits for her age
range, were considered low expectation, given Rachael’s other strong capacities.”

“Interesting to note was that when provided with additional time, Rachael demonstrated the
capacity to complete one of these tasks as slightly stronger – average levels. Attentional skills
were within the normal range, with some minor variability, ranging from the average-low average
range up to the average range.”

“Memory performances were variable. New learning and recent memory of visual-spatial
information was in the average range, and though normal for her age, was somewhat reduced as
compared to her stronger verbal intellectual skills. Her new learning and recent memory for
auditory-verbal information was variable. Immediate recall of pairs of words that were repeated
was in the average-low average range and was average following a time delay. Recall of a story
immediately after presentation was in the borderline to extremely low range and was in the low
average-borderline range following delay.”
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“Tests of executive functioning were performed in generally the average range as compared to
age matched peers. Therefore, there were many which were well within normal limits (for
example, average) for Rachael’s age, but possibly reflect departures from what is expected based
on her educational achievements.”

I could not believe the results. I was hoping for some reassurance and validation. What I found
out was that I have been affected terribly by my mental illness.

Apparently, cognitive

diminishment is common for people with my diagnosis. So, I am officially disabled; officially
lacking full mental capacity. My capabilities were in fact diminished. I was sadly ‘handicapped’
according to some mental health professionals. In calling me ‘handicapped’ even though
questionably a Freudian slip of the tongue, having said so, the professionals perpetuated the label
they try hard to eradicate.

Below is an extract of some of the text of my personality assessment inventory (PAI) (assessment
done October 2012):

“With respect to negative impression management, there are indications suggesting that
the client intended to portray herself in an especially negative or pathological manner.
Some deliberate distortion of the clinical picture may be present; evaluation of the critical
items indicates she is not malingering. Also, such results often indicate a ‘cry of help’, or
an extreme or exaggerated negative evaluation of oneself and one’s life. This exaggerated
negative evaluation is consistent with how the respondent describes herself in interview.
Regardless of the cause, THE TEST RESULTS POTENTIALLY INVOLVE
CONSIDERABLE DISTORTION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AN ACCURATE
REFLECTION OF THE RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIVE STATUS – THE FOLLOWING
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INTERPRETATION IS PROVIDED ONLY AS AN INDICATION OF THE
RESPONDENT’S SELF DESCRIPTIONS” (Assessor’s bold and capitalised effects.)

“Despite the general level of negative distortion noted above, there are some areas where the
client described problems of great intensity... These areas could indicate core problems that stand
out from the general level of distress and dysfunction reported by the client, such problems merit
particular focus in further inquiry. These areas include disruptions in thought process; unusual
ideas or believes; feelings of helplessness; tension and apprehension; heightened activity level;
irrational fears; and compulsiveness or rigidity.”

“She likely questions and mistrusts the motives of those around her, despite the nature or history
of her relationships with the following areas: antisocial behaviour; problems with empathy;
unusually elevated mood or heightened activity.”

“A number of aspects of the client’s self-description suggest marked peculiarities in thinking and
experience at a level of severity and usual even in clinical samples. These features are often
associated with an active psychotic episode, with poor judgement and impairment in reality
testing as hallmark characteristics. It is likely that she experiences unusual perceptual or sensory
events as well as unusual ideas that may include enchanted thinking or delusional beliefs. Her
thought processes are likely to be marked by confusion, distractibility, and difficulty
concentrating, and she may experience her thoughts as blocked, withdrawn, or somehow
influenced by others.

She may have some difficulty establishing close interpersonal

relationships.”
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“The client reports a number of difficulties consistent with a significant depressive experience.
She is likely to be plagued by thoughts of worthlessness, hopelessness, and personal failure. She
admits openly to feelings of sadness, a loss of interest in normal activity, and a loss of sense of
pleasure in things that were previously enjoyed. However, there appear to be relatively few
physiological signs of depression. The symptom picture appears to be relatively free of changes
in energy, appetite, weight, and sleep patterns.”

“The client indicates that she is experiencing specific fears or anxiety surrounding some
situations. The patterns of responses reveal that she is likely to display a variety of maladaptive
behaviour patterns aimed at controlling anxiety. For instance, phobic behaviours are likely to
interfere in some significant way in her life, and it is probable that she monitors her environment
in the vigilant fashion to avoid contact with the feared object or situation. She is more likely to
have multiple phobias or a more distressing phobia such as agoraphobia, then to suffer from a
simple phobia.”

The assessor goes on to say, “the respondent (me) displays core needs that need to be addressed.
These include disruptions in thought processes; unusual ideas or beliefs; feelings of helplessness;
tension and apprehension; heightened activity level; irrational fears; and compulsiveness of
rigidity. The respondent is likely to be withdrawn and isolated, and she may have few if any
close interpersonal relationships and may get quite anxious and threatened by such relationships.
Her social judgement is probably fairly poor, and she has difficulty making decisions, even about
matters of little apparent significance.”
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My presentation during testing was affected and based on my psychotic state at the time during
the hospital stay in Ward A (public) – October 2012 - where my perception or reality was
eschewed and unreal. The testing did not represent who I am. This is not who I am. I was
psychotic and dissociated from reality; at a time when I was nothing valued in society

I am

misunderstood, devalued and famed. The misrepresentation affected my life. The language and
symbolic power used to adversely misrepresent my experience of living with schizoaffective
disorder is based on biomedicine and science. I was represented by a testing which begets testing
which begets misrepresentation, as well as stigma (Bourdieu 1991; Goffman 1963).

An

identification understood and measurable by biomedicine (DiGiacomo 1987). Suffering with
schizoaffective disorder, and not knowing how to understand the disorder apart from
biomedicine; I am pathologised.

The assessor went on to say, “The respondent indicates that she is experiencing a discomforting
level of anxiety and tension. She is likely to be plagued by worry to the degree that her ability
to concentrate and attend are significantly compromised. Associates are likely to comment about
her over-concern regarding issues and events over which she has no control. Affectively, she
feels a great deal of tension, has difficulty relaxing, and likely experienced fatigue as a result of
high perceived stress. Overt physical signs of tension and stress, such as sweaty palms, trembling
hands, complaints of irregular heartbeats, and shortness of breath are also present.”

Here I comment, again, because I am being defined and assessed by a priori assumption of
madness. I’m defined by the assessment, by an assessment grounded in biomedicine and
pathology. I lack agency. I am lacking. I am stigmatised and devalued and defamed.
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The assessor follows on, “Her self-image may be largely influenced by a belief that she is
handicapped by her mental illness. She is probably also seen by others as being something of a
perfectionist. She is likely to be a rigid individual who follows her personal guidelines for
conduct in an inflexible and unyielding manner. She ruminates about matters to the degree that
she often has difficulty making decisions and perceiving the larger significance of decisions that
are made. Change in routine, unexpected events, and contradictory information are likely to
generate untoward stress. She may fear her own impulses and doubt her ability to control them.”

“Given this self-doubt, she tends to blame herself for setbacks and sees any prospects for the
future as dependent upon the actions of others.”

For me, the assessment displays an unfathomable difference between my own self-perception
and the PAI assessment of me. How is this difference defined and negotiated? How does this
unfathomable difference between self and institutional measurement illustrate the significance
and potency of relationships across the divide? What power dynamics are rife to craft an
argument and identity around difference? It is these power dynamics that are fundamental to
craft the critical theory stance of (post)colonialism. The purpose of (post)colonialism in this
discussion highlights colonial existence, whereby the self is subjugated and disempowered under
the powerful existing hegemony, in this case the PAI assessor and supporting paradigm of
biomedicine (Said 1978). To associate with Smith (1999), the concept and process of mental
illness service delivery can be likened to colonialism, whereby the dynamic between self and
institutional measurement are unpacked.

(Post)colonialism implies a step away from

colonialism, whereby there is a difference between self and institutional measurement.
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A concept that epitomises the difference and power negotiate ons across the board is the Silenced
Manifesto. The Silenced Manifesto allows for a space, a ‘(post)colonial space’, admitting and
permitting a possible commensurability between the heard (colonisers) and the silenced (the
colonised). These advances coalesce as (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2008: 341). The language
used in such as analysis forms to make the manifesto discourse. The language used coalesces
between my own self-perception and the PAI assessment of me.

To continue, the assessor goes on, “The respondent’s interpersonal style seems best characterised
as self-effacing and lacking confidence in social interactions. She is likely to have difficulty in
having her needs met in personal relationships and instead will subordinate her own interests to
those of others in a manner that may seem self-punitive. Her failure to assert herself may result
in mistreatment or exploitation by others, although at this point, it appears that the strategy has
been effective in maintaining her important relationships.”

When reading the above report from my PAI, I was amazed. Yet, nowhere in my medical notes
is there evidence to show that I am empowered to define my own identity. I am defined by the
hierarchy of mental health professionals as fundamentally lacking and without the means or
resources to participate fully in society. There is somewhat of an assumed a priori knowledge
that the psychiatric participants are lacking or in deficit in some way, and in need of intervention
and support. I lack the capacity to make my own friends and to develop a social and fruitful life
(according to the Personality Assessment Inventory – PAI). I am the consumer, the inmate, the
social misfit. What’s more, in other spheres, more broadly defined in society, in economics and
politics, I am the subhuman, the sub-citizen.
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It appeared and felt to me that I was reading about an entirely different person. I didn’t relate to
anything the psychologist said. It made me wonder what on earth the assessor was hearing,
because in reading her report, I didn’t recognise myself at all. I felt divorced from my assessment.
This assessment is a good example of miscommunication between health professional and
consumer.

This miscommunication also illustrates power differentiations between the health professional
and consumer. The language used between health professional and consumer whilst both
speaking English, was seemly incommensurable. The cultural clash becomes a strong imbalance
between the health professional and me.

Miscommunication and misrepresentation are

commonplace in medicine. For example, the “Sharing the True Stories Report” (Cass et al 2002)
based in Darwin, Northern Territory, showed an example of the significance of
miscommunication between cross-cultural groups.

Measurements and assessments become cultural artefacts in the world of the (post)colonialist
medical science and specifically (post)colonialist psychiatry. Cultural artefacts are sociopolitical objects which aid in the governmentality of (post)colonial power structures. In reaction
to exploring and negating, the nature of (post)colonialism is known by deconstructing it. Social
power play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in
theory if there is an actual difference between the two. Note that (post)colonial power structures
negotiate power in whichever name you give the paradigm, such as the science of biomedicine.
Foucault’s concept of pastoral power contributes to the construct of the State and
governmentality, both of which are socio-structural constructs, operating, validating, justifying
and making accountable them institutions (Foucault 2007).
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There are assumptions made a priori in the factoid assessments. The individual needs to be
empowered and in charge of their own agency and future – the individual is the central focus and
values the factoid. The factoid assumes that the power of the individual reigns. However,
Foucault argues that the power really belongs to the social pathways and social structures which
define and confine the agency of the individual. According to Foucault (2007), the individual is
not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the closely monitored product
of relations between power and knowledge. Power dynamics are profound in the case of the
mental health consumer and the services provided to them. The psychological measurements in
these testings have significance to anthropology; they come to life as a series of statistics, cultural
artefacts and factoids. They can also raise the question of what the measurements represent, and
indeed who owns the knowledge of the crazy? (Lea 2008) Psychometric measurements are a
socio-political technology which aid in the governmentality of current power structures.

I later received clarification and explanation of the neuropsychological assessment and the PAI.
An expert in the field, a neuropsychologist, assured me that these tests are not necessarily
completely accurate. There are masses of bewildering and puzzling factors. I had a lot riding on
the tests. I wanted to prove that, despite my disability, I was absolutely capable, competent and
clever enough to get exceptional marks on these tests; to prove that I am proficient and qualified
enough to complete my PhD, and that I can live a full life. Instead I received average marks with
average indicators. However, as the excerpt stated, I applied great effort and commitment to my
study if nothing else.

I was worried, indeed petrified, that this test proved that I was inept, and I lacked aptitude to
complete my PhD. Although the neuropsychologist noted that there are a lot of impermeable
factors which meant that such a negative conclusion was expected. I have been told by mental
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health professionals that I am capable of completing my PhD, though it may just take me three
times longer. The truth of the matter is that my quality of life has diminished permanently.

Proximity of measurement

Measurements, assessments and diagnostic tools are historical and cultural artefacts used in the
proximity (Kowal 2006) of medical science, specifically psychiatry. An example used in
psychiatry is the cultural medical practice of having regular set blood tests. First, the blood test
results have a numerical value - certain levels of certain medications must be present in the blood,
at therapeutic levels defined by medical science. Second, the process of having monthly blood
tests can be seen as a cultural regime, where the mental health participant is drawn into the
rhetoric of psychiatry and becomes defined and dependent on the medical system, fixed in a
paternal relationship with mental health services.

The blood tests are anthropological symbols of servitude – that is related to symbolic and
interpretive anthropology (Wikipedia 2014), from the consumer and ‘protection’ for the mental
health professionals. The measurement, in this case the blood test, precipitates in an Us and
Other dynamic where power play is rife (Derrida 1966). The mental health professionals - the
Us - use techniques of measurement, diagnosis and treatment, to stake a claim on the way the
mentally ill should live. The mentally ill – Other – not being privy to the sanctity of medical
knowledge, have little choice but to trust the deified mental health professionals. As per Smith
(1999: 52), “What makes ideas real is the system of knowledge, the formations of culture and the
relations of power in which these concepts are located…[A] major sociological concern becomes
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a struggle over the extent to which individual consciousness and reality shapes or is shaped by
social structure.”

In an analysis of diagnosis and the utilisation of measurement tools to legitimise the cultural
labelling of the mentally ill, the roles of the subhuman/sub-citizen/social misfit are bantered and
negotiated and ultimately legitimised. Diagnoses are defined and perpetuated by the culture of
madness and predicated by the scientific fairy-tale statistics of evaluation (Lea 2008). This is a
seemly impossible venture, especially considering the anecdotal cultural evidence that ultimately
measures the unmeasurable.

Nevertheless, psychiatric science with its measurements cannot be ignored. In trying to find a
sound measurement tool; to bring to life the magical proof of numbers in a diagnosis – psychiatry
relies on measurement - statistics, pie graphs and bar graphs. The magic of digits and quantitative
methods cannot be ignored. These digits and graphs can be understood as cultural artefacts or
factoids. Statistics actually represent the kaleidoscopic phenomena of mental illness. The
illuminations of measurement factoids enable the mental health facts to develop a social life.
(Lea: 2008: 128)

Measurements legitimising diagnosis seem to create a space of proximity where it is possible to
negotiate and exchange between and within the socio-cultural structure, and this is embedded in
the many persuasions of power control and comprehension from which they came. This space
for legitimising measurements is important as it provides some cognition, some proximity, for
negotiation between cultural artefacts and factoids (Kowal 2006; Lea 2008). To make this space
workable, there must be some proximity in the connection between what is the phenomena of the
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measured and the un-measured. What is defined as within the realms of the measurable and the
un-measurable? That is, discovering an understanding between what is science and how this
relates to non-science. For example, considering the cultural artefact, and if or how there is space
for an understanding of science, one can ask if and how and why it is significant. Thus, some
space is available in the proximity to measure the unmeasurable.

If there is space for proximity and measurement between the measurable and the unmeasurable
there is also space for proximity and analysis. What if there is a misrepresentation in the
proximity? One can argue that in trying to define and assess the diagnostic process, the mental
health professionals can categorise and misrepresent the mentally ill. As such, mental health
measurements may perpetuate a culture which ultimately leads to a crisis of representation (Smith
1999). The ultimate power of the physician, in this case the psychiatrist, reigns as a demi-god in
medical science. In an effort to make commensurable the incommensurable, there is a call for
university students of today to study the anthropology of medical science and/or medical
anthropology (Kleinman 1988).

Mental health has become part of dinner party conversations, corridor talk, seminars and political
enquiries. As part of my experience, immersed in the context and texts of a major psychotic
illness, there exists an idea of what is an acceptable form of mental illness. It certainly isn’t
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. There is a ‘right’ kind of madness, which is somewhat
more accepted and respected. It is not uncommon today to have highly esteemed personalities,
whether they be politicians or musicians, living with depression or anxiety or even more
complicated disorders, pay homage to their diagnosis to add to their common respect and appeal
(Lea 2008).
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Capital

There exists a concept called ‘ethnographic capital’. It is perhaps more of a reality than a concept.
Ethnography, according to ethnographers, equips the researcher with the power and commodity
of knowledge. The ‘capital’ of ethnography relates to how knowledge comes to be owned
through its development and creation. Socio-cultural structures or perhaps institutions such as
governments, have a vested interest in owning knowledge which produces cultural artefacts,
because owning knowledge empowers institutions/structures.

Ownership of knowledge,

accumulated as capital, becomes a commodity because it can be defined, understood, exchanged
and given value. These commodities, for example cultural commodities of art and discourse,
have made capital out of the ethnography (Lea 2008: 84).

What is ethnographic capital in this study? I have found that autoethnographic methods of
measurement build autoethnographic capital.

The cultural phenomenon of measurement

supports the power of the psychiatrist’s diagnosis. Measurements are part of the cultural
phenomenon that supply the ‘truth’ for the science of psychiatry. Measurements also supply the
truth supporting the ‘right kind of mental illness’. Like what Lea (2008: 84) describes as the
‘right kind of white’.

Discourse
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‘Discourse’, as defined by Foucault, refers to the ways of constituting knowledge through text.
Together with the social practices, the subjectivity and power relations of discourse adhere to
such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and
producing meaning (Massey University – University of New Zealand 2020).

The language used in texts, which has developed for the mentally ill, is potent. For example, the
texts available for the consumer are mostly to do with their rights and responsibilities. The walls
at my psychiatrist’s rooms, covered in mental health advocacy brochures, used the powerful
words of psychiatric jargon. The ‘Charter of Consumer Rights’; ‘Do You Know your Rights as
a Consumer?’; ‘Your Rights and Responsibilities as a Consumer’ and brochures about the right
to give feedback about services received. The brochures are aimed to empower the mental health
participant. As well, the brochures could be seen as propaganda for mental health service
provision, though I didn’t understand the significance at the time. Once, when I was waiting at
my doctor’s rooms, and somewhat manic, I completely reorganised the mental health brochures
to my liking. This act empowered me in a sense, to make order the significant texts to my liking.
I organised and structured the brochures first in topic, then chronologically, then alphabetically.
If there were any misfit brochures, I would order them in the colours of the rainbow.

So, it

seems that the efficacy of the brochures was questionable in my case.

These information resources are based on the broader documents of state/territory and national
mandates of mental health in Australia. For example, the Northern Territory’s overarching
document is called the ‘Northern Territory of Australia Mental Health and Related Services Act’
(28th July 2016). The governing document for the Australia Capital Territory is the ‘Mental
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Health Act 2015’. And national governance in mental health is led by the ‘National Standard of
Mental Health Practices’ (2010).

All these texts combined and analysed together form cultural and discourse phenomena. Mental
health is in some ways an art form that negotiates the language complexities between cultural
meaning, natural sciences, social sciences and esoteric, existential and holistic care.

The effective words of mental health language, used by mental health professionals, often have
underlying meaning attached to them. For example, the question ‘How are you feeling?’ has
extra underlying meaning. Not only is the mental health professional interested in your physical
feelings due to physical reactions to medication, the consumer is also supposed to describe other
non-physical symptoms. Here the question ‘How are you feeling?’ also conveys the meaning of
an insightful nature, especially regarding psychotic symptoms, which affects all phenomena.
Reporting on the esoteric factors ‘I am feeling’ requires me to have a sense, an insight to the
degree and the depth of my feelings.

I must be careful here. If I use the wrong words or expression, I may give the mental health
professional the wrong impression and wrongly reflect my condition and what label I should be
classed under. Usually with diagnostic labelling, mysterious and obscure feelings are defined and
labelled into diagnostic categories. Psychiatry itself is defined as profound and perplexing (Szasz
1970). Extrapolating from Lea, psychiatry attempts to ‘intellectualise’ crazy (Lea 2008: 137).
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Disempowerment

I get caught in an extreme and intense storm of madness, seemingly engulfed in a turbulent
whirlwind of insanity. I am suffocating in the wiles of the storm of lunacy. I am helpless, with
no site of freedom ahead of me. I am imprisoned by my label and my diagnosis, reliant on the
science of psychiatry to grant me freedom, because it doesn’t seem like I can do it on my own.

Measurement can be liberating for some and disempowering for others. Coming from the camp
of disempowerment, where I am defined and confined by my diagnosis and categorisation of
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, these questions are important. How am I labelled as a
subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit? How is this defined and enacted? What are the tools of
diagnosis, the tools that measure sanity?

And what is the broader significance of these

measurements?

There is a sacredness about measurement, about culture, about representation and meaning. Each
measurement utilises a tool of some sort. These measurements are objectified to define and
identify the properties according to the modern science of medicine. Medical science of the
masses comes under the realm of public health.

Public health studies make it clear that health is reliant on cultural constructs, arguing that there
are social determinants to health. For example, Australian Indigenous peoples’ health is affected
by socialisation into the racist and colonisers’ culture. (Carson et al 2007; Paradies 2006; Thomas
2004; Smith 1999).

Here we step into the realm of the social sciences. I mention this to
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emphasise the point that measurements have a subjective element, or whole. The factoids support
and create cultural products, or artefacts, which add depth to the original biomedical scientific
assessments (Lea 2008).

The State and the silenced

Then there is the phenomenon of silenced reports on shelves. Here I place the concept of the
Silenced Manifesto, with the silenced becoming part of the hidden mental health discourse. (To
be detailed in chapters 12 and 13.) The sciences of the brain (including psychiatry, psychology,
neurology and neuropsychology) produce and utilise methods for authorising, legitimising,
validating and treating mental illness. These psychometric tests have cultural significance and
produce artefacts. These measurements are highly esteemed in biomedicine (McMahon 2013).
They situate the individual in question in accordance to a pre-determined definition of
‘normality’. This information substantiates the diagnosis and treatment of such.

Policy is central to governance infrastructure, linking together and forming foundations of the
capital and substance of the socio-cultural, political and economic. National quality frameworks,
part of the backbone of policy, form objects of governance, and produce objects of knowledge.
These political objects of knowledge produce further knowledge. Health professionals forge and
define programs through power banter, for example, between themselves the governing bodies,
the Us, and mental health clients, the Other. The bureaucracy decrees that psychometric
measurements are necessary tools for knowledge production, an extension of the biomedical
model and scientific measurement which defines and justifies national policy and governance.
Today, in Australia, there is a political commitment to deal with the ‘mental health issue’.
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There are seemly no absolute and completely reliable and valid measures to assess mental health
participants, and there are certainly not reliable and exact measures to direct treatment. My
experience with schizoaffective disorder, for instance, would be contextualised by the many
variants in my life. Diagnosis and subsequent treatment need to be individually assessed, and
not be declared for an assumed homogenised group, combining pathological mechanisms in to
one disorder. Psychiatry needs to be careful not to simply generalise or categorise too swiftly,
especially not at the at the expense of the individual’s health (Szasz 1970).

Foucault argues, when looking at the agency of the individual, power really belongs to the social
pathways and social structures with which the individual is defined and confined. According to
Foucault, “the individual is not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the
closely monitored product of relations between power and knowledge” (Farrell 2020). Foucault
also argues that power play exists in all interactions, including measurement processes, which
are essentially part of a production of knowledge based somewhat on socio-cultural and political
factoids (Foucault in Appignanesi et al 2005). Information alone assumes an independent
universal and highly potent ability to change people’s lives and behaviours (Lea 2008:127). The
prevailing assumption is that scientised facts have a considerable capacity to engender sorts of
behaviour change (Lea & Wilson 2005). As such, data itself has developed to being inherently
powerful (Lea 2008: 132).

Many different capabilities exist in the utilising and conceptual analysis of measurement.
Foucault (1969) argues that power is not a thing but a relation, and that power is exercised
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throughout the social body, operating at even the most micro levels of social relations. Power is
omnipresent (O’Farrell 2005).

Dynamics of factoids include giving agency to and

anthromorphising the factoid; empowering the individual narrative; and empowering the State
and the various institutional apparatus and infrastructure of which the factoids are a product.

Cuthbert (2013) states that it is essential to treat the various and mostly complex symptoms,
rather than concentrate on categorising people into definitional diagnosis.

A system of

measurement is essential. A system of measuring brain science is essential.

A system of

incorporating the heterogeneous and multi-faceted phenomena into psychiatry and brain science
is essential.

This includes incorporating the factors of experiential, environmental, and

behavioural measures, as well as observable, neurobiological, neuropsychological and genetic
measures. A system of assessing and treating psychiatric symptoms is essential. Some scholars
argue that a grouped definition of schizophrenia does not exist. Other scholars argue that we
need valid and reliable ways to measure. Others argue that the cultural phenomena of mental
health cannot be negated. We need rigorous research to decipher rigorous ways of measuring
psychiatry, in all areas of assessment, diagnosis and treatment (Szasz 2008).

Conclusion

My goal for now is to prove to myself that I am intelligent. For over half my life I have been
mentally ill and have managed competing, confusing, baffling and bewildering noises in my
head. With these noisy thoughts, I have limited capacity to decipher rival knowledge. I cannot
trust the version of reality my mind gives me. I want to feel that my thoughts and perceptions
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are valid and true. That I don’t have to constantly second guess myself and annoy people by my
constant need for reassurance and validation. With psychosis, I hear things that (I hope) are not
true. I am constantly in a state of distrust and confusion about the version of truth in my head.

Measurement may be likened to a tool of (post)colonialism (Smith 1999: 6; 23). Many distinct
populations, including the mentally ill, have experienced colonialism, in various ways (Smith
1999: 26). Diagnosis and labelling are (post)colonial actions (Smith 1999: 26). Those labelled
as mentally ill, or non-white, or female are historically not granted the status of fully human.
Some of us are not even considered partially human (Smith 1999: 26).

The psychometric measurement tools are empowered as entities of their own and generate or
adversely define structure and agency for those who engage or disengage with the tool. For
example, an individual could have his/her voice heard within the institutional bounds of the
service provided. Further analysis could portray how institutions can use the ‘science’ of
measurement.

Outside the walls of positivist medical science lay the social foundations of mental health. These
foundations include facets such as: taking account of the complex nature of human interaction,
socialisation of science, and the power dynamics bantered in the potent, and cogent exchange of
what is socio-cultural capital. Health factoids circulate as authoritative accounts of success (Lea
2008: 150-1). For it is a fact of bureaucratic logic that the full sweep of human experience and
meaning can be distilled into categories of assumed wider impact (such as economics, politics,
and colonisation).
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS

MY CRAZINESS IS PERPETUAL: 7 STORIES OF BEING LABELLED
AND EMBEDDED IN CULTURE

Seven stories of my craziness follow, although there are many more.

1. My perspective of the self: who am I?

Who am I?

Am I the inpatient in a psychiatric ward that got lost in the foyer of the hospital trying to find a
toilet? Or am I the inpatient who was trying to get in another patient’s bed, apparently not
wanting to be removed. Or am I the person whose potential employer ran away from, until she
realised it was not a dignified thing to do?
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Who am I? Am I the subject: the mental health subject?

Am I the loved and cherished daughter, sister, friend, colleague, cousin, or partner I’ve always
wanted to be?

Who am I? Or am I the crazy girl, disabled by the noises she hears, or the paranoia that plagues
her, or the panic that suffocates her, or the incredible depression that bestows her?

Who am I? Am I the label that people mark me with, the stigma, the disempowered human misfit
that is ostracised from society?

Who am I? What have I got to offer? What is my space? Where am I placed?

I am stuck in the paradigm of mental health science provision. Lacking the agency to live a full
life. My life is not my own. I am stuck. I am within the space of disablement, where I am
silenced and shelved via diagnosis and in relation to the deity of mental health professionals, who
decree my appropriate care. And the care providers have the best intentions. It is the culture that
labels, not individuals.
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2. The highs and lows of living with schizoaffective disorder

How has living with schizoaffective disorder changed me? What are the symptoms? For one,
and an obvious one: the noises – I prefer to call them noises, as mentioned previously. There are
about seven of them. They are always chattering, never giving me any peace. When I am well,
they are just a whisper. When I am unwell, they are shouting and wailing. They say things like:
“You’re hopeless”, “You’re stupid and worthless”, “You won’t amount anything”, “You’re fat
and ugly – no one will want you”, “You are a burden to your family and friends, if you even have
any”, “You are a social misfit, a sub-human and a sub-citizen, sapping resources from society for
your sorry arse”. The noises are all different ages and of different sexes. About seven of them
rule my head.

It is very hard to negotiate these noises. Everything gets so blaring. My senses are magnified.
The noises can be all consuming. It seems that they fight for my attention. I also try not to listen
to them because I feel it empowers them. This whole process smothers me more, making me
question my perceptions. I become paranoid, as the noises challenge all my senses, and all the
ways that I can decipher reality.

I am silenced. Once known that I have a major psychotic illness, I am assumed a priori to be
stupid and disabled, therefore, not to be listened to. I am labelled, I am stigmatised, I am Othered,
including by myself.
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I am fighting the labels and culture by embarking on this PhD. I want to prove everyone wrong,
especially myself, for I think I am fundamentally stupid - an assumption that has been embedded
in my psychology over the many years of subjugation from the persistent noises. I am fighting
this uphill battle because I have been told by a neurologist that my brain does not function
properly. Also, in some other testing, the measurements rightly or wrongly have shown that my
cognition is lacking. I am determined to show medical science wrong. I hope I am wrong.

I feel an intense shame about how I act while I am unwell. I am a mess. One day, when I hadn’t
been to work for three days, my supervisor came to my house. Apparently, I was passed out on
the couch. There was an empty bottle of gin on the floor beside me. I was in the depths of
despair, hardly able to get up. There was nothing in the fridge, no food in the house at all. My
supervisor brought me some food. I hadn’t eaten in days.

In a matter of a week, I had jumped out of my depression. I was buzzing with energy. I was
overactive and unstoppable. I had just been given a class to teach. I threw myself into the job.
So much so that my supervisor pulled me aside and told me to calm down and slow down. I was
smoking incessantly, spending a ridiculous amount, all on a multitude of credit cards. I scrubbed
my house clean and clean and clean again. My supervisor paid me to clean her house. I scrubbed
her whole house, polishing all wooden floors and furniture with orange oil, putting everything in
neat order. I remembered having the conflict in my logic. I had difficulty deciphering what was
real and what wasn’t. My friends were carrying me. I relied on them for my dignity.
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3. The significance of coffee

In a recent job in Town C my supervisor pulled me aside to go and have a coffee. I knew that
when you are pulled aside for a coffee something is wrong. So, my supervisor pulled me aside,
halfway through my contract.

What he then said was devastating and shocked me to my core.

He stated that I have not got the skills for my job. That my resume and referees’ reports were
vastly different from the person here in front of him. He also said that there is no way that my
contract would be extended, as I had hoped.

My supervisor stated that the severity of my mental illness was to blame for not being suitable
for the job.

This seemed incredulous, mainly because the organisation prided itself on

accommodating and supporting those with mental health issues. They seemed to support people
with minor mental health issues, but any illness more complicated or volatile, is too much to
understand and too much to fathom.

Considering that I do have a disability, as affirmed by my supervisor, an option was to give me
a two day a week job; a tokenistic gesture created to show the mental health sector that this
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organisation does support people with mental health disabilities. I would be the token disabled
employee, though my supervisor would not phrase it that way.

I thought at the time that my supervisor could give me a lifeline. I asked him if he could possibly
support me in being a referee. He refused. He said that he can’t be honest and true to himself in
being a referee for me.

My supervisor stated that they will advertise for my position. When I asked if I should apply, he
stated that I could apply, but I won’t get the job. I asked him whether they would re-advertise if
they couldn’t find someone suitable. He said yes. And still I will not get the job. I can apply
for the job, but I will not get it. But do apply! It reminded me of being sectioned. I was totally
disempowered and paralysed. Whatever I choose as an option, I lose out.

My supervisor otherwise displayed supportive and empathetic behaviour, holding my hand and
crying, offering his services. Though when it came to employment - to really support and
empower me, the help that would mean something to me, he was unable to give. Again, I could
not be truly supported because I, in his sight, lack the skills. The skills they need are apparently
those of a well person.

I was good at what I do yet was not valued for my skills – I was effectively sectioned by my boss.
I’m not sure what skills are valued? A previous supervisor once gave me a reference stating that
my main issue is my massive lack of self-confidence.
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So, my supervisor thought he could ‘help me’. What does this mean exactly? It seemed to me
that the help my supervisor was offering was absolutely from a kind heart, but at the same time,
also paternalistic. I am being extremely supported yet fundamentally and ironically suppressed
and discriminated against - stigmatised.

4. The dynamic of needing the disability support pension

My psychiatrist believed I should apply for the disability support pension as a safety net. As it
now stands, losing my job, I am definitely in need of it. Even succumbing to needing the
disability support pension is a slap in the face. I remembered being on the pension before, how
shameful it was. I felt like I wasn’t part of society, like I wasn’t contributing.

Below are snippets from a letter written by my supervisor (the one who could not support me) to
help support my application for the disability support pension. The comments are very harsh,
yet sometimes, frustratingly very true:

“...the magnitude of Rachael’s mental illness has resulted in her having a significant
psychosocial disability, which makes it extremely challenging for Rachael to function
effectively in the workplace”
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“I am now able to recognise that this was not just a case of regular ‘interview nerves’, but
a manifestation of Rachael’s psychosocial disability”

“It impedes her ability to process clearly with any speed what has been asked of her, and the
more she realises that she has missed the point of the request, the more rattled she becomes and
the more difficulty she has in understanding what has been asked of her. It becomes a great
impediment to Rachael in interview situations and in the workplace. It is also very clear that this
sequence of events causes Rachael great humiliation and distress.”

“We have many examples from her period of employment with us of Rachael apparently
understanding what she has been asked to do and how to go about undertaking the task – but in
reality, producing something very different from what we intended. Rachael requires a period of
time and additional support to absorb information that we are unable to accommodate. She has
difficulty processing instructions and managing more than one task at a time. Rachael appears to
suffer functional memory problems and gets easily confused. When this happens, she gets very
stressed and this further exacerbates the problems to an extent where even basic tasks can be a
struggle. This is not just my experience working with Rachael, but also that of my colleagues.
We see in Rachael, intellect, determination and goodwill, but an inability to complete the tasks
appropriate to her job description.”
(My supervisor’s emphasis)
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Physically, emotionally, intellectually. It’s suffocating. I cannot move. It’s shameful. I want to
scream, yet I have no voice.

5. I feel so ashamed

There are so many emotions tied up in living with schizoaffective disorder. So many feelings
involved in the pain of life. These range from: humiliation, devastation, anguish, feeling deeply
remorseful and crippled, guilt, suffocation, desperation, a feeling of drowning, and being lost.

Of particular note is the feeling of shame.

Along with this, I feel like a subhuman, a sub-citizen.

I am ashamed of it all. It is official. I am stupid. I don’t belong. I make stuff up so that I seem
to fit in, but I really don’t fit in. I am ashamed that I was dependent on my boss and friends. I
was a liability, sapping whatever I could, drawing out whenever I could. I do not fit in even in
my culture.

The shame I feel, and still feel... I drown in it. I know that it is silly of me to invest time in even
thinking about the stigma that infects me. I don’t seem to have a choice. No matter how much
people try and encourage me, my society – with all my progressive friends – cannot grant me a
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complete and empowered identity. It is too soon for our society to do away with the titles of
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, although all power is claimed and people living with
schizoaffective disorder are declared equal.

Expressed feelings from the mentally ill are not important. They are only a compilation of
random, meaningless and empty words. My feelings are obsolete, as I’d imagine would be the
case for many of the mentally ill.

6. The inevitable powerlessness

I am punished and powerless for having a major mental illness. It seems that only minor mental
illnesses are tolerated. My mental illness is the reason I am classed, or labelled, as unskilled.
This really hurts. Diplomatically phrased by the Executive Officer of my (aforehand) supervisor,
‘I have a different skill set’ – one not needed. In the same breath of announcing to the staff that
my contract was not going to be extended, the Executive Officer emphasised that there will now
be a commitment to the implementation of the organisation’s vision of evaluation, measurement
and quality assurance – all skills that I possess and are known to possess. This was ignored,
while I sat, my heart breaking, and no one knew, cared or understood. I’m invisible and silenced.
No one sees me or hears me.

The rules of human resources management from my

aforementioned position provided the glass ceiling of discourse, which I could not break through.
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Whose voice is being heard? What are the implicit or explicit silences in this discourse? Which
noises are empowered (Hanisch 1969)? I am silenced. Once known that I have schizoaffective
disorder, I am assumed a priori to be stupid and disabled, therefore, not to be listened to. I am
labelled, I am stigmatised, I am Othered. With every voice heard, there is/are noises silenced.
For every voice empowered there is/are noises disempowered. Again, which noises are heard?
What social structure manifests the noises and makes them clear? The Silenced Manifesto
provides the social structure of governance, manipulates the vernacular and shelves the silenced.

I have such skills, demonstrated skills, but I am silenced in this space. Those also labelled as
mentally ill are also silenced, just for being in the community space. The silenced, those labelled
as inadequate, or perhaps more commonly labelled as disabled, the seriously mentally ill lack
power. As labelled and disabled, I am powerless. I have not the power to take what I need from
society, my own authority and self-determination. The powerful allow the distribution of
command to the disabled, with supremacy. Disabled, suffocated, silenced. Not fully human; not
a full citizen.

Because of this, I am overwhelmed. I am drowning. I cannot understand why I am being treated
this way. The whole point of working is to retain some sense of self-worth and dignity. By
working I am contributing to society, paying taxes and being an active member of the politicoeconomy. Yet somehow and someway I have been marked as incompetent and incapable.
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My mental health status becomes the fault of everything going wrong in my life. I go to the
doctor with a physical ailment and come out petrified and defeated that my physical health has
actually turned into a mental health issue. I had lost another battle.

As an act of pity, or perhaps good will, my supervisor offered his help for me to get a job. The
main way he would support me would be by attending interviews with me, translating questions
as the interview went along, because I apparently get confused about what is being asked of me.
I should note that I am very, very bad at interviews. With that in mind, I cannot figure out if this
gesture is meant to be significantly kind, or significantly insulting. My boss said he will be my
advocate because I am disabled and need help. Despite the sugar-coated insult, I accepted his
offer. My supervisor then stated that he will write an email to my psychiatrist to explain his
benevolent gesture, buying into the cultural vernacular that my actions and presumptive
allegiances are determined and sanctioned by the greater good, a macro-narrative of society, for
example the medical professional. My micro-narrative, an autoethnography of society just
doesn’t cut it.

7. The phenomenal meta-narrative

Through living with schizoaffective disorder, I have noted that I am in a constant dialogue,
sometimes even a fight, competing with bioscience. Science is a meta-narrative that consumes
the culture of health.
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Being labelled in a stigmatised culture comes with self-loathing, and a belief that I lack dignity,
personhood and agency. This label of fundamentally lacking impinges on the basic human rights
for those with disabilities. Specifically, Articles 5 and 12 of the United Nations Convention of
the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD 2014). To add, the WHO has developed a
comprehensive mental health action plan (2013-2020). It calls for a change in the attitudes that
perpetuate stigma and discrimination that have isolated people since ancient times, and it calls
for an expansion of services in order to promote greater efficiency in the use of resources (WHO
2013).

What is it like to live with a disability? How am I disabled? As per the United Nations (UNCRPD
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs Disability 2014), disability should not impinge on
the quality of life and agency awarded to those living without a mental illness. How has my
disability affected my life? I lack the discourses and resources, the social, cultural, economic,
political resources that can potentially enable me to live a full life. Being disabled, I am regarded
as a social misfit and deranged, identities constructed for me as a lesser human being. I am
forever labelled. That branding will scar me forever.
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CHAPTER TWELVE

THE SILENCED MANIFESTO

“The Silenced Manifesto, being likened to the exposition of a religion, through its
commanding language and discourse, mandates the governance and placement of the
silenced.”
(Field notes April 8th, 2018)

“[There is] no need to hear your voice, when I can talk about you better than you can speak
about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know
your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a
way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still
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author, authority. I am still [the] colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the
center of my talk”
(bell hooks, 1989).

My goal is to prove to myself that I am intelligent. I am paranoid about it. For almost half my
life I have been mentally ill, and have in turn heard competing, confusing, baffling and
bewildering ‘noises’ in my head. Describing them simply as ‘noises’ takes away the agency and
power that the ‘voices’ try to claim. With these noises, I have limited capacity to decipher rival
knowledge. I cannot trust the version of reality my mind gives me. I want to feel that my
thoughts and perceptions are valid and true, that I don’t have to constantly second guess myself
and annoy people by my incessant need for reassurance and validation. With psychosis, I hear
things that (I hope) are not true. I am in a constant state of distrust and confusion about the
version of truth in my head.

This chapter expands on my concept of the Silenced Manifesto. The Silenced Manifesto is a
powerful concept that I have developed as part of my original contribution. It describes the
position of the marginalised and what Foucault (1961) calls the ‘underdog’ and how they have
been and are being silenced. It encompasses the discourse that perpetuates the labelling of the
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfits.

The focus of the Silenced Manifesto as a concept is to give a voice to those whose voice is not
or has not been heard. This concept may be reappropriated to many situations where there is
disempowerment, discrimination, and discernment of a group, or indeed regarding an individual.
In this case, giving a voice to those living with a mental illness, specifically schizoaffective
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disorder. We have been silenced by our diagnoses and labelling, both historically and now. We
are/have been silenced, suffocated, and disabled in more compounding ways than living with the
original disability. The labelling and silencing have perpetuated and enhanced the position of
lacking for the disabled; it has a snowball effect. The silenced become more silent. And the
disempowering discourse becomes more entrenched. Thus, the Silenced Manifesto imprisons
the marginalised.

In my lived experience of having schizoaffective disorder, my quality of life has diminished permanently. I have been stuck, categorised and hence silenced by my diagnosis and the
perceived appropriate treatment I need to have, as per mental health professionals decree. The
silencing and suffocating of my expression, my thoughts, my essence is perhaps the most
disabling, disempowering and de-humanising experience of my life. And I wish I could say that
it happened only once. Rather, I argue that such silencing and suffocation is embedded in
psychiatry. This is compounded by the added marginalisation and subjugation that mental health
participants receive when they are an already marginalised and subjugated group, namely the
disabled as labelled, in this instance. My story is one embedded in the definably unjust world of
psychiatry.

The ‘silenced’ part of the Silenced Manifesto refers to the complex of narratives where the
marginalised are silenced. They are simply not heard. The silenced, I argue, lack the resources
to be heard. They lack the language of governance to be heard. They lack the power to be heard.
Their silenced narrative; their plight, their voice, their language; their politics, their power; are
shelved, along with the many texts and discourses that are subject to the disempowerment of the
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marginalised. Their true representation is in crisis (Smith 1999; Rabinow in Clifford & Marcus
1986).

The ‘manifesto’ of the Silenced Manifesto unlocks the incredible chest of knowledge, the
language, the symbols, the narratives, the texts and the discourses which decree who has power
over the structure of society. The manifesto is the part of culture that culminates and represents
the discourse which has power over the underdog (Foucault 1961), the colonisers having control
of the colonised.

I have separated the discussion of the Silenced Manifesto into sub-headings:
•

An anthropological paradigm – the Silenced Manifesto

•

Methodology and the Silence Manifesto

•

The Silenced Manifesto – its application to all narratives

•

My narrative, language and the Silenced Manifesto

•

Reality and the Silenced Manifesto

•

Labelling theory and measurement and the Silenced Manifesto

•

Social theory and the Silenced Manifesto

•

(Post)colonialism and the Silenced Manifesto

•

The Communist Manifesto and the Silenced Manifesto

•

Governance, politics, policy and the Silenced Manifesto

•

The space of commensurability and the Silenced Manifesto

•

The Silenced Manifesto and stigma
o The Silenced Manifesto and the stigmatised self

•

Discourse and the Silenced Manifesto
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As discussed in earlier in this thesis, at times my logic and expression are fragmented, as my
mind is fragmented. I have tried to explain the concept of the Silenced Manifesto with the best
logic that I know how. Though my expression may be spasmodic and somewhat ‘fruitful’.

An Anthropological Paradigm – the Silenced Manifesto

The Silenced Manifesto is also an anthropological paradigm, tied to culture by its spoken and
written word. Culture, the learned behaviours and ideas that are characteristic of a social group,
exists to support society; that is its function. Just like the heart's function is to maintain blood to
the body, culture functions to maintain society. Individual need is still important, but it is
succumbed to maintaining the structure of society. Foucault argues that the power really belongs
to the social pathways and social structures which define and confine the agency of the individual
(in Rabinow 1984).

Foucault (in Saar 2002) also spoke about the ‘genealogy of subjectivity’ where we think we
are free agents in our society, but we are defined by our historical development over time.
This historical definition process is covert. It has meant that notably, power intersubjectivities
and processes have been embedded in the cultural values and social fabric. Over the last few
centuries, the pillars of science have been naturalised, that is science as supreme is considered
an assumption before any other knowledge or perspective. Scientific fact has an a priori
assumption. This version of reality is the version of reality with its’ accompanying metanarratives. All analyses come after this fact (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007).
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Following on and situating the discussion, regarding Indigenous Australians, there is the ‘Closing
the Gap’ discourse; and economies of scale built on ‘Closing the Gap’ (Kowal 2006). There is
an assumed remedialism here (Kowal 2006) that may be associated with the historical
construction of sub-citizen policy, and the identity structure and manufacture of subhumanity, all
to influence the power negotiations that make the social misfit. All this is developed and
precipitated by the culture which supplies the space, the sustenance, the life blood and the
resources for these underdog categories to survive (Foucault 1961). The Silenced Manifesto
helps define and express these categories of survival; finding a structural means which allows for
survival separate from the hegemony; a way of fighting through the glass ceiling of the Silenced
Manifesto.

An anthropological perspective of the Silenced Manifesto, regarding this thesis, entails
enculturating the silenced and the hidden into an imprisoning discourse and reality from the
perspective of my lived experience of having a psychotic illness. I have been labelled, and these
labels have been perpetuated by a culture and a corresponding narrative which upholds
Otherhood and colonisation. Here the labels of subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit are
perpetuated by a culture that values the disempowerment and inequality of the underdog, albeit
covertly and perhaps unknowingly. An analysis of culture and the discourse it pertains serves to
unpack the values held by the micro/macro/metanarratives.

Kleinman (1980: 178) comments that culture affects the way we perceive, label and cope with
somatic symptoms as well as psychological ones. All illness is normative (that is at least in part
socially learned and guided by cultural norms) and culture shapes illness behaviour principally
by cognitive processes.
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Methodology and the Silenced Manifesto

The Silenced Manifesto is also a methodology, which piggybacks on emancipatory
methodologies, for example and in this case, autoethnography.

The methodology of an

autoethnography, unpacks the plight and perspective of the underdog, in this case the subhuman,
sub-citizen and the social misfit.

The Silenced Manifesto describes the way that these

subordinates are hidden. As well as describing how and why the underdog is stigmatised and
labelled as such.

An autoethnography, such as mine, is used as a methodology to illustrate and expose the broader
meta-cultural phenomena as well as the more micro cultural phenomena; both being universal
underpinnings of the Silenced Manifesto. A sample of one is not egotistical or narcissistic. The
singular sample size enriches the study and analysis by depicting a different alternative viewpoint
– amplifying the whisper of the disabled, or the ‘handicapped’ as I have been labelled and
defined. Again, through the labelling and the culture labelling, here is a strong reference to the
Silenced Manifesto.

The Silenced Manifesto – its application to all narratives

The universality of the Silenced Manifesto can be expressed by the concept/s of colonisation and
discrimination, where the marginalised are ultimately disempowered, by not having the resources
necessary for agency, not knowing the language of the powerful and as such, not being able to
have a voice.

The universality of the Silenced Manifesto may be described by all
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micro/macro/and metanarratives where agency and structure suffocate and limit the freedom of
everyone, but most importantly in this case, the mentally ill.

The universal narratives as part of the Silenced Manifesto include those related to tangible
textualized objects such as discourse, text, language, historical accounts, stories, policies, rules
and regulations, government acts, and measurement. The Silenced Manifesto illustrates the
silenced’s position. For example, where there is an imbalance of power, this imbalance is hidden
and silenced both overtly and definitely covertly. The silence in its overt form is omnipresent
and ubiquitous, and more covertly, unseen, unheard or unheeded.

The silence permeates all narratives, universally, to various degrees. Examples of how the
Silenced Manifesto is perpetuated as a universal concept include categorising the underdog as
lacking and part of a crisis of representation, as per (post)colonisation (Smith 1999). The
universal application of the Silenced Manifesto can be related to the system of governance and
politics which has contributed to the discourse separating Us and Other, colonisers and colonised.
This discourse infiltrates the macro narrative where the structure of the health system is pieced
together by policies and bureaucracy (Lea 2008). The Silenced Manifesto, with its universal and
suffocating discourse developed through history, describes how the marginalised cry out to be
heard. Yet their voice is stifled by the weight of colonising labels such as stigma. They live with
a perpetual and invisible limit that confines and defines their freedom to succeed in ways that
they wish. This is similar to the metaphor of the glass ceiling associated with the struggle of
feminism to achieve in their career goals (Shade 2018). Foucault (1961; 1976) advocates for
basing concepts of power imbalance in their historical situatedness, such as those socially
identified with women, race, LBGTQI+ or the disabled, where marginalised groups are defined
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and confined by a historical development of governance and politics that essentially labels the
Other into a dynamic of socially crafted reality (Hacking 1999; Lea 2008).

The meta narrative of national and international governance is streamed down into the macro
narrative of the health system, which in turn is streamed down to an individual, a micro narrative,
where internal struggles of power play with relationships and knowledge are negotiated and
textualized into a discourse that can be situated universally.

The individual narrative

reappropriates into a great internal struggle. This internal struggle is navigated within forced
boundaries, succumbing to power negotiates of narratives, of the Silenced Manifesto.

Another universal application of the Silenced Manifesto can be related to class actions against
the Catholic Church from then abused children, or even the stolen generation amongst Australian
Indigenous peoples where these disempowered people have had their worlds classified and
categorised as per their dominant and decriminalised discourse. The institutionalised are good
examples of how discourse and silencing are infiltrated by a culture that fundamentally, yet
covertly, endorses inequality, as power is negotiated between Us and Other and knowledge
production.

This culture perpetuates a system that inadvertently and covertly and mostly unknowingly
endorses and supports discrimination and disparity. The universal application of the Silenced
Manifesto situates the universal narrative of a culture into a socialised dynamic, albeit a culture
set by international civilisation and hegemony, that structures and defines the marginalised.
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At times subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits fall into the realms and traps and labelling
of each of the narratives, that is micro/macro/meta narratives. It is not unusual for there to be
miscommunication between the three narratives. At times, through the dynamics of different
narratives, one questions the extent and precipitation to which the culture perpetuates the
existence of the subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits. Considering this, one should
question who is silenced and not silenced in the politics of the narratives. I question who is
marginalised and disempowered by this process. Which characters have gained and/or lost
power? And considering the process and development of narratives, looking outside the square,
the mentally ill can and should craft their own narrative, to try and empower and demystify, and
to unpack the stigma that exists so pervasively in culture. Here the Silenced Manifesto is
anthromorphised, where the manifesto can personify narrative/s. Through the narrative/s, and its
system of organisation of language and symbols the disempowered are given a voice. The
silenced have come alive.

My Narrative, Language and the Silenced Manifesto

“Here the underdog are not heard. They speak another language. There is little commensurable
space to communicate and understand. Who are the silenced? Who are the noisy?”
(Field notes June 12th, 2018)

I hope my narrative will assist to emancipate those living with a psychotic illness. By revealing
in text my hidden world of being dehumanised and disabled, being forced into an identity of
subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit, this thesis creates a discourse and methodology which aims
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to empower those living with schizoaffective disorder, and indeed potentially other mental
illnesses. The discourse revealed by my narrative.

This narrative explores some of the dynamics between the self, the production of knowledge (the
factoids generated), the technologies of governance, and the compilation of the use of
measurement into a system of governmentality, to be used to validate, justify and make
accountable the position of the service implementers. I am still trying to reconcile or find some
commensurability between the motive of the service provider, the rigour of the methodology
which makes the service provision valid and accountable, the ultimate governance of services,
and the self-determination and agency of the service recipient.

Language is the site of social organisation, within which power is exercised and contested. To
the present time, reality consists of many narratives and discourses. As a site of exploration and
struggle, language is constantly an area where there are competing meanings and related
practices, and discourses (Foucault 1978; 1979). Discourses represent the negotiations of power
between groups and individuals to determine what is ‘true’ in relation to each other. What
something means to an individual is dependent on the discourses available to them (Grant 2010:
581). The Silenced Manifesto utilises the worth of language and communication to negotiate
powerplay in discussion of self within the space of commensurability.

The sick person encounters difficult medical languages as s/he moves through the health care
system (Kleinman 1980: 53). Sickness is to be understood and explained by semantic networks.
For instance, culturally articulate systems interrelate and cognitively categorise personal
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experience, psychological states and social relationships. Healing viewed from that perspective
involves the same semantic networks (Kleinman 1980: 364). The social is intertwined by
symbols, and to language it is a necessity to communicate internally and externally in the social
landscape. Symbols and thereby language, are fundamental and pivotal to all functions social
and otherwise.

Language is the system that permits structured thinking. Thinking is the ‘system output’ that
occurs in the interactions between subjects (situated within culture) and the environment (nature).
These interactions, social, cultural or otherwise, are the objects of thinking. Language allows us
to communicate in social relationships; and to categorise our environment as represented symbols
(Appignanesi 2004). Language, a symbolic tool supporting the connections within the social,
can be likened to a social entity, a cultural artefact. In its operations, sometimes illicit, language
may (dis)empower, silence and control, as per the Silenced Manifesto. Language connects
medicine as it connects and translates the experience of madness and its negotiation of power.

Foucault explains how power is a relationship not an object (Foucault in Rabinow 2002). Our
identity, experience and stories are intertwined with the identities, experience and stories of the
Other; our writing must be both faithful to experience and respectful of relationships. Sometimes
these narratives show that individual experience does not fit theory (Richard 2008: 1720 in Ellis
& Bochner; Muncey 2005).

Richards (2008: 1720) argues that narratives are often treated as data for a researcher. They do
not, however, come into existence as data, but instead as a process of identification formation
that has significance for the narrator. They are formed as individual stories that are generalisable.
All narratives address several key theoretical debates. For instance, with micro and macro
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linkages, there is structure and agency and their intersection, then colonisers and colonised, and
social reproduction and social change (Laslett 1999: 392 in Wall 2008: 39).

Narratives are created and maintained by social phenomena, which also creates and maintains
individual phenomena. Like all stories, narratives are a way of making sense of things, in this
case, mental health.

Mental health narratives are often presented with culturally embedded

symbols that reveal personal and social beliefs (Sharf & Vanderford 2003). Indeed, in analysing
the phenomena of narratives, the concept of socially constructed facts is precipitated. The cycle
of deviance and mental health turns again and again. In this cycle, the mentally ill remain
squashed into a medicalised narrative.

The biomedical model can be described as a cultural system, which precipitates the political,
economic, social and environmental narratives of mental health. DiGiacomo (Senior et al 2006)
argues that the position of biomedicine as a cultural system focuses on the symbolic structures,
events, and relationships involved in biomedicine (Kleinman 1987: 341), including micro, macro
and meta narratives. DiGiacomo describes the power dynamics of biomedicine between the
positions of micro (the individual doctor) and macro (the national medical system) and meta (the
broader international health system) and how it negotiates and compares to the individual micro
system of symbolic structures, events, and relationships in the cultural system of the dynamics
of the micro self. The cultural dynamic in the micro/macro/meta biomedicine narrative is
exemplified by the example of DiGiacomo. Her experience of biomedicine illustrates the cultural
complexities of her battle to be involved in the decision-making process of her treatment, and to
obtain enough and clear information about options (Senior et al 2006; 2009).
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Mental health patients, the mental health professionals and government bodies upholding policies
form the institution of mental health service delivery. The culture embedding and centring
mental health service delivery has traditionally been borne from the positivist macro-narrative of
medical science. With the advent of social sciences, other narratives were introduced into the
mental health vernacular. What is of great importance is the new emphasis of new types of
measurements, thus new ways of delivering assessments, diagnosis and treatments. I am
interested in unpacking and repacking the foundation and the contents of the social structure of
mental health service delivery, which I believe creates a sound basis for culture analysis,
illustrating and highlighting the grounded values and norms.

Reality here is viewed as textual and understood within the parameters of language. Reality
consists of many micro, macro and meta narratives and discourses, which are all reliant on the
structure and utilisation of language, encompassing the values of the Silenced Manifesto. The
social world is structured, covertly, by our means of understanding and communicating in the
world, which is through the prism of symbols and language. Narratives and discourses, directed
by language, control us but we are not overtly aware as we are so engulfed in them. In our
everyday lives we are blinded by this power play as we are so accustomed to it. Derrida (1978)
argued that we must deconstruct and make less natural or real the meta-narrative at hand. The
micro/macro/metanarrative can be any discourse which is utilised to overpower the Other.
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Reality and the Silenced Manifesto

“What makes ideas real is the system of knowledge, the formations of culture and the
relations of power in which these concepts are located...a major sociological concern
becomes a struggle over the extent to which individual consciousness and reality shapes or
is shaped by social structure”
(Smith 1999)

Socially crafted reality, a relatively new developed concept, in the last fifty years or so, is part of
a re-arrangement of views of science and rationalisation, creates a whole new gamut of cultural
artefacts (Lea 2008).

These cultural artefacts, developed from a self-reflective social

construction of reality, act to construct madness. As an anthropologist, I am consumed by the
social construction of reality. I cannot separate the cerebral from the social. Neither can I
separate reality from other social phenomena like culture, politics, spirituality and economics.

Now the question lies, how is reality constructed, albeit socially constructed, by someone with a
psychotic illness that fundamentally skews all perceptions of reality? Psychosis is a social
construction in the sense that its ramifications and the magnitude of its true meaning are very
much defined in the social phenomena. If psychosis were not such a stigma those suffering from
this mental illness would not be so ostracised, demoralised and stereotyped as subhuman, subcitizens and social denigrates.

Then there is another factor in the socially crafted concept – verisimilitude – the feeling or
illusion of reality (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015: 85). Hacking (1999: 33) argues that the world
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does not come quietly wrapped in facts. Facts are the consequences of the ways in which we
represent. Latour (1991: 21) states the philosophers of science and historians of ideas would
like to avoid the world of the laboratory.

Health care systems are socially and culturally constructed. They are a form of a social
construction of reality. A social construction of reality signifies the world of human interaction
existing outside the individual and between individuals (Kleinman: 1980: 25). At the same time,
something can be both biomedically real and a social construct.

In each case, the chaotic repetition and heterogeneous iteration and absorption of health facts has
its own specific density of encounter (Hacking 1999), but at the same time each moment forms
part of a wider patterning. They both draw on and reify historical classifications (the agreed
consolations of phenomena that warrants sombre measurement) and a culturally established
“trust in numbers” (Porter 1990). That is, each iteration embeds and is embedded within a deep
socio-cultural underpinning that imbues statistical representation with a logic and
comprehensibility they would not otherwise have given their highly abstracted character. This
heritage enables first the authoring of factual research within health (and ordains the institutional
resources such authoring relies upon) and second the widespread acceptance is that such cultural
artefacts are transparent representations of a more serious underlying social construction of
reality they purpose purport to explain (Lea 2008: 145).

Regarding the Silenced Manifesto and its place in the dialogue between what creates reality,
there is a covert, at times overt, cry from the camp of the silenced. Reality, in this case for those
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living with a psychotic illness, is understood both as biomedical and social. Each perspective
has its own discourse that seeks to find a space of commensurability to understand the language
of each other. Communication, text, discourse, language of the silenced is more about the realm
of the social sciences than the biomedical sciences. The social construction of reality for the
silenced is about those who are silenced just as much as those who are already granted a clear
voice. It is a discourse between the silenced – the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit – and
the powerful - the greater debate of governance. The Silenced Manifesto depicts a space for
reality construction that lives within the boundaries of discourse, albeit a quiet discourse.
Considering a socially constructed reality, which cannot be negated, there is little conceptual
space for a reality to exist in isolation from its discourse. The reality of biomedicine also cannot
exist in isolation from its discourse. Again, reality relies on a space of commensurability between
sociality, in this case culture, and medical science.

The biomedical realm has historically encompassed mental health, but mental health biomedical
science cannot be understood separately from the social construction of reality. For example,
during my admission to Ward B (public), I was desperate to have social contact. For me, social
contact re-fuels me so that I have the courage to go on. It helps me to stay strong. However,
Ward B (public)was highly stigmatised within the Town B community. It limited my visitors
due to the stigma and poor reputation it has. I was shamed, gutted. I was made to feel a social
misfit and downcast. Not only silenced but invisible.
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Labelling Theory and Measurement and the Silenced Manifesto

“It should be noted that it is ironic to label what we state we should not label.”
(Field notes January 5th, 2014)

I have difficulty in being labelled.

To be called ‘handicapped’ by progressive health

professionals today is disempowering, although it may well be true. Who do I trust now? ‘My
own ‘questionable’ and ‘lacking’ perception of reality, social construction of reality or
supposedly named positivist reality? Or should I perhaps trust the scientific and rigorous
cognitive functioning test performed on me by an experienced neuropsychologist? Do I trust the
cultural artefacts of the testing over my own perspective? Which perspective reigns with the
most power? Should I trust my individuality over categorisation? What does all this mean in
the context of the social construction of reality, the reality formed through social dynamics, the
neuro-psychological assessment, and the cultural artefact? Does the artefact legitimise madness?

I think that I have less capacity and capability in my cognition. With the example of my
emotional investment in psychometric testing, it makes me feel defeated, depressed, conquered
and crushed. Even with testing that is supposed to empower me by discovering my strengths, I
am still defined as lacking. I have let down my family, my friends and myself. I feel great shame,
it encompasses me still... I drown in it. I know that it is silly of me to invest time in even thinking
about the stigma that infects me. I don’t seem to have a choice.

The internalisation of the label develops into a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the individual is
indoctrinated so much by the powerful, they will actualise and become the label they are given.
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For example, if a teacher praises and encourages a student, the student is more likely to succeed
(Scheff 1974).

As discussed, measurement has become a tool, depicting a kaleidoscopic, dynamic and sociocultural production of knowledge. The assessment process creates a space of knowledge
production, a formation of political technology where the act of ‘measurement’, also narrative
development, forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance. The
measurements produce knowledge: transforming the numbers into factoids (Lea 2008). The
factoids become more structured conceptually as the language and symbols of knowledge
production. As part of the language of scientific knowledge, these factoids/objects of knowledge
become validations for governance, to ‘measure the unmeasurable’. (Lea 2008) Similarly, the
Silenced Manifesto represents a concept where a hegemonic discourse stifles the heard, so its
becomes a negotiation of ‘to hear the unhearable’.

Psychometric measurements, embodied as factoids, are socio-political technologies which aid in
the governmentality of modern power structures. There are no completely reliable and valid
measures to assess mental health patients, and there are certainly not reliable and exact measures
to direct treatment.

Broadly speaking, in this thesis, tools for measurement are classified as socially created defences
and weaponry to justify mistreatment and misrepresentation and the disempowerment of people
living with a major psychotic illness, and perhaps all people living with a mental illness. There
is a sacredness about measurement, about culture, about representation and meaning. Each
measurement utilises a tool of some sort. These measurements are objectified to define and
identify the properties according to the modern science of medicine.
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Having schizoaffective disorder immediately categorises you as a social misfit, deviant,
subhuman, sub-citizen. These underdogs are unable to experience full quality of life. Some of
this negative labelling can be blamed on, quite ironically, measurement. Measurement is
assumed to be liberating as it is presumed to define and provide answers to troubling questions.
How am I de-humanised? How is this defined? What are the tools of diagnosis, the tools that
measure sanity? And what is the broader significance of these measurements? How do the
mental health professionals measure the seemly unmeasurable?

In exploring the anthropology of evaluation and measurement, one must consider the
anthropology of accountability (Lea 2008), including validation and justification. Lea (2008:
120) argues for the “persuasive power of the pie charts’’. A pie chart is an artefact of evaluations,
and an artefact of medical science – to me, evidence of tunnel vision and science bias. What are
the power dynamics involved in evaluation, measurement and accountability? What are the
social constructions of facts – ‘factoids’ (Lea 2008), and the cultural/statistical artefacts geared
to justify reproduction of cultural institutions/phenomena, such as bureaucracies? Then there are
the phenomena of silenced reports on shelves, representational evidence of the Silenced
Manifesto.

Latour (1991: 241) states that today, those who are labelled as mentally ill are society’s
stigmatised scapegoats, officially and in principle. Historically, for example, both the medieval
witch and the modern mentally ill patient have been the scapegoats of society. Latour goes on
to describe the dehumanisation and degradation that is caused by mental illness. The alcoholic,
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the addict, the homosexual – all and many more are said to have a mental illness (Latour 1991:
122-123).

The labelling of downcast and social misfit came about as defined categories through a dominant
culture which highly values economic, social and political classes. For example, during times
when I have been very unwell, I have been unable to work. My economic class thus changed. I
received the disability pension. I had become a dependent on the State. I was not value-adding
to the economy. I felt great shame as I could not contribute. I even felt shame in front of my
family and friends. They did not judge me – they felt sorry for me. This perpetuated my shame.
The cause of this, arguably, is the culture that perpetuates being subhuman, sub-citizen and/or a
social misfit. I was labelled, and I could not do anything about it. As a young woman when I
was diagnosed, it was through the culture of medical science that my identity was set, and this
identity has been perpetuated via stigma.

Social theory and the Silenced Manifesto

Theory can help to make sense of this. Theory enables us to make assumptions and predictions
about the world in which we live. Research and theories that follow have a great significance for
[subhumans] that are embedded in our history under the gaze of Western imperialism and
Western science. Social science is based upon ideas, beliefs and theories about the social world
(Smith 1999: 40, 41, 49).
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People always live in some form of structure. Subhumans and sub-citizens, as categories are a
part of structure, as are colonialism and the rights of citizenship [or lack of] in ways that produced
the underdog discourse, related to the underclass. Goldberg (1993) shows how this process is
being extended and renewed by categories dominant in present day social societies, for example
the ‘West’; ‘underclass’; and the ‘primitive’.

Poststructuralism is mentioned here as being closely aligned to postmodernism, but perhaps also
reactive to it by negating the importance of all social theorising, not limiting social analysis just
to multiple truths. In reaction to exploring and negating, the nature of structuralism is known by
deconstructing it. There are no macro-universal truths, nor micro nor nano-truths. Social power
play is rife, which brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in theory, if
there is an actual difference between the two. For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a post
structuralist (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007)

Poststructionalism can be understood as measurements, assessments and diagnostic tools that
become cultural artefacts in the world of poststructuralist medical science and specifically
poststructuralist psychiatry. In this case, they form part of the vernacular of psychiatric language,
from culture and structure. The mental health workers use techniques of measurement, diagnosis
and treatment, a structure of poststructuralist medical knowledge, to stake a claim on the way the
mentally ill should live.

The mentally ill – Other – not being privy to the sanctity of

poststructuralist medical knowledge, have little choice than to trust the deified mental health
professionals.
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(Post)colonialism and the Silenced Manifesto

The discourse of solidarity and political reconstruction has retreated into the academy, where it
is theorized as ‘(post)colonialism’. Here we find the critical theorizing of scholars like Edward
Said and Gayatri Spivak, both of whom construct analyses of the colonial Self and the colonized
Other. (Or ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ as I have been naming it.) As Edward Said (in Smith 1999: 38)
asked: “Who writes? For whom is the writing being done? In what circumstances?”

The only way I could retain some self-respect during my hospital admissions was to employ my
skills as an anthropologist. As did DiGiacomo (1987), I started to unpack what I was seeing
around me, what I was experiencing and how people were relating to each other. I observed
negotiations of power, which defined the mentally ill as colonised (Smith 1999).

“At some point there has to be dialogue across the boundaries of oppositions.” (Smith 1999: 40).
As Smith (1999) argues, human nature, that is the essential characteristics of the person, is an
overarching concern for Western philosophy even though the concepts of ‘human’ and ‘nature’
seem to be in opposition to each other. The separation between mind and body, the investing of
a human person with a sole psyche and consciousness, the distinction between sense and reason,
definitions of human virtue and morality, are all cultural constructs. While the workings of the
mind may be associated in Western thinking, primarily with the human brain, the mind itself is
a concept or an idea.

The struggle to assert and claim humanity has been a consistent thread of anti-colonial discourses
on colonialism and oppression. We are a first world country full of (post)colonial guilt that we’re
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content to [let people suffer] with a benign refusal to attribute blame and locate responsibility
accurately (Smith 1999: 27; 144). There remains pervasive gaps between the colonisers and the
(post)colonised. There is the income gap, the education gap, the class gap, and the gap between
privileged and deprived neighborhoods (Kowal 2006)

Historically situated, the European powers had by the nineteenth century already established
systems of rules and forms of social relations which governed interaction with the Indigenous
people being colonised. The same can be said of the mentally ill. The principal of humanity was
one way in which the mentally ill, or peoples seen as not fully human, enabled and justified
various policies of social control (Smith 1999: 28). You cannot look at colonised relationships
without addressing the complex problem of power relations (Smith 1999: 23).

Ethnographers turning into autoethnographers, came to realize that stories were complex,
constitutive, meaningful phenomena that taught morals and ethics, introduced unique ways of
thinking and feeling, and helped people make sense of themselves and others (Adams 2008;
Bochner 2001; Bochner & Ellis 2002; Fisher 1984). Furthermore, there was an increasing need
to resist colonialist and sterile research impulses of authoritatively entering a culture, exploiting
cultural members, and then recklessly leaving to write about the culture for monetary and/or
professional gain, while disregarding relational ties to cultural members (Conquergood 1991;
Riedmann 1993; Ellis 2007).

Ellis (2011) posits that autoethnography may be associated with a type called Indigenous or
native ethnographies, where the autoethnography is developed from colonised or economically
subordinated people and are used to address and disrupt power in research. An example is the
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reaction of cultural guilt expressed by white Australians to Australia’s Indigenous citizens
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 773). Once at the service of the (White, masculine, heterosexual,
middle/upper-classed,

Christian,

able-bodied)

autoethnographer

Indigenous/native

ethnographers now work to construct their own personal and cultural stories; they no longer find
(forced) subjugation excusable (see Denzin, Lincoln & Smith 2008). The Indigenous social
structures which Western anthropologists purport to study may in fact be artefacts of the colonial
era (Layton 1997: 190). And these cultural artefacts have histories within the colonial era.

‘Archaeology’ was the term Foucault used during the 1960s to describe his approach to
writing history. Archaeology is about examining the discursive traces and orders left by the
past to write a 'history of the present'. In other words, archaeology is about looking at history
as a way of understanding the processes that have led to what we are today (Foucault in
O'Farrell 2007).

Madness is associated with a break in historic structure, our historic hegemonic structure of
White, masculine, heterosexual, middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied perspective.
All ideas have histories, and they have different types of histories, including social histories
(Hacking 1999: 30). Anything worth calling a construction has a history (Hacking 1999: 50).
To understand the character of certain issues means to examine their history (Latour 1991:
113).

Over the last centuries, both the study and treatment of the mentally ill has been captured by the
natural and social sciences. Mental health studies have been leaking out of the tight grasp of the
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natural sciences and spread into the realms of the social sciences. We can now claim that mental
health was pathologised in its conception, borne from biomedicine. More recently mental health
has been socialised. What is socialised and ostracised, the social sub-citizen, is also pathologised.
DiGiacomo (1992) states that anthropologists fear clinicians will not take them seriously unless
they accept the concept of biomedical diseases as the gold standard. There is a hierarchy in
mental health care, historically, classing the biomedical model above all else.

Governance, Politics, Policy and the Silenced Manifesto

“How is madness bureaucratised and made a part of social policy? And how is madness
governed if not by measurement and science? The stigma of the mentally ill is protected
and authorised by the government bureaucracy.”
(Field notes 16th, 2017)
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Hanisch argued that the political is embodied in the personal, and vice versa (Hanisch 1969;
1970; Richards 2008: 1724). It is about giving a voice, empowering the silenced, the social
outcasts, and recognising the cultural meaning and significance that the outcasts are confined to
(Butler 2000). Living with schizoaffective disorder, I feel conflicted. I feel conflicted and
confused as if my world is falling in around me. It is about an assault of the mind as well as
culture. I question the culture that suffocates me as such, often without my input or true
representation. It is about recognising the importance of the foundations of knowledge in the
broader system of politics and economics. Such is the task of the Silenced Manifesto, removing
the silenced reports off the shelves and putting mental health experience and discourse into the
vernacular. The vernacular being the language of the powerful in mental health, that is simply
put, the governance and bureaucratisation of biomedicine.
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Considering the ’manifesto’ part of the concept of the ‘Silenced Manifesto’, is the discourse that
the hegemonic culture covertly/overtly uses, via its texts, to claim power over the marginalised
in society. For example, the discourse developed over Australian history and used by Australian
governments to covertly have power over the mentally ill, and at the same time disempower the
mentally ill, becomes the Silenced Manifesto. Continuing, the manifesto becomes a cultural
artefact, the sentiment of which is entrenched firmly in the tools of governance. The use of
language covertly and/or overtly entrenches the strategy of governance. Its (mis)representation
of the marginalised in government policy cements the imbalanced power relations between
government and the mentally ill. Unequal access to and influence on policy, especially the
language of policy representing the true needs of the mentally ill, demonstrates a significant
misappropriation of power. Control over the government texts, that is the government’s cultural
artefacts in the form of policies, demonstrates the power of State and its political use of language.
Language becomes texts, texts become cultural discourses, discourses become enculturated
manifesto, the manifesto covertly and overtly identified and empowered in governance and
policy - the silenced manifesto breathes, it breaks through and comes to life. The suppressed
voices of the mentally ill are silenced and situated within the cultural discourse of governance.

Latour (1991: 213) argues that the State owns everything, people included. People are at once
an investment and a product. Which makes their identity...what?

Governmentality as a strategy and rationale, Foucault claims, has dominated political power in
Western countries since the eighteenth century (Lupton 2013: 115). “For some scholars drawing
upon Foucault’s writings, ‘dispositif’ is a term used to encompass the governing of the social
body, configuring a heterogeneous assemblage of discursive, administrative, technical, legal,
institutional and material elements (Aradau and van Muster 2007: 91). A dispostif relates to the
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bringing together of these heterogeneous elements, or knowledge structures, which enhance and
maintain the exercise of power within the social body” (Lupton 2013: 118). According to Lupton
(2013: 118-119), some suggest in the form of neo-liberalism, maintaining social order and
governance relies on productive and dispersed forms of authority. Citizens are cultivated to
govern themselves and to focus on self-actualisation rather than emancipation.

Measurement is empowered, seemly by scientists, to be a socio-cultural entity with its own
agency. It is empowered to define service delivery implementation as a form of political
technology. As well, measurement is seen as an object of governance; empowered to play a
significant part in knowledge production and as an object of knowledge. Foucault argues that
the individual is not something that needs to be liberated, rather the individual is the closely
monitored product of relations between power and knowledge (O'Farrell 2007). Foucault uses
the word to refer to the fact that it is not just the object of knowledge which is constructed but
also the knower (O’Farrell 2005). Knowledge is decreed acceptable if the governing body
declares it as such. Knowledge constructions are not produced in sterile and stoic vacuums.
Human volatility is considered, as well as the significance of cultural constructs.

Freedom is a cultural construct. Foucault notes that he “believes solidly in human freedom”. He
also argues against nineteenth century existentialist views of an abstract freedom and a ‘free’
subject and says that freedom is a practice rather than a goal to be achieved. Knowledge starts
with rules and constraints, not freedom. Freedom is also a condition for the exercise of power
(Foucault in O’Farrell (2007).

The medical factoids, as well as being objects of governance by the health professionals, have
also become a subject of governance by the mental health patients, illustrating a comprehensive,
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complex, and dynamic, socio-cultural production of knowledge.

Factoids become more

structured conceptually as objects of knowledge. These objects support governance.

The

factoids thus can become objects that support the biomedical truth; the truth that is supported and
validated by medical science, including psychiatry.

According to Foucault (2007), “the

individual is not something that needs to be liberated rather, the individual is the closely
monitored product of relations between power and knowledge”. Foucault argues that power play
exists in all interactions including the measurement process which is essentially a production of
knowledge based on socio-cultural and political factoids. (Foucault 2007). For example, the
mental health professionals, to varying degrees, retain a position of power over the mentally ill,
perpetuated by a system of dependence. To illustrate, despite my apparent independence and
functionality, I am forced into a dynamic of dependence to get my medication. And I have in the
past have had to get this in a public place at a set time, with no regard to the fact that I might
have a job and other things to do. “Always, there is monitoring, measuring and medicating.
Always.” (McMahon 2017: 26)

Lea (2008) argues that white men, middle class, able bodied, and non LGBTIQA+ develop and
empower bureaucracies and policy magic, enabling the inner sanctum of policy a life and value
of their own. Policy is central to governance infrastructure, linking together the substance of
socio-cultural, political and economic foundations. Good medicine would be given status and
legal protection by the State; it would be the task of the State to make sure that a true art of curing
does exist (Foucault 1973: 20). Medicine and the health care system in Australia are mostly
supported by the State. The first task of the doctor is therefore political (Foucault 1973: 33).
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The National Mental Health Strategy is a commitment by Australian governments to improve
the lives of people living with a mental illness (Department of Health 2014). National quality
frameworks, part of the backbone of mental health policy, form objects of governance. These
policy objects of governance define objects of knowledge, which in turn and cyclically, produce
objects of governance (Johnstone 2001; Jenkins 2002). The bureaucracy decrees psychometric
measurements as a necessary tool for knowledge production, an extension of the biomedical
model and scientific measurement which defines and justifies national policy and governance
(Lea 2008).

“Today’s mental health institutions and hospitals are all about measuring and judging and
surveillance.”
(Field notes November 22nd, 2015)

The mental health assessment tools and medical observations, cultural artefacts of modern
psychiatry, are all about measuring and judging deviance. Measurement tools are negotiated as
tools of governance. They are promoted and supplied with a price. They are commodified.
Policy is commodified. Governmentality is commodified. Psychiatric care is commodified.
Wellness is commodified. The Silenced Manifesto, incorporating all these things, is also
commodified. There is a glass ceiling of oppression and subjugation when being commodified
and defined in a society where economy is valued highly.
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The Space of Commensurablity and the Silenced Manifesto

Part of the role of the rehabilitation nurse in Ward B (public) was to find some space of
commensurability between wellness and unwellness, to improve communication and
understanding and preparedness, and thus to minimise the time spent in hospital. Although this
didn’t happen in my case. Efforts for rehabilitation were a piece meal gesture, with little agency
or effect. In this instance the space of commensurablity can appear to be tokenistic or even false.

The space of the Silenced Manifesto has historical roots. Foucault’s concept of historical
situatedness describes the factors that have been instrumental in the development of the space of
commensurability, related to the paradigm of the Silenced Manifesto. In his book, Madness and
Civilisation (1961), Foucault studied the sub-citizens or deviants in society, including prisoners,
homosexuals and the mentally ill. Foucault here discussed the ways that our identities are
historically produced and situated.

As discussed in chapter three, in the Middles Ages the mentally ill were an accepted part of public
life, but by 1650, the mentally ill were burnt as witches. In the eighteenth century, the mentally
ill were classed as abnormal and removed from society. Then with George III’s delirious descent
in 1788, satirists and cartoonists were given a golden opportunity. Madness had become a sort
of entertainment. The mentally ill were re-categorised again, this time as entertainment, freaks.
In the twentieth century, the mentally ill were medicalised, pathologised and became patients and
experiments of medical science and institutionalisation. So, the terms of what have defined
mental illness and its association with deviancy have changed. In modern times, according to
Foucault, the mentally ill are subject to more measuring and surveillance and judgement as is
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relative to the recent legacy of medical science. The silenced are gagged again. The hegemonic
culture perpetuates the discourse. Yet this is the space where social change can happen; through
a shared space where language and power can be negotiated.

“Mental health, as a socio-cultural phenomenon, has developed over hundreds of years,
with foundations in superstition and growing into medical science and positivism, and then
becoming more relatable to the social sciences”.
(Field notes May 11th, 2015)

The concept of power negotiation has been a strong theme in this thesis. Mental health services
have long been influenced by landscapes of power. We are also confronting geographics of
power within the acute care experiences (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 108). The landscape
for those living with a mental illness, as decreed by Foucault (1973: 188-189), states that disease
exists in space before it exists in sight. The landscape of the disease is also immediately a causal
space.

As for the landscapes of power, as recently as 1860, it was not necessary to be mentally ill to be
incarcerated in an American mental institution. It was enough to be a married woman.
“Married women...may be entered or detained in the hospital at the request of the husband of the
woman or the guardian...without the evidence of insanity required with other cases” (Szasz 1970:
15).

To clarify, institutionalisation refers to the process of embedding some cultural conception (for
example, a belief, a norm, social role, value or mode of behaviour) within the control of an
organisations’ structure of science and politics. Latour (1991: 127) argues that an example of
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the institution is a prison – structures for the confinement of socially undesirable persons, that is
subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfits. Foucault (1961; 1963) declares that in the eighteenth
century, institutional spatialisation of disease makes its appearance. There grows space for
interrelations and power play between each micro and macro conception.

Hacking (1999: 58) argues that categories of knowledge are used to empower relationships. As
a fundamental statement that Foucault generated and supported, power is intrinsically linked with
knowledge. Whoever has knowledge has power and vice versa. Whoever has knowledge, then
power, has the resources to disempower or empower themselves and Others.

When the

discourses of power are in the hands of the underdog, the power distribution shifts, even if only
briefly (Foucault 1961, 1975; Richard 2008: 1724). To expand, being known about is interrelated
to knowability. According to Hobbes, [creating a language] which understands power to equal
knowledge, there is an equation that is at the root of the entire modern (Latour 1991: 26).

The Silenced Manifesto can here be noted as having created a commensurable cultural space
from which a discourse of mental health, from all perspectives, including policy, can be defined.
I want the mentally ill to have their voice heard and to create a discourse platform from which
they/we can obtain strength. In this context, I ask the questions: how can I break through the
cultural divide, break through the disempowerment and misrepresentation bestowed on me
because of culture? How am I labelled and defined? Who is granted a voice in this cultural
space? Stigma – the ‘why’ of the Silenced Manifesto.
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The Silenced Manifesto and stigma

Stigma comes from the Greek, to mark or brand. Stigma refers to marks that publicly disgrace
the person (Kleinman 1988: 158). Goffman (1963: 2) notes that in more recent times, stigma has
come to refer more to the disgrace then to the actual bodily mark. “The normal and the
stigmatised are not persons but rather perspectives” (Goffman: 1963: 138). The changed
meaning is an instance of the more general process of the psychologising of experience in the
West, through which metaphors of distress and other human problems that were once bodily have
become mental. Even amongst those living with disease, there is a social hierarchy of health.
Lack of social support and feelings of stigmatisation can hinder health care utilisation (Wohl et
al 2011 in Spieldenner 2014). Those first stigmatised were associated with their religious beliefs.
Later, the association shifted. Meaning was then related as a person to be a slave, a criminal, or
a traitor – deformed, ugly, blemished, ritually polluted and to be avoided. The unwell are also
associated as social misfits - especially in public places behaviour clashes with social norms. It
is questionable where the space of commensurability is, and who has the louder voice when
conducting or considering a shared space with the stigmatised - they become part of the Silenced
Manifesto.

The Silenced Manifesto and the stigmatised self

My self-image is largely dominated by a belief that I am handicapped by my mental illness. The
consequence of being labelled mentally ill includes such penalties of personal degradation, loss
of employment, loss of the right to drive, to vote, to make valid contracts, or to stand trial – and
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last, but not least, involuntary incarceration in a mental hospital, possibly for life (Szasz 1970:
xxxi).

Grant (2010: 581) argues that there are various types of self in relation to society, with various
types of stigma. Firstly, the cultural self informs and influences our experience of ourselves,
Others and the world. In a modern theoretical landscape, having many different ‘selves’ to draw
on, in a constantly shifting interior landscape, the boundaries between self and Other, mediated
by language, are often blurred.

A type of social self, according to Grant (2010: 581) is the stigmatised, Othered self. Goffman
(1963) has contributed much to the discussion of stigma. His book, Stigma: Notes on the
Management of Spoiled Identity (1963), is summarised by examining those who are considered
less than human, that is subhuman. For example, the woman, the disfigured person, the blind,
the homosexual, the mentally ill patient and the member of a racial or religious minority, all
identities that can be considered areas of judgement, judged potentially as socially ‘abnormal’,
and therefore in danger of being considered less than human, a subhuman.

For the human predator in society, the rule is to stigmatise or be stigmatised (Latour 1991: 260).
How and why are some people treated more humanely while others are met with silence, disgust
and abuse (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015: 14)? What about the silenced? The silences in mental
health governance and the mental health lived experience? What are the often-silenced voices
of the stigmatised saying (Liggins, Kearns & Adams 2013: 106)? Here the Silenced Manifesto
can be concomitant and concurrent, helping to explain the stigmatised position of the silenced.
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Discourse and the Silenced Manifesto

The discourse mandating and officiating the colonising reality described here, and the
perpetuating culture that situates and brings meaning to the plight of the mentally ill, creates the
’manifesto’. The manifesto can be described as today’s mental health discourse, borne from a
histology in medical science, and developed in time to dominate those who are lacking, the
mentally ill. The manifesto is the offspring of governmentality, its economics and its culmination
in the policies which feed the health bureaucracy, which is in turn a cultural artefact (Lea 2008).
The development and nurturing of the health bureaucracy is fed by the validating measurements
of psychiatry.

There is both a covert and an overt relation between discourse and inclusion in histology and its
supposed and declared empowering of the mentally ill (Foucault in Goldstein & Cascaito 1991).
The policies, crafted by what one would expect from a manifesto, are grounded in language and
the complexities of mental health semantics, the relationship between governance and
economics, and a system of class that labels the mentally ill and their place within the structure
of society. Thus, the labels of sub-citizen and social misfit. The term, the Silenced Manifesto,
is used to describe the mentally ill, although it can be widely used in other arenas. In this case,
the Silenced Manifesto depicts the mentally ill as lacking. However, the term is a whispered
voice, whispering the covert disempowerment of the mentally ill.

The written word, the texts, discourses, are representations of culture. It doesn’t have to be
written as such. Discourse, in this case of the Silenced Manifesto, could mean oral history, the
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products of the arts, the sciences, and any form of transfer of knowledge. The manifesto is a
representation of cultural significance, a fluid space, transferable from one to another. It is
fundamentally essential to all parts of socio-cultural significance.

The Silenced Manifesto identifies and/or develops a discourse, a vernacular that represents the
plight of the ‘disabled’ in some way, in this case my living with a major psychotic illness. The
notion of the silenced is included in that these often marginalised groups are not heard. They are
shackled, disempowered and disallowed in the vernacular. They do not possess roles that are
significant to the order of society. They are smothered, suppressed, and shushed out of the culture
– silenced and hidden.

The Communist Manifesto and the Silenced Manifesto

Who are the classes today? The intelligentsia, industrialist, the politician, the economist, the
religious? (Foucault 1972). The mentally ill being neither producer or consumer, have no class:
idle, vagabond, unemployed, belonging only to confinement, a measure by which he[/she] is
exiled and as it was abstract for society (Foucault 1961: 218-19). Having no class creates a
limited space of commensurability, communication and translatability. As per the Silenced
Manifesto, a non-class situation creates a glass ceiling, or similarly a straight jacket that confines
and restrains and restricts the means of agency for those living with schizoaffective disorder.

Who are the classes today? The class struggle isn’t Marx’s invention. In medieval Rome there
were knights and slaves. In the Middle Ages, feudal lords, artisans and serfs existed. The modern
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bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class
antagonism. It has established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle.
Australian society is more and more splitting into two great Australian camps: bourgeoisie and
proletariat (Martin 2016; Ponzanesi 2014). The worker exchanges his commodity, labour power,
for an equivalent wage, so the boss says, to purchase what he needs to survive: light, food, roof,
clothes (Martin 2016; Ponzanesi 2014). Patriarchy is revived with madness in the bourgeois
family (Foucault 1961: 240). The Silenced Manifesto blocks the degree of movement between
classes, both by confining the space to be heard, and also by confining the avenue for the
discourse to be navigated, as per all power negotiations.

It seems that tools and objects utilised in the mental health arena can be called commodities, and
the processes in developing and using these commodities should be called commodification. I
was not given any ownership of the commodification of knowledge production, and hence I was
not granted access to the power bestowed in such a production of knowledge. Following on, and
as Brenner (1974 in Kleinman 1980: 48) has demonstrated, mental illness is strongly influenced
by our society via socioeconomic changes.

Regarding the Silenced Manifesto, the process of commodification silences the voices of those
living with a psychotic illness by commodifying the underdog, thereby limiting the space of
commensurability into a relationship between economy and social misfit. The main accolade of
the underdog and economy is the labelling of class. The labelling of commodity perpetuates the
culture which places boundaries on the underdog. The labelling silences the mentally ill by
limiting spaces from which commensurability operates.
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The economic wealth of mental health services is not solely based on measurements and
numerals. I hope that the psychometric results from assessments themselves are meaningless,
due to their negative reporting and misrepresentation of myself. Are they true? Do they really
represent me?

Socialisation, socio-cultural capital, the kaleidoscopic nature of human

interaction, and the power dynamics bartered in the potent and cogent exchange, become the nonnumerical wealth. Social relationships become economic wealth. The socialised stories behind
the numbers enrich the data. Although the stories alone are not substantial for the discerning
eyes of those with a positivist perspective.

In the psychiatric wards, I did not have control over my own resources when admitted.
Everything was taken from me; my own resources were manipulated by the medical staff. As
my admitting nurse in the Ward B (public) said to me, “You cannot have in your possession
materials which place you at risk, that is at risk of self, others or reputation.” At risk objects that
were taken from me included chocolate. I could not argue for threat of being sectioned. Thus,
the Silenced Manifesto. My voice and word was and is imprisoned.

Biehl (2005: 23) argues that from the perspective of one human life...deemed mad and
intractable, one comes to understand how economic globalisation, State and medical reform, and
the acceleration of claims to human rights and citizenship, coincide with and impinge on a local
production of social death, albeit being silenced and textualised, as per the notion of the Silenced
Manifesto. The negotiation over the human and nonhuman forms part of a complex set of
relations through which individuals are linked to each other and to the political body. The Other’s
dying makes it possible for one to belong to a family like institution, to a new population and
subjective economy. The ethnographic challenge is to find these empirical relations and linkages
– technical, political, conceptual, and affective – and to bring them out of thoughtlessness.
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The Communist Manifesto stressed the social need to produce an interior space that coexists with
the exterior practices of citizenship. The manifesto, related to Foucauldian or Deleuzian
language and logic, introduced the question of subjectivity as a matter of counter-governance: all
spheres of government should influence the ways in which individuals and groups constitute
themselves as subjects so that citizens may elude both established forms of knowledge and
dominant forms of power (Biehl 2005: 137).

Biehl (2005: 316) states, “That is not to say that mental disorders are basically a matter of social
construction, but rather that such disorders do take form in the most personal junction between
the subject, his or her biology, and the intersubjective and technical re-coding of ‘normal’ ways
of being in local worlds.” “Indeed, it’s a mystery!” (Biehl 2005: 236)

Whatever the cause of my last relapse and hospitalisation my experience in the Ward C (private)
was relatively pleasant, although expensive. The main difference between the other two wards
was capital.

In anthropological terms, for instance, the difference was cultural capital,

ethnographic capital and discourse capital, to name a few. Conversations about power support
such capital/s. Though it is not as simple as that. Having the means to control the resources in
your life enables your recovery. Access to more resources is needed if one must consider
recovering in a different culture with a different language. Ward B (public) and Ward A (public)
and Ward C (private) all have different cultures. The Ward B (public) is somewhat colonialist.
Ward A (public)is somewhat paternalist, but more supportive of rehabilitation. Ward C (private)
is somewhat empowering and focussed on rehabilitation. These cultures, some may argue, fall
in different spectrums of the Australian Mental Health values and politics. The values of the
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Australian Mental Health system include: coordinating treatment and supports for people with
severe and complex mental illness; improving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander mental
health and suicide prevention; and reducing stigma and discrimination (Australian Government,
The Fifth National Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Plan, August 2017: 4).

The Silenced Manifesto can be included here as a relation to the Communist Manifesto where a
space of commensurability between the interior and exterior spheres of personhood are created.
So, it is possible to create social power, empowering the marginalised and providing a platform
to make themselves heard, to equip the silenced with the semantic tools to be understood, to make
the personal political. The text, embedded, creates a newfound ‘discourse’. The newly heard
and marginalised are heeded, a commensurable space is created, their consequent power is
precipitated by the culture that it envelopes, and the marginalised, that is the colonised, now have
the hope of becoming full humans and citizens, and definitely not social misfits.

Conclusion

My identity is not my own. This sentiment is typical of people living with a psychotic disorder.
Many, including me, are defined as dependents of the State, with prescribed agency or freedom,
without the freedom to live as desired. Is it possible for me to regain my freedom? For this to
happen, a broader mind may be necessary, as some people living with major psychotic illnesses
act oddly at times. They are social misfits. Am I also a social misfit?
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Considering all that I am, who am I? Am I defined purely by my sociality? To what extent is
my identity influenced by my understanding of self? My mental health journey is neither linear
or predictable. Who am I? Who am I regarding all the factors involved in personal and social
construction?

In this thesis, the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit are described as having been forced
into a position of disempowerment, being disabled, disengaged, and detached because of the
hegemonic government macro-narrative.

This macro-narrative dictates the historical

construction of sub-citizen policy in Australia, where the dynamic political landscape is
changing. There is the deconstruction of current self-determination/post self-determination
policies, and the politics of implementing these (Kowal 2006).

Since I was 23, I have been suffocated by my experiences of living with schizoaffective
disorder. Over time, I have swayed, and I have fought to and fro, back and forward, through
each experience, remembering some, forgetting much. My sense of self, my identity as a
person, these fundamental, unique and distinctive facets of my self-concept, my agency in this
regard is limited. My fundamental and basic human right, to be free from unwarranted
prejudice, has been robbed of me in many ways (OHCHR n.d).

My quality of life has diminished permanently. I have difficulty in being labelled. To be called
‘handicapped’ by progressive health professionals currently is disempowering, although
seemingly true (from their bio medical perspective and validated by their measurements of me).
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There are many questions that have been explored in this autoethnography. How has my
disability affected my life? Why is my story significant? How does my autoethnographic
methodology succeed with this topic? How do my experiences contribute to an anthropology of
mental health? How has my psychosis and forthcoming thesis been enculturated and situated in
space and history? How does stigma work? How do language and narratives encapsulate the
meaning, identity and purpose of the underdog? How do politics and policies wield power over
the marginalised, and strengthen and support such power? How do measurement and labelling
provide insight into the experience of living with schizoaffective disorder? How significant is
the social creation of reality to this thesis? What does the phenomena of (post)colonialism add
to the analysis presented here? What structure and function is there, and how is this concept
fluid, flexible, waxing and waning, blown to and fro in the winds of influence and power? And
I ask, how are the silenced made silent, and how does discourse perpetuate the labelling of the
silenced?

All these questions can be answered in some way with the Silenced Manifesto.

Considering, the PAI assessment absolutely disempowered me. I had no power left to fight with,
no power. It was a battle of the wits, a battle of the minds, albeit between the knowledge of the
sane and the knowledge of insane. I had no chance at winning. There is a presumption that the
social misfit is stupid, lacking. The assessing psychologist was sheltered from criticism because
of the deified position that an esteemed mental health professional is bestowed. There were many
influences that swayed the psychologist’s assessment. Power is swayed to the value of the
measurer who trumps the resource lacking and knowledge poor psychotic person. Psychosis is
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related to the tangible individual, which equals fear, uncertainty and chaos. Psychology as related
to tangible science equals certainty and hegemony.

I am silenced. I am ignored. I am hidden. I do not share a commensurable space with the
government and its politics and policies, the processes of labelling and measurement, and the
means of silencing and cementing the underdog in discourse. I do not have access to freedom.
Indeed, I am excluded and imprisoned in many ways from society. The Silenced Manifesto
reappropriates and encapsulates all opportunities to exert, resist and influence power. It creates
and builds a foundation compassing the commensurable causal space, language and narratives,
the production of knowledge, all governance and policy, the construction of reality, the
processing of labelling and measurement, the paradigm of (post)colonialism, stigma and social
theory.

I would like to be known as someone who is independent, who controls the circumstances
influencing her life, and has power to own my own knowledge. Though actually, I am vulnerable.
I have long periods of being unwell. I always will. It is difficult to live past that, knowing what
may come. I must do things like get income insurance and full health cover and to keep my
affairs in order, that is when I can afford it, which to be honest, hasn’t happened now and will
probably never happen. In many ways, I am commodified.

My experience of living with schizoaffective disorder is described by the Silenced Manifesto. I
am silenced and imprisoned often by a straitjacket of oppressive governance. I have been
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excluded: by language; by power; by politics and policies; by inaccessibility of services; by
discrimination. Ultimately, I am silenced: by being hidden; by being choked; by the limits of the
manifesto.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CONCLUSION

7 LESIONS: 7 VOICES: 7 DRUGS: 7 STORIES: 7 CONCLUSIONS

Seven conclusions

In this concluding chapter I will extrapolate and compile seven conclusions from this thesis.
These follow on and develop from the five questions/statements posited in the introduction
chapter.

I have learnt over the twenty plus years of living with a major psychotic illness, that people do
not expect much from me. My psychiatrist in Town B tried to make me work part time for years,
and definitely not to have me study on top of that. A nurse I spoke to recently during one of my
monthly Clozapine clinic assessments, stated that she is astounded by what I do, by what I have
achieved. She describes me to her friends and colleagues as a ‘real achiever’, despite the ‘pain
life has caused me’. I find it a little disconcerting to be labelled as ‘successful’, as someone who
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fights the labels of ‘disabled’ and ‘handicapped’ (terms used by health professionals I have seen),
as if I am not capable of living an enjoyable and full life.

The discipline of my intellectual (de)construction is anthropology, and stemming on from that,
this ethnography is an autoethnography. The day that anthropologists give up their attempt to
ground meanings in politics and economics will be a sad day (Douglas 1992: ix). As per my
perspective, in this autoethnography, I have addressed with raw insight the issues of a culture of
schizoaffective disorder. In this case, the culture of mental health, exemplified by my experience
of living with schizoaffective disorder.

As Kowal (2006) states, anthropology is concerned with culture and discourse. Mental health
discourse has historically been defined by and developed and supported by the biomedical model.
It is this dominating medical culture, the structured perpetuating narrative, connecting the doctor
(the scientist) and the patient (the lacking), that cements the roles of the powerful doctor and the
powerless patient in their allocated and respected constitutes. A culture change dissipating the
tower of strength of the scientific foundation has proven difficult to conquer.

Western knowledges, philosophies and definitions of human nature are what Foucault has
referred to as archives. Some people might refer as a storehouse of historic artefacts, ideas, texts
and/or images which are classified, preserved, ranged and represented back to the West. Foucault
also suggests that the archive reveals practice from which the West itself cannot necessarily
describe because it operates within the rules and they take it for granted (Kleinman 1988: 43).
Clinicians (and researchers too) need to unpack their own interpretive schemes, which are filled
with personal and cultural biases (Kleinman 1988: 53).
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Autoethnography is a valued methodology with which I was able to realise the minutia and
intricacies of what it is like to live with schizoaffective disorder. I have examined and unearthed
the culture of my world, and the world of culture. This perceptiveness helps me to paint a picture
and provide an in-depth analysis of the culture of the mental health experience. It would be
difficult to find a methodology other than autoethnography that could provide such depth of
detail, richness, thick description (Geertz 1973) and insight into the detail of life experiences of
schizoaffective disorder.

1. Labelling

When considering the cultural identities of subhumans, sub-citizens and social misfits, I cannot
ignore the importance of labelling theory. The essence of labelling theory is that individuals are
crafted by society and given identity by society. This is done via the labels that individuals are
given by the society. Some labels result in harmful effects, such as the perpetuation of deviance,
and the creation of stigma. This label is perpetuated by the society. The negative effects of
labelling, the naming and assumptions, are internalised by the individual so that they adopt the
negative influence of the labelling. Importantly, the individuals self-actualise and learn to accept
and identify as a subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit. The internalisation of the label develops
into a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the individual is indoctrinated so much by the powerful, they
will actualise and become the label they are given. For example, if a teacher praises and
encourages a student, the student is more likely to succeed (Scheff 1974).

342

Regarding mental illness, labelling can lead to negative outcomes. The more the person living
with a mental illness believes and internalises the labelling of subhuman, sub-citizen, social
misfit, the more they will believe they are devalued and lacking. And so is the self-fulfilling
prophecy. The individual living with a mental illness internalises the language and culture and
politics and psychology and economy, and the interpersonal relationships. All these factors are
given space, a possible commensurable space, to flourish. In this commensurable space the labels
have been cemented and developed and have been self-actualised. And so is the self-fulfilling
prophecy.

The culture that labels those living with a mental illness perpetuates and the

individuals become part of the culture defined as the lacking (Scheff 1974).

“The university and in a general way, all teaching systems, which appear simply to
disseminate knowledge, are made to maintain a certain social class in power; and to exclude
the instruments of power of another social class.” (Foucault & Chomsky 1974)

A mental illness diagnosis can label you for life. Once painted with the brush of mental illness,
in this case schizoaffective disorder, it is hard to break that association. In measuring the
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unmeasurable, there exists a crisis of representation (Said 1978). Diagnosis can precipitate such
a crisis of representation, in being the ‘esteemed’ scientific phenomenon of labelling and
categorisation. It relies on the ethnographic capital of measurement.

It makes me sick to know that I am being known about, by others, who themselves perpetuate
the labelling of those living with a major psychotic illness. The main difference is that in my
situation I have somewhat of an insightful ability to question the capability of those with power
over me.

Those who I am close to, most gently always ask me how I am going with my study, eager for
me to complete. Many find my symptoms to be annoying. They do not realise that my memory
and cognition problems are symptoms, albeit permanent, and not innately part of my personality.
They are not conscious choices. I have no power over these annoying aspects of my illness. I
feel like I am judged. To live with me, I feel judged. I live within the boundaries of a priori
knowledge from others. I am bounded by what is defined for me, not what is true to me. Here,
again I am defined by others. Though, I should not be patronised because of it; again, treated as
a child. Living with a major psychotic illness, I am often treated as a child.

Labelling is an activity that predisposes the fundamental subject of this thesis. Put another way,
the culture of mental health and its associated labelling precipitates the stigma of both the system
and personal phenomena of living with a major psychotic illness. In sociology, labelling theory
is the view of deviance according to which being labelled as a ‘deviant’ leads a person to engage
in deviant behaviour (The Chegg Study n.d.). The mentally ill patient is viewed as a deviant,
defined by those disassociated and detached from the labelled group of society.
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I obviously do not belong, especially not in this workplace, but also in study and in relationships.
In fact, I don’t know of any area of my life that has not been plagued by my mental illness. I
have been labelled in every manner. How can I break through the cultural divide, break through
the disempowerment and misrepresentation bestowed on me because of culture?

Szasz (1970: xvii) argues against the practice of psychiatry, saying that “the result is the
dehumanising, oppression and persecution of the citizens branded mentally ill.” One may also
argue that the labelling of the mentally ill is precipitated in the functioning of culture.

The

functioning of culture, with its foundations of values and meaning, plays into the need for culture
to empower or disempower its subjects of participants, and whether this system/society supports
them or inhibits them.

2. Subhuman, sub-citizen, social misfit

The subhuman, sub-citizen, and social misfit are lacking. The subhuman, sub-citizen, and social
misfit lack the power and agency to participate fully in society. Biomedicine measures what is
mostly the scientific ways the person is lacking. In this instance, we are looking at my lived
experience of having schizoaffective disorder. The culture that affects me and perpetuates the
existence of the subhuman, sub-citizen, and social misfit also limits the power that I may attain.

From my experience, I am most emancipated when my own voice is heard and heeded. In this
analysis, one must ask, what are the implicit or explicit silences in this discourse? Whose noises
are (dis)empowered? (Butler 1990). What culture precipitates the subhuman, sub-citizen and
social misfit? These questions are addressed by the concept of the Silenced Manifesto where the
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person living with schizoaffective disorder, me, has not the empowerment of being heard let
alone the platform, or space, to speak from. To follow, Foucault stated (in Zolatova 2010),
“There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie
and permeate discourses.”

According to Marx and to a lesser extent Foucault, the workers do not own any of the modes of
production or modes of information which will contribute to their quality of life (Poster 1992;
Nussbaum & Sen 1993). One may think that it is the workers who are at the bottom of the class
struggle. But it is those who do not even make it to the class of worker that concerns me. They
belong to the figurative class of stigma. They are subhumans and sub-citizens, who do not play
an active role in society other than a dichotomous comparison between normalcy and whatever
deviance is. Being a social misfit and deranged means that you do not even participate in any
economic equation, let alone be included in any sort of societal evaluation (Appignanesi 2012:
99). There seems to be no room for the subhuman, sub-citizen and social misfit, the anti-social,
with what Foucault (1973: 74) called the revitalised ‘enlightened bourgeois’.

Foucault (1967: 65) notes that in England, the hospital later called Bedlam, exhibited their
“lunatics” for a penny every Sunday...madness itself... which put on a show. The mentally ill
created entertainment for the society. They were an exhibit, commodifying and sensualising the
stigmatised, disempowering the subhuman, the sub-citizen and socially marginalised.

In

analysing the ‘space’ which encompasses and allows for major psychotic illnesses, there is an a
priori, an already assumed knowledge, that the mentally ill person is disabled; lacking. It is
assumed that the person hasn’t the capacity to function intelligently, or to negotiate their own
health.
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3. Culture

Culture helps people to understand phenomena. “All cultural classification systems have
anomalies, things that do not fit, and ambiguities, things that may fit in more than one category”
(Lupton 2013: 62, 67).

Moreover, “...cultural concepts concerning labelling, boundaries,

classifications and categories, the violation of which confounds cultural values and
expectations.... these polluting people are culturally positioned on the margins of
society...Certain classes of people are singled out...requiring control to bring them back to
conforming with moral values” (Lupton 2013: 74). This is the way in which dominant groups
have reacted against those who are deviant (Lupton 1999: 54; Lupton 2013: 61). Of most
importance is how this autoethnography and relevant literature depicts the dominant culture, that
is how the dominant culture perpetuates the labelling of subhumans, sub-citizens, and social
deviants.

I argue that mental health is a social phenomenon, just as much as a scientific phenomenon.
Outside the walls of positivist science lay the social foundations of the concept of mental health.
Mental health facets include taking account of the kaleidoscopic nature of human interaction;
socialisation from science; and how the power dynamics are bartered in the potent and cogent
exchange of socio-cultural capital. The constructs of knowledge become cultural artefacts. And
the uses of these tools form together to support a system of governmentality. They work to
validate to justify and make accountable the positions of the service implementers.

From the perspective of an anthropological decree, considering socio-cultural capital, there is a
reappropriation into the textualized version, ethnographic capital. From this, the Silenced
Manifesto endorses and adopts ‘discourse capital’, which can be comprehended as using and
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understanding the wealth presented in language and culture. The Silenced Manifesto engulfs
discourse capital. It utilises the capital presented in text, in language and culture.

Such discourse is also precipitated in stigma. It is absolutely a socialised phenomenon (Kleinman
1988), connected with culture and everything there is about how one person can affect another.
Also, it builds into how a society affects an individual, and how an individual is barred by the
social. Historically the stigmatised are labelled as shameful and outcasts, not wanted or tolerated
by the mentally well. Kleinman refers to stigma as the socialised “shame of illness” (1988: 158).
The shame is inextricably connected to culture and its applications in society. One can connect
and relate the social to its misrepresentations.

Goffman

states,

“Social

misrepresentation

is

to

be

distinguished

from

personal

misrepresentation” (1963: 82). Social misrepresentation and the related socially stigmatised are
greater strangers to themselves (1963: 48). The personally stigmatised live in terror of their
mental health status being thrown in the face (1963: 109). Such is the turbulent identity
construction of the stigmatised, those with a major psychotic illness in this case.

4. Measurement

The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound (Lea
2008).

Measurement is an outcome with the use of its tools, depicting a kaleidoscopic, dynamic and
socio-cultural production of knowledge. The assessment process creates a space of knowledge
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production, a formation of political technology where the act of measurement, also narrative
development, forms a type of discovery which has political and governmental significance. The
measurements produce knowledge: transforming the numbers into factoids (Lea 2008). The
factoids become more structured conceptually as the language and symbols of knowledge
production. As part of the language of scientific knowledge, these factoids/objects of knowledge
become validations for governance, to measure the unmeasurable. (Lea 2008)

The power of measurements and consequent numbers and pie graphs are quite profound. In the
beginning I was wary and very sceptical but open to learning more about the possibilities of
psycho-measurements. In retrospect, I see that in adopting the neuropsychological tool, I was
perhaps over-zealous, projecting too much hope into ‘measurement’, too eager to believe in the
answers that I thought the measurement would bring. The psychometric factoids, although hoped
to bring good news for me, can demonstrably also generate bad news. The measurements
inadvertently create a schism of (dis)empowerment and labelling between those who use the tool
on the ‘Other’, and the ‘Other’ themselves (McMahon 2013).

Nevertheless, psychiatric science and its magical digits and quantitative methods cannot be
ignored. In trying to find a sound measurement tool; to bring to life the magical proof of numbers
in diagnosis – psychiatry relies on measurement, statistics, pie graphs, and bar graphs. These
digits and graphs can be understood as cultural artefacts or factoids. Statistics illustrate the
kaleidoscopic phenomena of mental illness. The illuminations of measurement facts enable the
mental health facts to develop a social life (Lea: 2008: 128).
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Measurements legitimising diagnosis seem to create a space of proximity where it is possible to
negotiate and exchange between and within the socio-cultural structure, and this is embedded in
the many persuasions of power control and comprehension from which they came. This space
for legitimising measurements is important as it provides some cognition, some proximity, for
negotiation between cultural artefacts and factoids and scientific relics (Kowal 2006; Lea 2008).
To make this space workable, there must be some proximity in the connection between what is
the phenomena of the measured and the unmeasurable. What is defined as within the realms of
the measurable and the unmeasurable? That is, discovering an understanding between what is
science and how this relates to non-science? For example, looking at the cultural artefact, and if
or how there is space for an understanding of science, and how and why it is significant. Thus,
some space is possibly available to measure the unmeasurable.

5. Critical theory

The main theory covered by this thesis is critical theory involving (post)colonialism. Other
theories briefly discussed in this thesis are structural-functionalism, Marxism, postmodernism
and poststructuralism. An important theorist used in this analysis is Michel Foucault (19261984).
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Critical theory is more emancipatory than the explanatory postmodernism and poststructuralism.
As well, critical theory aims to understand the social construction of reality. Other theories, apart
from (post)colonialism, classified as critical theory are feminist theory, queer theory and possibly
neo-Marxism. Foucault argues, each of these theories work to empower the Other through
analyses of the historical production of prejudice and their social-cultural-political a priori
assumptions. The awareness of present-day madness as a part of its theoretical basis in today’s
modern social science, is accomplished by a certain analysis of modernity, which is situated from
the start in the temporal, historical and social context (Foucault 1967: 201).

The main theorist I have used to analyse my thesis is Michel Foucault. Studying his work, gave
me a heightened perception and conception for a study such as this. His insight helped me to
understand better power relations, knowledge production and archiving, histology, critical theory
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and (post)colonial theory.

The labelling marked in this study can be explained via the

negotiations of cultural artefacts, and how they are utilised to silence or amplify the voices of
those consumed in the powerful cultural windmill of cultural infrastructure. Again, the Silenced
Manifesto is placed here, that is by giving a voice to the disempowered within the discourse of
the cultural infrastructure.

6. (Post)colonialism

To explore the anthropology of (post)colonialism, and the culture that precipitates the labeling
and definition of the mentally ill as social misfit and deranged, as lacking or in deficit, also
precipitates and holds high the values of paternalism and colonialism. Spivak explains how those
confined are not fully human.

Those living with a major psychotic disorder are essentially

bantered around between being colonised, decolonised and then re-colonised (Spivak 1990,
1998; Smith 1999). To extrapolate from Kowal’s argument (2006; 2008), the banter between the
colonised and the colonisers in Indigenous health can be likened to the banter between the
mentally ill and the mental health professionals and the politics engaged.

For the most part, those who advocate and insist on canonical forms of doing and writing research
are advocating a White, masculine, heterosexual, middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied
perspective. Following these conventions, a researcher not only disregards other ways of
knowing but also implies that other ways necessarily are unsatisfactory and invalid.
Autoethnography, on the other hand, expands and opens a wider lens on the world, eschewing
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rigid definitions of what constitutes meaningful and useful research. As such, writing personal
stories can also be therapeutic for participants and readers.

Measurement may be likened to a tool of (post)colonialism (Smith 1999: 6, 23). Many distinct
populations, including the mentally ill, have experienced colonialism in various ways (Smith
1999: 144). Diagnosis and labelling are (post)colonialist actions (Smith 1999: 26). Those
labelled as mentally ill, or non-white, or female are historically not granted the status of fully
human. Some of us are not even considered partially human. Ideas about what counted as human
in association with the power to define people as human or not human were already encoded in
imperialism and called colonial discourses (Smith 1999: 27). As Audre Lorde stated, “[The]
Master’s tools cannot bring down the master’s house” (Smith 1999).

The practice of measuring the mentally unwell can be likened to (post)colonial practice (Smith
1999). How do the mental health professionals measure the seemly unmeasurable? Some
perspectives on these are addressed in my medical notes. There are no completely reliable and
valid measures to assess mental health participants, and there are certainly not reliable and exact
measures to direct treatment. Due to being so uncertain, I must question whether my illness is
valid in its assessment and diagnosis.

The concept of the Silenced Manifesto depicts a relationship between the colonised and
coloniser. This relationship is covert and surreptitious, and hidden from the public societal
vernacular. This is very much part of the relationship between those living with a major
psychotic disorder and those who govern them. The coloniser, Us, have assumed power and/or
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have negotiated power over the mentally ill, the colonised Other. The Other are dependent on
the coloniser. Data begets knowledge which begets power, which begets knowledge, which
begets data. The coloniser’s agenda is to use tools of measurement, psychometric tools in this
case, as political technologies and artefacts which are entwined and essential to governance. Us
work to further enable cultural artefacts to become commodified, another avenue where power
can

be

won.

The

Silenced

Manifesto

Other, strongly, firmly yet in privacy and silence.

connects

the

Us

and

The measurements developed from a

technology of knowledge production to object of governance (O’Farrell 2005), may be used by
Us to have power and colonise the Other.

7. Silenced Manifesto

The negotiations between the colonisers and the colonised may also be understood by engaging
with the concept of the ‘Silenced Manifesto’. The ‘silenced’, the colonised, are disempowered
and stifled by the coloniser, be it through education, policy and politics, economics, and the
power play precipitated in the (post)colonial culture and space between the coloniser and the
colonised.

The colonised are governed by the manifesto discourse and mandates of the

colonisers, in this case, biomedical science.
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The Silenced Manifesto allows for a space, a (post)colonial space, constructed by the colonised.
It is a space where there is a possible commensurability between the heard and the silenced. A
space that acknowledges the relationship between coloniser/colonised, and the production of
coloniser resources, knowledge and power, that is conceding according to the colonisers
manifesto. The Silenced Manifesto allows for the development of such a space. These advances
coalesce as (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2006).

I have negated a traditional detailed discourse analysis, but in turn have provided an insight into
the culture of mental health, the labelling of the mentally ill and societal norms with the concept
of the Silenced Manifesto. The Silenced Manifesto positions the discussion in the (post)colonial
space using (post)colonial logic (Kowal 2006) which can supply a more complex and profound
analysis and perspective.

The manifesto perpetuates the cultures of politics, economics,

histology and science. I have included the concept of the Silenced Manifesto, to make more
apparent the powered narrative between coloniser and colonised.
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An Australian national health policy and program, the NDIS, holds the values of individual
choice and control in high regard. The NDIS, also used in mental health, mandates person
centred and directed care, creating a discourse which develops a manifesto, which in turn fuels
an arm of governance. Along with the sustenance that the manifesto gains from governance, it
secures solidarity and power from bureaucracy. Bureaucracy as such becomes a cultural artefact,
which further feeds into the vernacular and again, the drive of the manifesto.

In this case, the power of the manifesto doesn’t always corroborate and substantiate the
disempowered, that is those living with a psychotic illness. The voice of the mentally ill are
silenced by governance, its cultural artefacts for instance bureaucracy, and its discourse. They
do not speak the same language.

The voice of the mentally ill are overpowered and

disempowered; it is hidden; it is silenced.

**************************************

I have created an anthropological study of living with a mental illness. Specifically, an
autoethnography of living with schizoaffective disorder, looking at the way I have been labelled
as a lesser human, with an understanding that labelling is part of the culture which encompasses
it.

356

It seems ironic that although I fight being labelled and stigmatised, I have developed habits of
buying into the disempowerment bestowed on me. Today, I negotiated with a nurse about my
need to be admitted to a psychiatric ward – the Ward C (private) mentioned in chapter eight. The
psychiatrist was keen for me to be admitted so that my medications may be tweaked, two
medications. The first medication I am taking is of a high dose and needs to be reduced.
Similarly, my psychiatrist states that my cognitive functioning would improve if I am taken off
the second drug. These medication changes I am told will have little cost or effect to my mental
health. The nurse stated that I will most probably be in hospital for two weeks.

I spoke about this probable hospitalisation with a friend. He suggested that I am allowing myself
to be disempowered by the bio-medical model. He stated that I should do what is therapeutic for
me, possibly minimising the time spent in the hospital and more time in the more therapeutic
environment as my community – with my friends and family. This cannot be avoided. But
without realising it, I have disempowered myself. Indeed, the culture that perpetuates everything
bad as depicted in this thesis: the labelling, measuring, and stigma, is the same culture that has
caught me up, in the name of bio-medicine and science, of which I am subject to. Even though
I fight against being part of the disempowering discourse, there is a strong sense in me that finds
peace, solace and safety in being admitted to the Ward C (private).

In my experience, I have been a pawn in the power game of mental health service delivery and
have not always been able to negotiate my freedom. If the overarching structure is the culture of
a society, then I am a slave to our culture. In this thesis, I have carefully explored the enigma of
living with schizoaffective disorder, and being labelled a subhuman, sub-citizen and/or a social
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misfit. Then I explored the culture that precipitates the labelling. I hoped to explore this
mysterious and unfathomable culture. Like a true anthropologist, I was most interested in culture.

Partly due to my own undoing, I feel conflicted. I feel crushed. Can’t I be a whole person?
Although with what the noises say and what I hear others say, real or not, with all the pressure, I
am now convinced I am disabled. I am coming to believe that I am all the labels people are
bestowing on me. I am lacking. I am stupid. I am powerless. I am silenced. And I am blind “There are eyes everywhere. No blind spots left. What shall we dream of when everything
becomes visible? We'll dream of being blind” (Virilio 1977)

How and why has living with schizoaffective disorder affected my life? Perhaps because my
diagnosis has de-railed what is important to me. Living with schizoaffective disorder has
disempowered me as my values are based on social justice - individual agency, virtue and
equality for all. My agency is now severely limited. I can be detained if I am deemed to be
unwell, or not in my right mind. Whilst I can understand the hegemonic logic, it still does not
feel decent or moral to me. Under such a regime, I feel it is unjust, unequal, and even paternalistic
in the governance of ‘caring’ for someone living with a major psychotic illness. So, my life
expectancy, quality of life, agency, and self-determination are all questionable, disputed, and
dubious. Whereas, my profound feelings of personal shame and inadequacy are intensely
impenetrable for me.

There must also be more room for a more thorough analysis of the data sourced from Foucault
or Marx. For instance, as per Foucault (c. 1977), “from the idea that the self is not given to us, I
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think there is only one practical consequence: we must create ourselves as a work of art.” We
must embrace the art of autoethnography. One issue that needs exploring is Foucault’s historical
situatedness.

Avenues of analysis must be explored within the combination of culture and economics and
politics and governance – and how these phenomena become commodities. However, there must
be more depth to the analysis than concluding that commodities and resources are the major
causes for all ramifications and difficulties in the theory and practice of mental health.
(Post)colonialism must be explored further.

I suppose in many ways my focus should be to communicate well the cultural issues involved
in schizoaffective disorder, between the individual experience and the broader socio-cultural
terrain, including the situatedness of ideas and experience. Then the (post)colonial condition
may be able to offer hope for peaceful coexistence in the post-colony (Kowal 2006).

I am stupid!

I am disabled!

The mental health professionals use techniques of measurement, diagnosis and treatment to stake
a claim on the way the mentally ill should live. The mentally ill – Other – not always privy to
the sanctity of medical knowledge, have little choice than to trust the deified mental health
professionals.

Factoids are socio-political technologies which aid, for instance, in the
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governmentality of power structures. Note, however, that power structures negotiate, command
and influence in whichever name you give the paradigm.

For example, the paradigm of

(post)colonialism may be extrapolated here. So much is riding on the use of measurement.
Measurement therefore benefits service providers, or colonisers, to give power to and sanction
the socio-cultural, political and economically produced entity. Some may say that the purpose
of measurement is its validation of (post)colonialism.

I cannot separate my mental illness from my person, despite my every effort. I am absolutely
pathologised!

My measurements support this dependence.

I am handicapped.

I am

disempowered. I am named and determined by the colonisers. The biomedical colonisers
associate with the richness and power of the cultural artefacts, factoids. Biomedical agents are
colonisers, identified with the spectrum of what is mental health, such as governance and
bureaucracy, and the various mental health professionals. Yet I cry for help from the colonisers
when I am unwell and desperate.

I will always live with schizoaffective disorder.

I would rather live a shorter life than live in the hell of insanity.

The only reaction I must have is that I am absolutely gutted. Thoroughly. Completely.

I am branded by the Silenced Manifesto.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

GLOSSARY

Agency: Within Sociology, self-determination or free will (Denzin & Lincoln 2015: 340).
Alienation: As identified by Karl Marx, the condition of workers who feel estranged from
themselves or society due to lack of power, control, fulfilment, and satisfaction. Marx attributed
this to capitalist society, where the means of production are privately owned (Denzin & Lincoln
2015: 340).
Autoethnography: A young Anthropological methodology that focuses on the self (‘auto’) and
ethnography’ the study of culture. There is a sample size of one. All interchanges and
interrelations, including notes on power relations, are performed through the eyes of the
researcher (Adams, Jones & Ellis 2015).
Biomedicine: A conceptual body of illness that excludes psychology and social factors, while
focusing on the scientific of biology scientific factors (Free Dictionary 2020).
Bourgeoisie: In Marxist theory, the social class of people that owns the means of production
(Denzin & Lincoln 2015: 340).
Brain: The objective bodily organ that is in control of all cerebral functioning such as processing
rationality, thoughts and senses.
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Bureaucracy: Defined by Max Weber as a system of organisation that is characterised by a
hierarchy of rule-bound officials. Bureaucracies are arguably socialised entities that create a
structure of people.

According to Lea (2008), government bureaucracies are cultural

manifestations which create their own facts, or ‘cultural artefacts’ to legitimate and validate their
position. For example, the work that bureaucrats do can arguably create and actually perpetuate
and strengthen the meta policy of ‘Close the Gap’ rather than emancipating those the policy was
designed for. This can be called the ‘magic of bureaucracy’ (Simonton 2015: 340).
Confinement: In Madness and Civilisation (1961) Foucault describes a movement across
Europe in the seventeenth century which saw the establishment of institutions which locked up
people who were deemed to be ‘unreasonable’. This included not only mad people, but the
unemployed, single mothers, defrocked priests, failed suicides, heretics, prostitutes, debauchees
in short anyone who was deemed to be socially unproductive or disruptive. He labels this
movement the ‘Great Confinement’. He continues his study of confinement in his history of the
birth of the prison, Discipline and Punish (1982) (Foucault in Farrell, C. 2020).
Crazy/craziness: A term made in jest for the mentally ill to introduce and provoke and request
another level of understanding of what it is like living with a major psychotic disorder. I use this
term to invite poetic quip into the discussion. The liberty of using poetic licence through humour,
as permitted with the methodology of autoethnography, provides a more complex and
multifaceted understanding of the experience of living with schizoaffective disorder. Indeed, by
using the term ‘crazy’, I am also labelling the mentally ill as with the terms sub-human, subcitizen and social misfit. A premise of this autoethnography is that it is a reappropriation.
Critical theory: Which includes queer theory and feminism, critical theory encompasses theories
that seek to deconstruct the hegemonic theories, and in doing so disempower the powerful (often
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referred to as and colonisers) and empower the powerless (often referred to as colonised). Critical
theory is an emancipatory theory (Bronner 2011).
Culture: The languages, customs, knowledge, beliefs and norms that combine to make up the
way of society. May also refer to the arts (such as music, theatre, literature and so on) (Geertz
1973).
Discourse: In general use, communication in speech or writing; in sociological use, a framework
or system of ideas that provides a perspective on life and governs the way it can be discussed.
Discourse imparts a meaning to events, and varies in different eras, geographical areas, and
within social groups (Simonton 2015: 340-241). Discourse is a rather slippery notion in
Foucault’s work but at the most basic level he uses the term to refer to the material verbal traces
left by history. He also uses it to describe a certain ‘way of speaking’ (Foucault 1972).
Discourse analysis: Discourse analysis (DA) is a type of discourse analytical research that
primarily studies the social power dynamics of culture through text and talk. The power
dynamics are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political
context. DA represents the analysis of the social structure (Dunn & Eble 2015).
Economic determinism: A materialistic view of history which claims that economic forces
cause all social phenomena and the evolution of human society (Simonton 2015: 341).
Episteme: This term, which Foucault introduces in his book The Order of Things (1966), refers
to the orderly ‘unconsciousness’ structures underlying the production of scientific knowledge in
a particular time and place. It is the ‘epistemological field’ which forms the conditions of
possibility for knowledge in a given time and place. It has often been compared to T.S. Kuhn’s
notion of paradigm (Kuhn 1962).
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Feminism: A social movement that advocates the social, political and economic equality of the
sexes. Feminism is recognised as having had several ‘waves’, or eras, each with a different
agenda of issues (Simonton 2015: 341).
Foucauldian power:
•

Power is not a thing but a relation

•

Power is not simply repressive, but it is productive

•

Power is not simply a property of the State. Power is not something that is exclusively
localised in government and the State (which is not an universal essence). Rather, power
is exercised throughout the social body.

•

Power operates at the most micro levels of social relations. In fact, power is omnipresent
at every level of the social body

•

The exercise of power is strategic and war-like. (Foucault 1983)

(Simonton 2015).
Full citizen: For an individual to be able to participate fully, in sound mind and body, in the
political and economic spheres of society, so that the individual may have control or influence
over the resources that affect his/her own life.
Full human: For an individual to be in full capacity of themselves, including of sound mind and
body, to take control of the resources that affect his/her life. This includes full capacity within
an individual’s existential, cultural, social and spiritual context.
Gaze: Foucault uses the word to refer to the fact that it is not just the object of knowledge, the
person gazed upon, which is constructed, but also the knower. Clinical medicine at the end of
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the eighteenth century set much more on visibility – on looking and seeing and on visible
symptoms (Jennifer Reinhardt 2020).
“If thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee” (Nietzsche: 1886 “Beyond
Good and Evil”).
Governmentality: Foucault originally used the term ‘governmentality’ to describe a particular
way of administering populations in modern European history with the context of the rise of the
idea of the State. He later expanded his definition to encompass the techniques and procedures
which are designed to govern the conduct of both individuals and populations at every level not
just the administrative or political level. In consideration of history and politics, measurement
can go on to deliberate the issue of governmentality (Foucault in Farrell, C. 2020).
History: Foucault’s entire philosophy assumes that human knowledge and existence are situated
and profoundly linked in history. He argues that what is most human about man is his history.
He discusses the notions of history, change and historical method at some length at various points
in his career. He uses history as a means of demonstrating that there is no such thing as historical
necessity, that things could have been and could be otherwise (Foucault 1961, 1963, 1969).
Historical a priori: This is the order underlying any given culture at any given period of history.
Foucault also uses the phrase the ‘positive unconscious of knowledge’ to refer to the same idea.
The episteme which describes scientific forms of knowledge is a subset of this (Foucault in
Farrell, C. 2020).
History and historiography: Foucault’s entire philosophy assumes that human knowledge and
existence are profoundly historical. He argues that what is most human about man is his history.
He discusses the notions of history, change and historical method at some length at various points
in his career (Foucault in Farrell, C. 2020).
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Homo economicus: In relation to the individual’s structural and functional position within the
economy (Chen 2019).
Insanity: Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results (Albert
Einstein).
Madness: The state of having a serious mental illness; extremely foolish behaviour; a state of
wild or chaotic activity. More of a historical term that developed over the last century and a half.
A value-laden term, a cultural term with prejudice undertones for the mentally ill.
Marxism: A structural theory of society...[where] social change arises out of conflict between
social classes, that is, the owners of the means of production, and the exploited working classes
(Simonton 2015: 342). There is a strong correlation between Marxism and homo economicus,
where the individual’s identity is bound by economics and the politico-cultural principles it is
structured by. Foucault is well known for his controversial statements in 1966 that “Marxism
exists in nineteenth century thought like a fish in water: that is unable to breathe anywhere else”
and that it was a mere “storm...in a children’s paddling pool” (Foucault’s The Order of Things
1966: 262). For a brief period of time after 1968 Foucault’s comments on Marxism as a form of
political activity became more favourable. He subsequently returned to his earlier views on the
historical specificity of Marxism and to criticisms of the inflated claims made by Marxists in
relation to Marxists in relation to Marx’s work. As Simonton (2015: 29) states, “Modern society
has two great classes: the industry-owning bourgeoisie and the proletariat”.
Measurement: An act that explores, validates and seeks to gain reliability for an outcome. In
this context, the significance of measurement in psychiatry aims to qualify and quantify the
validation and accountability of services. It is also a way of gauging the individual’s mental
health status and changes that treatment may or may not have instigated. In this discussion,
measurement may be related to mental health to other forms of prejudice like racism and sexism.
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Mental illness: A mental illness is a health problem that significantly affects how a person
thinks, behaves and interacts with other people. It is diagnosed according to standardised criteria.
Mental illnesses are of different types and degrees of severity. Some of the major types are:
•

anxiety

•

schizophrenia

•

schizoaffective disorder

•

bipolar mood disorder

•

personality disorder

•

eating disorders

•

depression

•

psycho-social disorder

•

post traumatic stress disorder.

Mind: the philosophic and socialised subjective entity that encompasses all functions just like
the brain. This includes rationality, thoughts and processing of the senses. The mind has a
cultural entity where it is subject to judgements of values and norms.
Othering/Us: to view or treat (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and
alien to oneself. The difference is a power dynamic between ‘us’, the economical and political
powerful, and the ‘other’, definably the disempowered, somewhat dependent on ‘us’. In the
instance of this thesis, the “othered” are the mentally ill, and “us” are those representatives of the
cultural schema that perpetuates the view of ‘Otheredness’. The ‘us’ in this case are primarily
the mental health professionals (Said 1978).
Politics: the structure which encompasses the systems, laws, culture, discourse, internal and
external power plays, influencing the actions and policies of a government or getting and keeping
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power in a government. The work or jobs of people within the political sphere are included, such
as elected officials, who are part of a government. Also, the opinions that an individual or group
has about what should be done by governments. Finally, politics is about person's political
thoughts and opinions (Merriam Webster 2020).
Positivism: Within sociology, the idea pioneered by Auguste Comte, that it is possible to observe
social life in a measurable, verifiable and scientific way to establish truth about society. This
belief gave rise to the ‘positivist’ opinion that science could build a better world (Simonton
2015: 342).
(Post)colonialism: Colonial existence which entails the taking over of the governance of the
State, whereby the citizens are subjugated and disempowered under the powerful existing
hegemony (Said 1978). The concept and process of mental illness service delivery can be likened
to colonialism (Smith 1999). (Post)colonialism implies an end to colonialism. As Aboriginal
activist Bobbi Sykes has asked “What? Post colonialism? Have they left?” (Smith 1999: 25)
Postmodernism: A perspective that denies there can be a defining “truth” about anything,
instead suggesting that a text, person or society can be deconstructed according to many different
‘truths’. By its nature, postmodern social theory rejects being defined and is difficult to define
Appignanesi,et al (2005).
Poststructuralism: Closely aligned to postmodernism, but perhaps also reactive to it by
negating the importance of all social theorising, not limiting social analysis just to multiple truths.
In reaction to exploring and negating, the nature of structuralism is known by deconstructing it.
There are no macro-universal truths, nor micro nor nano-truths. Social power play is rife, which
brings to light the nuances of the social in practice and the social in theory, if there is an actual
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difference between the two. For a short time, Foucault claimed to be a post structuralist (Foucault
in O’Farrell 2007).
Power – knowledge: One of the most important features of Foucault’s view is that mechanisms
of power produce different types of knowledge which collate information of people’s activities
and existence. The knowledge gathered in this way further reinforces exercises of power.
Foucault refutes the idea that he makes the claim ‘knowledge is power’ and says that he is
interested in studying the complex relations between power and knowledge without saying they
are the same thing (Foucault in O’Farrell 2007).
Psychiatry - a specialist form of bio-medicine. A scientific bio-medical model of the workings
of the brain. Treatment prescribed by psychiatrists tends to be bio-chemical, with inclusion of
talking therapies and allied health.
Psychologist –the psychologist works with the functioning of the mind/brain, commonly those
with psycho-social disorders. In Australia, to become a psychologist it is customary to hold a
Masters degree in a related subject to psychology. Also, a psychologist often claims to be
scientific stemming from the bio-medical model which relies heavily on behaviour change and
development through talking therapies, and in conglomeration with other allied health
professionals, for a more holistic treatment. Sometimes psychologists working closely with
psychiatrists,

other

times

they

do

not

work

so

closely.

(The

Australian

Psychological Society 2020).
Psychosis – thoughts, feelings, behaviours that distort reality.
Relationship: a connection, association, or involvement (Cambridge Dictionary 2020).
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Rigour – a term to indicate that the issues raised by the concepts of validity and reliability are
important in qualitative research. The onus is on the researcher to deal with their participants
with integrity, honesty and fairness (Liamputtong & Ezzy: 1999: 38, 43).
Queer theory: A cultural theory that challenging binary notions of sexuality and instead suggests
that sexualities are in part cultural constructs influenced by time and space (Simonton 2015: 343).
Science: The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical
explanation of phenomena (Free Dictionary 2020).
Sectioning: involuntary admission when it is likely for the individual to cause harm of self-harm
to the others because of the illness or be of mental or physical deterioration (The Australian
Human Rights Commission 1992).
Self: the evaluation by oneself of one's worth as an individual in distinction from one's
interpersonal or social roles (Simonton 2015: 343).
Silenced Manifesto: I have founded, established, created and built the concept of the Silenced
Manifesto.
Social misfit/deviant: a behaviour or type aof person deemed ‘rule breaking’ in terms of the
norms of a particular society or social group (Kleinman 1980). A social misfit is a person who
does not fit into society. There is no room for them. They do not adhere to the public values and
behaviour of the socially kept and powerful. They are rejected and not tolerated. Their behaviour
is labelled as anti-social. They are outcasts of society. It is not uncommon that people living
with a mental illness, with their anti-social behaviour are homeless – and thus rather public.
Those who do not want to have their space infiltrated by anti-social behaviour do not want to see
the mentally ill homeless person in their public. They label such people as social misfits, and
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commonly the social misfits are admitted to psychiatric wards. They are silenced and hidden by
the mental health system. Where else are they to go?
Social Structure: The social institutions and relationships that form the framework of a society
(Simonton 2015: 343).
Society: the structure and functioning that brings a group together making a meaningful group
of individuals. “Society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics” (Simonton 2015: 37).
State: Foucault argues that the State is a codification of relations of power at all level across the
social body. It is a concept which provides a “scheme of intelligibility of whole group of already
established institutions and realities”. Further, “the State is a practice not a thing”. Foucault
emphasises that the State is not the primary sources of power (Foucault 2004: 282).
Stigma: A mark of disgrace or an undesirable characteristic, physical or social, that disqualifies
an individual from being fully accepted by society. The marginalising of individuals in society,
because they evoke negative responses from others, have been attributed (Goffman 1963).
Structuralism: The idea that we must understand – such as a text, human mind or society – by
examining the elements, or pattern of relationships, in its structure (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982).
Sub-citizen: Sub-citizens, very similar to sub-humans, who do not participate fully as citizens
of the state, for example, sub-citizens do not fully contribute to society politically or
economically. The notion of sub-citizen is in relation to the state or nation.
Sub-human: Sub-humans are defined as those not granted full human status in society in that
they are deemed to lack the capacity to participate in society. They display behaviour that is
antisocial, going against what is the norm of social behaviour.
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Systems: The socio-cultural, political, economic, religious and/or environmental structures all
connected by language in some sense of the word.
Theory: Framework, or ‘lens’ through which to understand phenomena.

Us/Othering: to view or treat (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and
alien to oneself. The difference is a power dynamic between “us”, the economic and political
powerful, and the ‘other’, definably the disempowered, somewhat dependent on ‘us’. In the
instance of this thesis, the ‘othered’ are the mentally ill, and ‘us’ are those representatives of the
cultural schema that perpetuates the view of ‘otheredness’. The ‘us’ in this case are primarily
the mental health professionals (Said 1978).
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